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· Introduction
As the concept of peacekeeping continues to evolve as a pragmatic solution to
conflict resolution, another term -

peacemaking - requires equal consideration.

Peacemaking is a form of conflict resolution that focuses on establishing equal power
relationships that will be robust enough to forestall future conflict, and establishing
some means of agreeing on ethical decisions within a community that has previously
had conflict. Whereas peacekeeping is a notion that rose to importance when it became
part of the Charter provisions relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security, peacemaking is a term that is yet to reach popular appeal but nonetheless
conveys some important ideas. Whereas the term peacekeeping is used to describe a
way. of helping countries tom by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace,

1

peacemaking is a means of bringing about peace through a willful effort to prevent or
mitigate conflict rather than a passive stance that hopes to maintain the status quo.

2

This research aims to provide an overview of the primary documentation of those
political organs relating to the history, structure, and laws of international peacekeeping.
But its purpose is to show through an analysis of these laws and histories that the costs
and benefits of keeping peace in a particular region call upon peacemaking operations.
The focus of this research is southern Thailand with the idea that such a study will help
bring back the security, stability of the region and will support the reconstruction,
development and integration of the varying differences while keeping in mind some of
the contemporary challenges of globalization.
1 Meeting New Challenges, United Nations Peacekeeping, available at
http://www.un.org

2

Webster's Third New International Dictionary, G.&C. Merriam Company, Springfield, MA 1965.

1

Although throughout its long history, Thailand has undergone many significant
changes -, abolishing the system of slavery, transitioning from an absolute monarchy to a
democratic regime, neutralizing the challenge for the Communist Party of Thailand in the
early 1980s. -- these major transitions, the conduct and resolution of Thailand's external
and internal affairs, happened without a major political revolution. 3 Whether as a result
or a cause of this, the Thai people have been 'often characterized as peaceful, typically
seeking to resolve conflict through means other than extreme forms of violence.
The violent attacks in southern Thailand in 2004 are, however, an example of
serious internal conflicts that pose a great challenge to the current Thai Government. Yet
they are not conflicts that, I believe, should lead to broad, full-scale structural change but
rather imp-octant changes in laws, policies and attitudes that this thesis will hope to
explore in analyzing the various aspects of the cultural, racial, economic and ideological
conflicts.
In the first chapter, I hope to look at the history and background of those cultural
groups in conflict in Southern Thailand. In order to understand where the difficulties
stand at the present moment, it is crucial to understand how those problems are rooted in
the past. Because this region used to be prosperous and used to be the center of the old
Empire, the religious, linguistic cultural and economic landscape is distinctly different
from the rest of the country. The primarily Muslim population of Southern Thailand
inhabits a world where the vestiges of the old regime are very much alive. Part of the
challenge for modem Thai Government is to incorporate and balance the various regional
concerns with the demands of a centralized state. As an example of these old conflicts,
Pattani once paid tribute to Siam, and this gift was taken by the Siam Government as a
3

LikitTeeravakin, Political-Revolution in Thailand 2, Thammasat Press 2003 (1990)_

2

sign of respect for the law. However, Pattani did not consider the gift to be a concession
to the government's legal power but merely a gift that had no other meaning. When the
Thai Government declared that scarves (traditionally a Muslim adornment) could not be
worn, there was a great furor over the way in which the centralized government did not
respect or accommodate Muslim cultural and religious mores. This type of policy that has
been culturally insensitive to Thailand's diverse populations has contributed to the
potential for violence and this thesis hopes to explore the possibility of new policies
based on greater cultural, historical and economic understanding of this region (Pattani)
so as to analyze the problems that have occurred during and since 2004.
In the second chapter, I will explore the particular tactics and strategies of
violence that have characterized these moments of dissent. It is important: not only to
consider the forms of violence (how acts of violence were committed) but the pattern of
violence. Without scholarship on this topic, these patterns will doom Thailand to an
ongoing and unresolved internal battle that can only escalate without a reconsideration of
contemporary policy. Furthermore, there can be no attempt to resolve these violent
outbursts without first considering how those eruptions of violence are deeply rooted in
economic disparities, the historically high crime rate and the long-standing history of
d~scrimination against Muslims in this area. To attempt to resolve the violence without

considering the economic and religious context would only to looking at the symptom
without considering the disease.

This chapter will examine, therefore, the forms of

violence that erupted in 2004 and attempt to put those acts in context of the region's
troubled economic, religious and cultural climate. The Thai Government cannot have a

3

successful policy if there is only an attempt to fix the chronic problems without taking
into account where those problems came from.
Chapter Three will explore whether the violence in Southern Thailand is related to
the terrorist acts in this era or not. I will look at the application of Thai and international
laws to such acts of violence, how the Thai Government responds to these acts, and the
problems in the use of the term encountered by the United Nations.
Chapter Four will examine the question of whether Thailand's domestic laws
regarding the operation of Thai Security Forces defies international agreements of armed
conflict, humanitarian laws, and human rights law. This thesis will examine where there
are inconsistencies in order to consider ways of reconciling those differences between
Thailand's military laws and international agreements.
Chapter Five will suggest ways of resolving the problems by considering various
issues including legal battles, security issues, domestic policies, international relations,
cultural conflicts, and educational concerns. Further, the purpose of such a study is to
find the most appropriate approaches that respond to complex circumstances that
characterize this region's strife. The causes of the violent acts that have taken place in
Southern Thailand are composed of many factors and it is impossible to attempt to solve
such complex problems without consideration of these various elements. I will then look
at both long term and short term solutions.
This study is an attempt to understand the structure, nature and extent of related
public acts of violence in Thailand and the policies, laws and issues that have contributed
to the ongoing problems. It is my hope that through this research, there will be a greater

4

sense of what might be done to attain justice and peace while maintaining a faith in the
basic concept of Human Rights ..

5

~ CHAPTER I l
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1- 1 Introduction
The Kingdom of Thailand ("Thailand") is the only Southeast Asian country that
the European powers were unsuccessful in their combined and separate attempts to
4

subjugate and colonize.

Thailand is located on the Southeast Asian Peninsula, and

covers an area of 513,115 square kilometers (198,062.39 square miles). Archaeological
recently discoveries made this century support us 'logical ideas to believe that -the
northeastern regionS of Thailand was actually one of the first cradles of civilizations in
Southeast Asia. 6 The country was known as "Muang Thai" and interchangeably as
"Siam" until May 11, 1939, when its official name, "Thailand," was adopted. The word
"Thai" means "free"; thus, "Thailand" means "Land of the Free.,,7

Thailand as a

Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy with the King as a sovereign Head of State. The
Government exercises power under the law and the Constitution is based on democratic
principles (i.e., the King rules the country through the National Assembly, the Council of

Pre-History, Suvarnabhumi, Land of Gold, The Siam-Thai Millennia Book, Nation Multimedia Group 1920,2000.
[S)outhest Asia is referred to as Suvarnabhumi or the "Land of Gold: The remains of Homo Erectus found in
Java prove that this region has been occupied by humans since the Pleistocene period (two million to
~ o~,ooo. years a~~) when islands in the South China Sea including those now part of Malaysia and
~ onhesta, were Jotned to the mainland. Other evidence indicates that there were permanent settlements in
out east Asia at least 30,000 years ago.

4

5

6

Isaan region
See Pre-History, Suvarnabhumi, Land of Gold, cited in note 4 supra, at p.11.

htt H
. tstorical
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Background, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
P.WWW.mfa.go.th/web/14.php. (last visited Feb.14, 2006).

Kingdom

of

Thailand,

available

at

6

Ministers and the Courts of law
•

.

In

accordance with the provIsIOns of the Thai

) 89

ConstltutIOn .

The country comprises 76 provinces, and has a population of approximately 64
million, of which 75 percent are ethnic Thai, 14 percent Chinese, 3 percent Malay and
other ethnic minorities (such as Mons, Khmers, Karens, Kachins, and various hill tribes).
The Thais are not a "pure" race; they are descended from people of many different ethnic
backgrounds,

10

and the people of modem Thailand are as varied as those in any nation.

They are of all shapes and sizes, complexions, and statures. Their professions vary widely
-as-well: farmers and computer programmers, soldiers and bus drivers, merchants and
students, princesses and monks. But virtually all of those who would call themselves first
and foremost "Thai," would define" Thai" as primarily political. In other words, the Thai
are "Thai" because they are citizens of Thailand, subjects of the Thai monarch. The

Constitutional of Royal Kingdom of Thailand B.E.2550 (2007), the National Legislative Assembly's Version
[hereinafter Thai Constitutional B.E.2550], sec. 3
[T]he sovereign power belongs to the Thai people. The King as Head of the State shall exercise such power
through the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the Courts in accordance with the provisions of
this Constitution. The performance of duties of the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the Courts,
and the constitutional organs as well as State agencies shall be under the Rule of Law, available at
http://www.senate.go.th/pdflConstitution2007.pdf (last visited Aug.1, 2007);

8

Constitutional of Royal Kingdom of Thailand (Interim Edition) B.E.2549 (2006), the National Legislative
Assembly's Version [hereinafter Thai Constitutional B.E.2549], sec. 2
[T]he sovereign power emanates from the Thai people. The King who is Head of State exercises such power
thro~gh the National Legislative Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the Courts in conformity with the
proVisions of this Constitution, available at http://www.senate.go.th/pdf/const.pdf (last visited Nov.1, 2006);

See. also the Constitutional of Royal Kingdom of Thailand B.E.2540 (1997), Office of the Council of State,

Tha~land version [hereinafter Thai Constitutional B.E.2540j, sec. 3 [T]he sovereign power belongs to the
Thai p~ople. The King as Head of the State shall exercise such power through the National Assembly. the
Council of Ministers and the Courts in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

~avit

.K.Wyatt, The Politics of Reform In Thailand: Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn 1, Yale
UOIverslty Press 1969.

9

~he first major Thai Kingdom was founded at the town of Sukhothai

on the northen edge of the great
The political and
the ~~~ oundatlons of Su~hothai established by its great rulers, from King Ram Khamhaeng at the end of
I eenth century to King Lu Thai at the middle of the fourteenth.

~~tra: :Iain Of. the Chaophraya River system, in the first quarter of the thirteenth century.
10

See Pre-History, Suvarnabhumi, Land of Gold, cited in note 4 supra, at p.11.

7

social, cultural and linguistic components of Thai identity each has its own rich history
and although such an analysis goes well beyond the scope of this study, what is important
to keep in mind is that the Thai people share a common linguistic and cultural identity
that historically has become differentiated into a large number of separate but related
'dentitles.
.'

I

11

The Thai Constitution recognizes the right of the people to enjoy freedom of
religion. Thus, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and other faiths are represented
throughout the Kingdom. Buddhism is the official main religion and can be considered
the national religion of Thailand (roughly 94.6 percent of the populations are Buddhists).
4 percent of the population is Muslim, the second most popular faith, which is
concentrated in the southern part of the country and constitutes a strong majority there.
Finally 0.7 percent are Christian, and 0.1 percent embrace other faiths. 12
Over many centuries "Thai," as term that denotes both a civilization and a marker
of cultural identity, has evolved out of the ongoing interaction between Tai
indigenous and immigrant cultures.

14

13

and

The Thai people have lived with generally peaceful

relations within the varying cultures and politics without great political turmoil or
irreconcilable ethical dilemmas.

11

0

'd
aVI K. Wyatt, Thailand A Short History (2 nd edition), University Press 2003.

12

htt ~oPulation and Housing Cencus 2000, National Statistial Office Available at
p.lweb.nso.go.th/pop2000ftables htm, (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
13

A term used to denote the various Tai peoples in general.
14

See D. K. Wyatt cited in Note 11 supra ..

8

Since 2004, Thailand has encountered sporadic bursts of internal violence in the
southern part of the country. The South includes the provinces of Pattani, Yala, 15
Naratiwat,16 and Songkhla l7 where violent activities have caused the death toll to top
3,000 in recent years. The attacks generally have occurred without warning, and are often
vicious and indiscriminate. The victims have included civilians, monks, and ethnic Thai
and Muslim government officials. On January 4, 2004, a group of Islamic militants stole
a cache of weapons and killed four soldiers in Narathiwat. On April ?8, 2004, the Thai
army captured more than one hundred of the suspected terrorists at Krue Se mosque in
Pattani. On October 25, 2004, after a protest turned violent, hundreds of protestors were
arrested, and approximately eighty died after being crammed into army trucks. Even now
the newspapers continue to report killings on a daily basis. The Government's efforts to·
enhance security by placing four provinces--Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Songkhla-under martiallaw l8 has resulted in further unending chaos.
The Government is not only concerned about the terrorist movement, but also
keeps a wary eye on the separatist movement. Although separatism and terrorism might
seem related in that terrorist activities perpetrated by individuals who desire to forge a
separate state, historical accounts show no actual or necessary connection between the
15

.

Yala proVinces is the southernmost province of Thailand. It has an area of 4,521 square kilometers
(1745.1. square miles )and is 1,083 kilometers (672.97 miles) from Bangkok. Its border is connected to
MalaYSIa (Perak and Kedah State) but it used to be part of Pattani Region.
16

Na.rathiwat province which borders on Malaysia is the southemmost province of Thailand.

In fact

Na~athlwat province was part of the Pattani Region until the Government made it a separate province in the

period of King Rama V.
17

S Songkhla province is a border province in southern Thailand, adjoining the State of Kedah in Malaysia.
~Ing)khfla covers an area of 7,393.9 square kilometers ( 2854 square miles). It is 950 kilometers (~9().32
ml es rom Bangkok.
.
16
Th
Situ ~~ law was superseded by the Thai Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency
a 10~, B.E.2548(2005).

9

separatist movement and international terrorism. Recent events, however, like the arrest
of Riduan Isamuddin, an Indonesian who goes by the alias, Hambali, could force the
Government to re-consider whether there might be an international or transboundary
connection. Isamuddin was suspected of being the operations chief for Jemaah Islamiah
(JI), a group allegedly linked to Al Qaeda and blamed for the recent Bali bombing and

. other attacks. Isamuddin was captured in the ancient temple city of Ayutthaya on August
11, 2003 during a raid on an apartment building after a tip-off by an unnamed

Government agent.

19

This dissertation will analyze the political and cultural issues involved and
propose a peaceful resolution to the problems that have been ongoing in Southern
Thailand. As ethical and religious conflicts are pressing contemporary issues, I will
discuss these problems by first contextualizing them and situating the challenges in this
region within the historical background. The purpose of such a study is to find the most
. appropriate laws that respond to complex circumstances that characterize this region's
strife. Additionally, I will analyze the other factors in conjunction with particular
incidents to find the best approach to workable legal, social solutions and policies. In
other words, my purpose is to find the most appropriate domestic, international law and
military operations for a set of complex circumstances in other chapters. The following
section introduces the province of Pattani and its history.

19

htt ."Terror
suspect
Hambali
quizzed
BBC
NEWS
(Aug 15
p. news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/asia-paciftc/3152755.~tm. (last visited Feb. 14,2006)'.

2003)

available

at

10

1-2 Pattani
A.

Introduction
Pattani (or "Patani" in the Malay spelling) is a small province that is located on

the east coast of Thailand. It has been know as an autonomous region for hundreds of
years. Pattani, with an area of 1,377 square kilometers (532.52 square miles), is
approximately 1,055 kilometers (655.57 miles) from Bangkok. Many millennia ago,
Pattani as an Empire included part of present-day Yala and Narathiwat provinces, which
had long been dissociated from Pattani to become autonomous provinces in their own
right. Pattani has a rich and diverse culture, its own indigenous regional customs, and is
known for extensive golden ~eaches along its portion of the Gulf in Southern Thailand.
Pattani region also has considerable natural resources such as rubber, coconuts
and sea fauna; much of the marine fauna is used as food. However, despite its ideal
location and cultural success, violence has been an ongoing problem in Pattani for as long
20

as 500 years. In fact, Pattani unsuccessfully revolted several times against Ayutthaya
and Bangkok under the modern Thai Rattanakosin Kingdom.

21

To understand how and

why Pattani has become the focus of conflict, and to resolve such problems, one must
take into account the history and perspectives of the southern region, its cultural
evolution, and be mindful of events and personalities from the past. We shall now tum to
this task, beginning with the history of Pattani. Time constraint implies that an in-depth

:f

~e ~~ngdOm of Ayutth~ya was officially founded in 1350 by King Ramathibodi (u----l=Aong). The Kingdom
pow!~' a;:~' whose. capital was also called "Ayutthaya", expatlded its territory and became the dominant
.

In sla. The Kingdom of Ayutthaya had existed for 417 years until it was sacked by Burmese in 1767.

Rattanakosin
.
.
'
was
found d Kingd
.
o~ was estabhshed
by King
Rama
I In 1782, founder of the Chakn. Dynasty. Bangkok
nine Thai~' as Its capital a~d remains the capital city of Thailand today. The Chakri dynasty has crowned
Ings, who have reigned without interruption for over 200 years.

21

11

study of history would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. I shall, therefore, provide
a brief outline and references for anyone desiring to pursue a more thorough historical
study of Pattani.

Historical Perspectives

B.

The history of the Pattani region is related respectively to the circumstances of
indigenous Malays in the Southern Peninsula and the Empire of Lankasuka. The
Kingdom of Pattani was founded in the early second century A.D. Legend has it that
Pattani probably rivaled Kedah as being the oldest ethnic Malay States on the
Peninsula. 22 Historical documents show varying descriptions 'of Pattani, many of which
seem appropriate to reproduce in extracts below.

1. The Arab Account:
....

Lankasuka was located on some latitude intermediate between
Kelantan and Singora. The position of Lankasuka most nearly
consonant with the exigencies is the vicinity of Patani.

23

22

The end of Lank
k th .
http://www
s b' .asu a, e nse and fall of Malay Kingdom at Patani, available at
,

. a nzalO.demon.co.uklmalaya/kedah3:ntm. (last visited Mar. 14, 2006).

23

. Paul Wheatley Th G I
befOre A.D.1500 258e U ~ den. Khersonese studies in the Historical Geography of the Malay Peninsula
..
' nlverslty of Malaya Press 1966 (1961).

12

2. The Chinese Map:
Lankasuka (Lang hsi chia) is placed uncomprisingly to the south
of Songkla (Singora). Its southern boundary appears to be a
river with the name (in Amoy Hokkien) of Kun-ha-ti.

It is

difficult to suggest any modern place - name corresponding to
this, but is clearly in the position of the Patani River. N

3. The Chinese Record:
Langkasuka ... was well known in China as a religious centre,
and in the later seventh century several Buddhist monks
specifically made voyages there ..... these small states could
conduct

diplomatic

affairs

with

the

aplomb

of their

neighbor ... By the ~ixth century Lankasuka in the Patani region
was sending envoys to the Chinese Emperor.

25

4. Malay Folklore:
Langkasuka has passed into Malay folklore as a west- coast
kingdom the predecessor of modern Kedah, though the evident
association of it~ rulers with Patani beyond and the hills and
forest may not be without significance.

24

26

Ibid.

25

Barbara Watson Andaya &-Bonar
L
d Y .Andaya, A History
.
. 21, Macmillan
.
. Ltd.
1987(1982).
of Malaysia
Education
26

See P. Wheatley, cited in note 23 supra, at p.262

13

5. The Tltai Alphabetical Order, tire Royal Institute, the Royal
Academy stated:
... the position of Lankasuka and Pattani were located at the
same latitude ...

27

. Dr. Paul Wheatlel 8 believed that Lankasuka was an important Kingdom during
the fifteen century and was situated in the vicnity of modem Pattani.

29

Meanwhile, the

history of Pattani indicates that Pattani was settled during the Empire of Langkasuka in
the seventh century. This is similar to the Chinese report.

30

The historical evidence found

in anvient documents is supported by archeological surveys of limestone hill formations
from Tham Din Cavern, which provide evidence substantiating a history of Pattani dating
.back three and a half millennia.

27

31

Anand Wattananikorn, History of Lankasuka and Pattani 13, Mitr - Siam 1988.

2B C'I ed'In note 23, supra.
t
([he] author was a specialist on comparative urbanism and historical urban geography and long-time
profess?r and chairman of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago. Or.Paul Wheatley
sef':'ed In the Royal Air Force during World War II. He was best known for his works on Asia, which explored
soel~1 rela~ions and developments related to ecological settings and comparative urbanism. An early work
published I~ 1961, The Golden Khersonese, focused on historical, social, and ecological development in the
Malay Pemnsula and drew heavily on primary source materials in Latin Greek Chinese Arabic and South
and
S ou th ea~t AsIan
.
'
, was also
' submitted
,
d
languages. The first draft of this work on Southeast
Asia
as his
oetoral thesIs at the University of London, awarded in 1958.

29

~ee P. Wheatley, cited in note 23 supra, at p. 265.

30

Ibid. at p. 263.

31

The archaeotogical
Universit
Patt.
stu d'les. .In South Thailand, a Fulbright-sponsored project at the Prince of Songkhla
afl~ surveyed In the areas near Pattani on the coast, investigation of the Yarang ancient
religious y,
http:/wwwcomPlex Inland on the coastal plain, and an intensive field survey of an interior region, available at
.uoregon.edu/-wsayresrrhaiiand.html(last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
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The first settlement of people to inhabit the Malay Peninsula was of a primitive
tribe after which came the Hindus from India and those who migrated from Siam; these
groupS were followed by the indigenous Malay ethnic group.33 Ethnographers and
archeologists, respectively, stated that the Thai and Malay races originated from the same
racial stock and geographical area. 34 In other words, the people ofPattani were aboriginal
Malay and were indistinguishable from the ethnic Thai group.35

c.

The Prosperity and Decline of Pattani

1. The beginning of Pattani
After the Empire of Langkasuka collapsed, leaving only a legendary name to
peasant mythology,36 archaeological evidence suggests that Pattani continued to thrive.
Though there is no clear and precise evidence about the origins of Pattani, 37 certain
references can be found on record:

32 See Pre-History, Suvarnabhumi, Land of Gold, cited in note 4 supra, at p.1 p.
{M]any tales in the Jatika(including "Mahajanaka" recently rewritten in Thai and English by HM King) tell of
voy~ges made Suvarnabhumi which is described as a prosperous land with which people form many races
aspired to trade.

~3 Ibrahi~ S.yukri, History of The Malay Kingdom of Patani: Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu 4, (Conner Baailey &
John N.MlksIC., trans., Silkworm Books Publisher 2005) (1985).
34

See P. Wheatley, cited in note 23 supra, at p. 265.

M S·
n Nuryanti, The landscape of Intellectuals' Thought: Pattani Identity and the Emergence of a Resistance
R~:ment <?enter for Political and regional Studies(L1PI), Indonesia 130, The Asian Face of Globalization,
nstructmg Identities, Institutions and Resources, the Paper of 2001 API Fellows.
35

36

See P. Wheatley, cited in note 23 supra, at p. 265.

H.
.IStOry of Pattani, Pattani Province,
available at http://~.pattani.go.th/(last visited Feb. 14,2006).
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the people of Pattani are able to eat a hundred kind offruits and
many kinds of meat such as beef, mutton, goose, duck, chicken,
capon, peacock, deer, mouse deer and birds.38

Known not only for the richness of its natural resources, Pattani also became an
important center of trade. It also had a well-known port, which was part of the general
trading system with Brunei, Cambodia, China, Holland, England, Indonesia, Java, Malay,
portugal, Siam, and Sumatra. 39 Items of trade included pepper, gold, textiles, and various
foodstuffs. Pattani functioned to circumvent Portuguese Malacca's predominant
commercial influence by serving as an international port from which pepper could be
acquired from its neighbors for trade with Chinese merchants in exchange for luxury
textiles and porcelain. 4o Historians also believed that within· Southeast Asia, Pattani
eventually became a more important trade center than Ayutthaya. 41 The chart on the
following page shows the reigning monarchs and queens of Pattani.
2. Kings and Queens of Pattani
It is believed that Pattani was one of the oldest kingdoms on the Malay Peninsula.

For centuries Pattani existed as an independent Kingdom. The chart below shows that
R'
aJa S'
n Wangsa42 was the first ruler. Thereafter, a number of his descendants ascended

to the Pattani throne.

38

See I. Syukri, cited in note 33 supra, at p. 32.
39A.leeuw & D.KWyatt, HIKAYAT PATANI THE STORY OF PATANI19, Konninklijk Instituut 1970.
40

Ibid.at p.7.

41

See I. Syukri, cited in note 33 supra, at p. 32.
42

See at the chart of Pattani Rajas.
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The Chart of Pattani's Rajas
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As mentioned above, Pattani also enjoyed its greatest prosperity during the reigns
of the Queens43 and became well-known in countries in Asia as well as in Europe. The
golden age of the Kingdom was during the regimes of its four queens: known as Raja
Hijau (The Green Queen), Raja Biru (The Blue Queen), Raja Ungu (The Purple Queen)
and Raja Kuning (The Yellow Queen).44 After Raja Kuning died, there were no other
decendants of Raja Sri Wangsa in line for the throne. Thereafter, Pattani was ruled by
Raja of Kelantan, Kampung Dawai and Sultan. The commerce ofPattani began to decline
after the rule of the Kelantan Raja.

D.

Beliefs and Religions
According to Islam, each person has his or her own identity. Each has individual

practices, rituals and systems of ethics that regulate behavior, and stress harmony and
ol)edience to Allah, the central deity. Further, Islam has promoted advancement in several
branches of science and medicine.45

Thus, Islam has been in practice in Southern

Thailand for a long time, and it has thereby established a lifestyle that has brought about
the harmonious binding of relationships among Muslims.
Since the first century A.D., Hinduism played a vital role in the
mundane and ecclesiastical affairs of the coastal kingdoms,
namely, Langkasuka, Ganga Negara, and to some extent Me/aka.
The Hindu-Malay rulers observed the same doctrines as
43

44

See I. Syukri, cited in note 33 supra, at p. 52.
Ibid.

45

htt ~~monti H?~sain, Islam behind the Stereotypes, available at
p. WWW.rehgloustoleralice.org/hossain_01.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2006).
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preached in the Indian heartland. Following the spread of
Buddhism in India and the activities of its traveling monks, the
scenario in Malaya changed accordingly. Many rulers adopted
the new faith, and the masses followed suit. For a thousand
years, these two religions had a popular following at all levels of
society. Hindu temples and Buddhist pagodas flourished across
the land. Their influences have left permanent marks on the local
language and custom. In the thirteenth century, when Arab and
Indian Gujerati traders brought Islam to the region, among the
Hindu-Malay aristocracy of the time, -the first ruler to officially
accept Islam was Parameswara, the Raja of Melaka, who upon
conversion changed his name to Megat Iskandar Shah. From
Melaka, Islam' spread to other districts of the Malay Peninsula
and to the Malay states in Sumatra and along the trade routes
throughout the Indonesian archipelago.

-16

Islam began a rapid expansion into the Domain of the Malay Peninsula, causing
many of the imperial rulers to change their religious beliefs. During this period, Islam
took root in Pattani during the reign of Raja Intera. For the edification of the royal family
and other people of importance, studies of Islamic law were conducted in the royal
palace. After that, the Islamic religion began to spread beyond the royal palace and
among the common people. It was only a matter of a few years before nearly all the
people of Pattani had embraced this new religion. Meanwhile, as the people of Pattani
began to give it less attention, the Hindu religion began a gradual decline. Buddhist

H'IS1to4ry of Malaysia, Embassy of Malaysia in Soul, available at www.malaysia.or.krlhistory.htm(lastvisited
Ma r. ,2006).
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idols, temples and other places of worship eventually succumbed to complete disrepair,
or were intentionally destroyed.

47

After Pattani had completely converted its inhabitants

to Islam, many Mosques were established. These edifices were symbolically intended for
the performance of religious activities while strengthening the belief in Allah:
Currently, eighty-eight percent of the popUlation of southern Thailand are
Muslims. This constitutes 4.6 percent of all Thais.48 Although Muslims are a minority
group of the country, the majority group of people in Pattani and the three provinces of
southern Thailand are Muslims.
As the Muslims have always been part of the historical and political scenery of
Siam, in the long-established period, their role was extremely significant and varies.

Th~

region communities differed widely in many customs from Siam, nonetheless they were
easily accommodated by the traditional systems. Muslims were able to settle, develop
and share their role within the Thai polity despite their cultural, ethnic, and religious
differences. The reform of the Thailand introduced factors that were not present in the
previous period. But even then, relations between the Muslim and the majority Buddhists
were still generally amicable and subtle. There is something in the nature and culture of
Thai society that seems to make Buddhists reasonably broadminded of others who are
different from them in terms of beliefs, origins, or outlooks, as long as Buddhism is not
politicized. There have been few cases of interpersonal conflicts or interreligious rivalry.
Throughout the centuries-old association with the Thai Buddhist polity, the Muslims in
Thailand, nearly have never experienced any mass persecution of systematic

47

See I. Syukri, cited in note 33 supra, at p. 22.
48

. See National Statistical Office, cited in note 12 supra.
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discrimination. 49 Consequently, it is probable that the Muslim minorities in Thailand are
more preponderant in the four southern provinces. Throughout many decades of cultural
growth and creation in Pattani, the overall cultural and religious settings become a unique
society. Islam has been widely practiced throughout the South of Thailand and was
considered by many to result from an original Thai Muslims culture. It seems apparent
that Islam has been rapidly absorbed into the region's culture.

E. The Expanding Kingdom of Siam
The Thai "Palatine Law" (Kod Monthianban), which King Ramathibodi
Borommatrailokkanat promulgated in 1448-1488 states:

... Altogether, twenty towns send gold and silver flowers to the
King: Nakhon Luand, Sri Sattanakkhanahut, Chieng Mai, Tong
U, Chiang Krai, Chiang Kran, Chiang San, Chiang Tung,

Chiang Rai, Hsenwi, Khemmarat, Phra, Nan, Tai Thong,
Khotrabong, and Reo Kaeo, these sixteen in the north; and, in

the south Ujong Tahah, Malacca, Malayu, and Varavari four
towns; altogether twenty towns which send the gold and silver
fl owers ...

50

49

C:attan1a Sugunasil . Dynamic Diversity in Southern Thailand Prince of Songkla University, Pattani
pus 5, Silkworm Books 2005.
'

soD .

aVId K.Wyatt, Studies in Thai History 83, C.S.Printing House 2004 (1994).
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The ideas following the foundation of Ayutthaya Kingdom modeled after Hindu
Kings or Godly Kings based on the epic of Ramang are not too dissimilar to those
inspired by the imperialistic ambitions of Great Britain, French, China, and Japan. The
objective of Ayutthaya was to create an empire by dominating its less powerful neighbor
nations.
According to the Ligor Choronicle or Nakhon Si Thammarat, 5 1 Ayutthaya
Kingdom began to extend southwards to annex the area of Malay-speaking peoples. The
two lords from Phetburi who were the descendants of the Phetburi royal family were
responsible for appointing Malays to supervise the Malay lands under Ayutthaya control
such as Pahang, Kelantan, Pattani and Kedah. Ligor known as Nakhon Si Thammarat

.

became the major Thai center in the south through which Aytltthaya was able to
supervise its Malay vassals. In the early sixteenth century each province, including
Terengganu (formerly spelled Trengganu), was required to send 600 grams of gold as
tribute. The two Ligor officials supervised the collections. 52
In the seventeenth century, the bunga mas S3 was sent from Kedah and Pattani to

the Thai Prince. In the Malay view, the Kedah ruler claimed that the bunga mas
demonstrated a gift of friendship and alliance, and not to confirm, or accept a vassal

51

ThN~khon Si Thammarat province, originally known as Ligor, is the second largest province in the South of
alla~d. It was predominantly Buddhist during the Srivijaya Empire Period. Nakorn Si Thammarat
(~~es .an area of 9,942 square kilometers (3837.61 square miles) and approximately is 780 kilometers
h' t '. mlle~) from Bangkok. The exactly founding date of Nakhon Si Thammarat is unknown. From the
~s o~cal eVidence, the ~ity flourished for 1,800 years and was a trading center since the first century. The
Ki~gdom of. Nakhon .SI Thammarat remained semi-independent until finally surrendering to the Thai
9 om dunng the reign of King Taksin.
52

See B. W. Andaya & L Y. Andaya, cited in note 25 supra, at p. 62.
53

St~!~e:owithdflower~ and leaves made of gold which the Ayutthaya Kingdom required its vassal
sen as tnbute.
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status. Ayutthaya, nonetheless, saw the dispatch of the bunga mas as Malay recognition
.

of its authonty over

MI

a ay.

54

The period from 1549 to 1563 was historically significant; during the reign of
King Mahachakrapat, a massive attack from Burma (Myanmar) was launched against the
Kingdom of Ayutthaya. Phraya55 Tani Sri Sultan (Sultan Muzafar Shah) carne to assist
Ayutthaya with two hundred warships, one thousand soldiers and one hundre~ women as
a combined force. However, when the Sultan saw that the Burmese had surrounded the
citadel of Ayutthaya and that the troops of Ayutthaya appeared to be losing, the Sultan
switched alliances and attacked the Ayutthaya Royal Palace, killing many of Ayutthaya's
soldiers.

Eventually, His Majesty King Mahachakrapat succeeded in driving off the

Burmese troops and re-gathered his forces. King Mahachakrapat then counter-attacked
the forces of Phraya Tani Sri Sultan and defeated them. The Sultan died during that
campaign from uncertain causes but was not buried in Pattani.

56

Between 1688 to 1702, during the reign of King Phrapethraja, Pattani declared its
full independence from its earlier status of semi-independence under the rule of
Ayutthaya.

Afterward, in 1767, when Ayutthaya w3.!' defeated by Burma and the

Kingdom was completely destroyed, all rajas who ruled the various territories subject to
Siam at that time desired to be independent and freed themselves from subservience to
the Kingdom of Ayutthaya. 57

54

55
56

57

Ibid .at p.66.

A non hereditary title conferred by the King.
See I. Syukri, cited in note 33 supra, at p.27
Ibid. at p. 52.
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It took seven months for Phraya Taksin to drive off the Burmese and to settle in

the neW capital of Thonburi. After he became King of Siam, he led an army to all
territories under the control of Siam to defeat the minor rajas who had strongly advocated
independence from Siam. In a short time, all the minor rajas, including Pattani (Sultan
Mahmud Reign), had again surrendered to King Taksin.
After the end of the reign of King Taksin, King Rama I rose to establish the
Chakri Dynasty in 1782 (the Rattanakosin Period). Since. the country had endured a long
war, King Rama I began to reunite the country. At the beginning of the Chakri Dynasty,
the attempt to regain the control of the Malay Peninsula was a complete success. The
reunion included Pattani, Kedah, Kelantan, Pedis and Terengganu.
From that time on, Pattani was ruled by the dynasty of Kalantan that had been
appointed by the King of Siam. 58 On account of the massive resistance demonstrated in
Pattani and other areas of Siam, a new strategy to restrict power was implemented during
the reign of King Rama II; it was a strategy of "divide and conquer." Pattani was,
therefore, divided into the seven following districts:
1.

Pattani

2.

Yaring

3.

Saiburi

4.

Nongchik

5.

Ra-ngae

6.

Reman

7.

Yala

58

Ibid. at p. 72.
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Each district still retained its own raja who was supervised and controlled by
Siam. After the fonnal enthronement of King Rama V in 1873, His Majesty announced
the reforms of all infrastructures in Siam such as the judiciary, the Treasury, and the
political structure. 59

This was a time of large-scale refonn and initiate fundamental

change of all structures within the country.60 The organization of the southern part of the
Kingdom included the four following regions (Monthon):
1.

Monthon Phuket .

2.

Monthon Chumpom

3.

Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat

4.

Monthon Saiburi

59

Arthorn

Chanta~imol,

History of the Land, Thailand 280, Auxsomthai 1995(1993).

See DKWyatt, cited in note 50 supra, at p. 273 and 278.
[T]he reform decree that followed, through the rest of 1873 and all of 1874, began more substantial
institutional change and attacked directly the existing state of public affairs. Along four separate
approaches, they undermined the strength of the semi-independent, oligarchic nobility. First, by announcing
the progressive abolition of hereditary slavery and by severely restricting the conditions under which the
nobility could hold debt bondservants, the King undertook to free tbe ordinary Thai farmer from traditional
constraints on his political and economic life-an action which struck against the chief source of the nobility's
wealth, which was their control over manpower. Second, he established special law courts to clear the
~normous backlog of litigation in Bangkok and its concomitant- delays, which oppressed all the litigants
In.volved and profited the nobleman and petty officers who controlled the myriad jurisdictions of the
Kingdom's legal system. Third, he worked to build up the financial resources available to the central
g?vernment, at the expense of numerous private pockets, by attempting to centralize collection and
dl~bursement records, by standardizing rates of taxation, by ordering that tax collections farmed out to
p~lvate individuals be let by public auction, and by establishing a central audit office (in which the King
himself, with the assistance of his teenager brother, pored over ledgers and receipts). Fourth, and finally, he
moved to consolidate his own political support against the men left in office by his father by establishing two
~dvlsory councils to consider public legislation and policy, the Council of State and the Privy Council. His
Intention in this respect was to bring older, more conservative officials into a larger body where they could be
outvoted or influenced by his young friends and loyal supporters.
60

Ibid. at p.282

~PlrO~incial

administration was brought under centralized direction and control and serviced by specialized

~nc~l~nal ministries staffed by competent specialists. Modern law-codes were drafted and put into force by
~ mlnl~trators, judges, and lawyers. Fiscal administration was centralized and modern accounting,

A~getlOg, and auditing procedures introduced. Railways and telegraphic communications were constructed.
rOad
IllTt
range of educational institutions was founded to serve all the varied needs of the state, and modern
II ary and naval forces were created.

25

The seven districts of Pattani were combined with Monthon Nakhon Si
Thammarat and each of the Monthon was ruled by royal commissioners instead of Rajas.
This reform impacted Pattani. When Muslims are governed by Buddhists, they might feel
that they are being ruled by "foreigners." Siam respects the unique cultural, historical
Buddhist and linguistic heritage of ethnic Thais, and the administration of the Siamese
Government control over its territory by a central bureaucracy.61 Such refonn br~ught
great dissatisfaction to Phraya Vichitpakdi (Tongku Abdulkadir Kamaralladin), which led
to the failed rebellions against the Siamese Government. Phraya Vichitpakdi was sent
into confinement in Phitsanulok for nine months. After his release, he returned to Pattani;
however,

th~

central government had undergone a great many changes because of the

reform initiated by Siam. Consequently, Phraya Vichitpakdi moved to Kalantan where
he died. Even during the reign of King Chulalongkorn, which sought the abolition of the
Pattani Sultanate, such historical tolerance was not entirely injeopardy. His Majesty's
intention was to develop the country, by modernizing its outlook and creating a secular,
polyglot of various cultures on equal footing within the whole of the country. The King
once stated that he hoped to eventually to achieve a situation where" even though
[certain citizens] are Malay and have a different faith ... [t]hey are Thai in sentiment and
outlook as any other Thai ... " For example, the King donated a piece of land to build the
new mosque "Unsorrizzunna" in Bangkok Noi and offered asylum to many Muslim
peoples in Bangkok. There is a long tradition in which many Muslim people have

;-----------------

c Aurel Croissant, Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 2 (Feb.2005): Unrest in South Thailand:

Contours,

h:~ses, and Consequences Since 2001, NPS Department of National Security Affairs, available at
P.IIWWW.ccc.nps.navy.millsiI2005/Feb/croissantfeb05.asp (last visite.d Apr. 13,2006).
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become extremely wealthy such as Sakul62 Na Na, Sakul Boonnak and others. Resulting
to this reform, the seven districts of Pattani were reorganized and separated from
Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat to become Monthon Pattani and remains a simple
separate province until this day.
During the age of the British Empire, from 1867 until 1946, the Malay States
were British Crown colonies. The British established their first strait settlement on the
Malay Peninsula in 1786. During the following century the annexation of the key ports
of Penang and Singapore led to the main region of Southern Peninsula being brought
under British control.

63

During this period, the influence of the colonial era expanded over the entire
region of South East Asia, Siam had to struggle hard to maintain its territorial integrity
and political "independence." Siam had its own methods of achieving its objectives. A
treaty was entered into between the King of Siam and Great Britain on June 20, 1826, to
engage in friendship, cooperation, and as well as to acknowledge Siam's sovereignty over
Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu. Another objective was to guarantee Britain's
right to Kelantan and Terengganu.
Siam could not, however, withstand the power of Britain. Therefore, on March
10, 1909, Siam signed another Agreement with Britain to cancel the Convention of April
6, 1897. The agreement concerned the Non-Alienation of Certain Districts of the Malay
Peninsula, which delimited the boundary as follows:

62

Thai Last Name

63

M·
Ichael Lynch, the British Empire 5, Book Print ltd 2005.
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Commencing from the most seaward point of the northern bank
of the estuary of the Ferlis River and thence north to the range of
hills which is the watershed between the Perlis River on one side
and the Pujok River on the other; then following the watershed
formed by the said range of hills until it reaches the main
watershed or dividing line between those rivers which flow into
the Gulf of Siam on the one side and into the Indian Ocean on
the other; following this main watershed so as to pass the
sources of the Sungei Patani (S. Patfani). Sungei Telubin
(Khlong Sai Buri). and Sunge Perak. to the point which is the
source of the Sungei Pergau; then leaving the main watershed
and going along the watershed separating the waters of the
Sungei Pergau from the Sungei Telubin. to the hill called Bukit
Jeli (Buket Yeli) or the source of the main stream of the Sungei
Golok to the sea at a place called Kuala Tabar.

This line would leave the valleys of the Sungei Patani, Sungei Telubin, and
Sungei Tanjung Mas (Tanjong Mat), and the valley on the left, or west bank, of the
Golok to Siam, and the whole valley of the Perak River and the valley on the right, or
east bank, of the Golok to Britain.
In addition to the Agreement of 1909 between Britain and Siam repealing the
Convention of April 6, 1897 (the Non- Alienation of Certain Districts of the Malay
Peninsula), the London Treaty was signed on July 14, 1925 with ratifications exchanged
in London on March 30, 1926. Article 5 stated as follows:
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Any treaty inforce at the time of the signature ofthe present
treaty, which fIXes or delimits the boundary between Siam and
British possessions or protectorates shall remain in jorce.

64

As a result of the 1909 Bangkok Treaty and the 1925 London Treaty was the
boundary established between Siam and Malaysia. This settled the question of the
boundary and Pattani, Narathiwat, Songkla, Satun and Yala have remained under Siam
until this day.

F.

Reform of the War-Time Siamese Government: Industrialist and

Nationalist Movements
In 1942, the ultimate goal of Field Marshall Phibul Songkhram65 was to
completely transfonn Thailand66 into a larger and more homogenous nation state. 67 To
create this new national identity, it was necessary to go beyond the scope of the current
regulations, or any religious belief or cultural practices. Therefore, Songkhram attempted
to achieve his aims by promulgating the "Rataniyom policy," and unavoidably, such

~~ntemational Boundary Study nO.57 -

November 15 , 1965, Malaysia - Thai Boundary, The Geographer,
h ~ of the Geograph~r, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, available at
ltp.lIwww.laW.fsu.edu/hbrary/COliection/LimitsinSeas/IBS057.Pdf (last visited Mar. 14,2006).
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A Prime Minister of Thailand from 1938 to 1944 and 1948 to 1957.
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Siam became known as "Thailand" in A.D .1939.
67

[qn~~1. SY~kri, cited in note 33

supra, at p.87

Walth 0 ~Sla~ese cultural institute was established in Bangkok and was known by the name of "Sapha

CUltur:~t

an, the goal of which was the advancement of nationalism and the expansion of Siamese
roughout the country.
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transformation impacted the lives of Muslims of the South. The chief features of the
Rataniyom policy towards Islam are summarized in the following twelve statements:

68

Statement 1: The official proclamation of the name of the country, civilians, and

•

nationality

•

Statement 2: The protection of the country from damages

•

Statement 3: The requirement of Thai citizens to acquire a Thai name

•

Statement 4: The respect of Thailand's national flag, Thailand's national song and

the King's anthem each morning or on special occasions in every town and village

•

Statement 5: The campaign of Thai people to consume Thai Products

•

Statement 6: The lyrics of the King of Thailand's national anthem

•

Statement 7: The campaign to build up the country

•

Statement 8: The King's anthem

•

Statement 9: The requirement that every Thai must learn the Thai language

•

Statement 10: The requirement that Thai citizens must dress in Western European

style

•

Statement 11: The activities of the Thai people

•

Statement 12: The aid and protection of young people, seniors and disable persons
Certainly, at least four of the statements seem antagonistic to Muslim culture.

Statement 3 requires every person to have a Thai name although they may already have a

-

~Th--~--------------

amsuk Numnond, Thailand in the period of World War II 61, Winyuchon Publisher 2004.

30

Muslim name. Statement 9 requires the study of the Thai language and prohibits the use
of Malay language, and requires Malay children to pray to Buddhist idols even though
they have the right and freedom to select their own religion, as guaranteed by the Thai
constitution. Statement 10 prohibits the wearing of Malay clothing. It also requires both
men and woman to wear hats. Statement 11 addresses daily activities of Thai citizens.
These statements are too inflexible to be compatible with Muslim traditions as Islam
prescribes certain activities for everyday life.
Unquestionably the campaign to harmonize traditions under the country's
"Rataniyom policy" has caused much widespread resentment and resistance among
Muslims. The policies of Phibul Songkhram administration significantly contributed to
the occurrence of the violence in southern region, which's religious and cultural has been
very sensitive.

The use of policy by the central government and the Thai authorities

made ordinary Muslim depressing and uncomfortable.

Therefore, processing and

carrying out this policy has been very difficult for the Thai authorities in the southern
provinces.

Although this policy was not successful in forcing Muslims to accept

B.uddhism, the government's attempt to push new ideas into Muslim faith, without first
trying to comprehend the role of Islam in their daily life, has led to serious tension. The
thought of losing their religion, being subjected to forced assimilation, and being asked to
abandon large amounts of their indigenous culture, forced many Muslims to consider
immigrating to Malaysia. Muslims began condemning the government's policy rather
than accepting it. The growth of the religious conflict expanded to a large scale. Haji
Sulong Tokmina, a Pattani Leader who did not accept and respect the Rataniyom policy,
began a widespread dissident movement that proclaimed a Muslim separatist movement
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from Thailand. This led to the deaths of many people and Haji Sulong Tokmina was
arrested.
As the result of the Rataniyom policy, it is probable that such a policy would cause
severe opposition having a religious fervor. The strong spirit of Islam among those early
Muslims, who had feared the loss oftheir culture and being totally assimilated into the
Thai way ofthinking, made them become extremely distrustful of the Thai Government.
The Muslims who had most strongly resisted the Rataniyom policy immigrated to Malay.
We have learned from the Rataniyom policy that the Government completely
failed. Muslims stubbornly resisted being assimilated into Thai traditions and culture, and
refused to be fully integrated into the Thai society.

I - 3 Conclusion
This section started with a study of the history. In addition to showing important
cultural and religious trends, I have also tried to add a human aspect to that history.
Although Thailand has governed of Pattani for centuries, the record, both past and
present, testified to the fact that Thailand has never conquered the heart and mind of the
Muslims of Pattani.
It may seem that the study of history is intended to relive the painful past, and
therefore, no State enjoys to reveal all of its history, only the lighter and more flattering
aspects. However, it remains true that the facts speak for themselves, and this can be our
guide to resolving certain problems that may seem interminable at the moment. For
success in the south to be achieved, the appropriate approach will be to confront these
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problems with wisdom and moderation and to appreciate the reasons for their failure.
This is a task that is distressing but ignoring the age-old problems can cause far more
distress and hopelessness.
Pattani's

long history

and the development of its own

governmental

infrastructures, and its diverse culture and social structures, have been the source of pride
among the people ofPattani. No doubt, Pattani still has strong social structures and a very
distinctive character. Pattani is no different from any other Empire or State in the world
that has tried to establish its own independence.
As the Thai Government atte-mpt% to create a centralized administration rapidly
without good research, the government officers will continue to face with the problem of
the power differential between the officers and native people from different cultures. The
contributing elements in this power differential are still the language problems. Until
today, Muslims who stayed in the countryside felt uncomfortably when in contact with
Thai officers. When people did not have good relationships with the government services,
they shut down communications. Therefore, first, it is imperative that the government
should seek to win the heart of Muslims.

One of the best solutions to the problems in

the South is to understand the way the people live and how they respond to the
government's policy. The Government has to bear in mind that peace cannot be achieved
in a single day or a single week.
This should be done prior to taking any other actions. When the Government
attempts to win over the "southern zone," at the very least, it should ensure that its plans
are not inconsistent or antagonistic to the local or indigenous culture.
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The above discussion has been aimed at gaining a historical perspective of the
historical and current problems occurring in the south of Thailand. This foundation of
understanding should help both the Government and the Muslim population to work out
solutions to the problems of the South that continue to lead to deadly conflict. Further
discussion of the history and the conflict will be reserved for the ensuing chapter.

******
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~ CHAPTER .. J
PATTANI TODAY
11- 1 Varying Types of Continuing Problems
Most Thais have never entertained the question of whether there could be a way
of living without conflict. Thais accept conflict as a part of their lives due to the cultural
belief that there is no life without conflict, and therefore, there is no living society
without conflict. 69 Within every society or community, there are conflicts and problems.
Even though the four provinces of Southern Thailand Songkhla -

Pa~, Yala, Narathiwat, and

form a small part of the Kingdom, these provinces have been the cause of

serious concern for the Royal Thai Government. In past decades, these four Muslimdominated provinces have been a source of natural history in Thailand, but the
government has been increasingly concerned with the other four southern coastal tourist
provinces of Phangnga, 70 Krabi,71 Surat Thani, 72and Phuket. 73

74

J. Krishnamurti, Psychological Revolution: 1962-1963: A Psychological Revolution 17, Krishnamurti
Foundation Publisher 1992.

69

70

. Phang Nga, one of the southern provinces, is nestled among mountains which rise up around the city and
IS located 788 kilometers (489.64 miles) from Bangkok on the west side of the Malay Peninsula. Phang Nga
COvers an area of 4,170.9 square kilometers (1,610.38 square miles) and indudes many islands in the
Phang Nga Bay, one of the famous tourist attractions for diving.
71

Krabi, one of the most attractive tourist destinations in Southern Thailand, is located 814 kilometers

:d

(505.80 miles) from Bangkok. Krabi occupies an area of 4,708 square kilometers (1,817.75 square miles)
borders the Andaman Sea to the west, which is known for its natural attractions such as white sandy
aches, enchanting coral reefs, limestone hills, and leafy forests with caves and waterfalls.

72

4Surat Thani is the largest province of Southern Thailand, covering an area of 12,891 square kilometers
(

,977.21 square miles). Surat Thani is located 644 kilometers (400.16 miles) from Bangkok. To the north

~nd W~st, it borders on the Gulf of Thailand where countless islands around, induding the tourist island Ko
alllui. SUrat Thani, named by Rama VI, literally means "City of Good People.~
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It has been ninety four years since the acceSSlOn of Kelantan, T erengganu,

Saiburi, and Perak to the Anglo Siamese Treaty.75 Under this treaty Thailand retained
sovereignty over Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. These provinces have a population of
approximately four million76 and are located in a very poor and undeveloped part of
Thailand in which there is woven a complex history of social, political, economic, and
religious conflict.
This chapter will be divided into two issues at the heart of the problems in this
region. The first issue will focus on the problems associated with social, economic, and
cu1tural structures. I will look first at the endemic crime in this region, considering why
the high crime rate is unchanged both before and after the resurgence of violent acts.
Secondly, I will spend some time analyzing the complex and long-standing ethnic
.conflicts so as to propose how the Thai Government might issue a policy that attempts to
' ..

"

unify the disparate elements of its society and integrate this region while respecting the
profound ethnic differences. Lastly, I will look closely at the economic problems that
characterize this region, which is rich in natural beauty, but is home to the poorest
members of Thai society. In examining these three elements, I hope to reflect upon the
types of Thai Government policies that have been implemented but have failed to provide

P .
. huket is known as the Pearl of the South and is Thailand's largest island with an area of 543 square
~~~meters (2~9.65 square miles). It is 862 kilometers (535.62 miles) south o~ Bangkok. With splendid cov~s
yS , whIte sandy beaches, a warm climate, comfortable accommodatIons, super seafood, Phuket IS
one 0 the perfect places in the world to have a relaxing vacation.

73

b:

74

IargAn~cha Charoenpo, Crime's fifth phase of crackdown kicks off this month: 30,000 drug dealers are still at
e, angkok Post, Mar. 19, 2006.

7S

a~' Angl? -

Siamese Treaty of 1909, or the Bangkok Treaty, was a treaty between the United Kingdom
lam sIgned on March 10, 1909 in Bangkok.

7$

SeeNr

"

.

a lonal StatistIcal OffICe cite in note 12 supra.
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assistance in order to get closer to a policy that, I believe, is appropriate for the problems
of this area.
In the second issue of this chapter, I will focus on patterns of violent acts in order
to better prepare the Govenunent for potential violence. I will look at the legal and
military ramifications of trying to keep the peace in this area. In this section, I am also
concerned about what types of military operations and legal terminology has and has not
worked in the past in order to better formulated future plans for containing, preven~ing,
and managing violent acts and their consequences. We now tum to examine more closely
the main conflicts in this area.

A. Criminal Problems
During the period of increasing globalization over the past few decades, Thailand
77

has actively participated in international investing, technology, trade, and tourism.
Although one of the changes that occurred as a result of the population explosion was an
increase in the crime rate following necessary economic and social modernizations, even
if compared to most industrialized countries, the crime rate in Thailand remains relatively
low. 78 The following chart shows recent comparative statistics of reported crimes.

n

for-:;.rrol~ W.Hudguet & Sureeporn Punping, International Migration in Thailand v, International organization
Igratton, Regional Office Bangkok, Thailand (2005).
78

http:// A comparative criminology tour of the world, San Diego State University, available at
WWW.-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/asia_pacificfThailand.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
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The Statistics of Reported Crimes 79
of
Thailand, United States, and Japan (2000) 80

per 100,000
inhabitants

total crime

intentional
homicides

major assaults

rapes

mlThailand

robberies

111 Japan

automobile
theft

burglaries

theft

OUSA

East Asian countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, are
used as transit points for drug trafficking, but the risks of rapid globalization are not just
economic,8l Thailand is a victim of its own virtues. Known for its cultural hospitality, its

Ibid,
[T]he offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor
vehicle theft. In the UN reports, murders are referred to as "intentional homicides." Aggravated assaults are
referred to as "major assaults," and larcenies are referred to as "thefts".

79

80

Ibid.

[A]ccording to the United Nations Seventh Annual Survey on Crimes, all Index crimes in Thailand by crime
~ecorded in police statistics shows the crime rate for the combined total of to be 174.84 per 100,000
Inhabitants in 2000. Compare this to 1951.92 for Japan (country with a low crime rate) and 4123.97 for USA
(country with high crime rate). For intentional homicides, the rate in 2000 was 8,47 for Thailand, 0.50 for
Japan, and 5.51 for USA. For major assaults, the rate in 2000 was 33.15 for Thailand, compared with 34.04
for Japan, and 323.62 for USA. (Note these data for Japan are for total recorded assaults, since Japan did
not report a figure for major assaults.) For rapes, the rate in 2000 was 6.62 for Thailand, 1.78 for Japan, and
32.05 for USA. For robberies, the rate in 2000 was 1.29 for Thailand, 4.07 for Japan, and 144.92 for USA.
For automobile theft, the rate in 2000 was 5,40 for Thailand, 243.81 for Japan, and 414.17 for USA. The rate
°2f burglaries for 2000 was 21.78 for Thailand, 233.45 for Japan, and 414.17 for USA. The rate for thefts in
000 was 95.13 for Thailand, compared with 1434.27 for Japan and 2475.27 for USA.
81

htt ~nited Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes: Drug Control and Urban Government, available at
P.lIWWw.unodc.un.oLthlfactsheetidruggovernance.PDF (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
.
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easy-going lifestyles, and its tolerance of diversity, the relative ease with which one can
get a visa have made it easy for illicit businesses to establish themselves in the country.
There is also the problem of large expatriate business communities that have made the
Kingdom one of the world's favorite tourist destinations.

82

This has been increasingly appreciated by globally minded criminals, and an army
of illegal migrants from all over the world has helped form crime syndicates that include
not only Asian but offenders from China, Taiwan, India, Russia, Korea, Australia,
Europe, Africa, and North and South America. Many of them have settled down and
made Thailand their home.

83

.

Southern Thailand has a reputation as a troubled region characterized by a high
.crime rate, lawlessness, endemic corruption within the bureaucracy, and as a place where
smuggling, small arms trade, and other forms of illegitimate businesses flourish.

84

The

problems include economi~ injustice, powerlessness or lack of political access, inequality
in the distribution of reve~ues, and the struggle to retain a cultural identity within the
larger political, economic, and social structure of Thailand.

82

Antony
Davis,
Vol.26
NoAO
Asia
Weeks,
Oct.13,
2000,
available
http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweekimagazine/2000/1013/na!.thaiiand.html(last visited May. 29, 2006).
83

at

•

h ~nme in Thailand, available at
ttp.IIWWW.thai-info2004.com/crimejn_thailand.htm (last visited May. 28, 2006).
84

See A. Croissant, cited in note 61 supra.
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The Statistics of Reported Crimes of Thailand by Region (Year 2003)85

Bangkok
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Ii!iI Bangkok II Middle 0 North 0 East ED Northeast Ii!iI West II South

During the 1970s and 1980s86, Thailand faced an increasing cnme rate from
illicit trade in opium, heroin, and cannabis. For many years, the Thai Government had
been moderately tmccessful in handling these problems on both domestic and
international fronts. 87 Ever since World War II, small bands of guerrillas, made of local
Malaysian communists (mostly Chinese)88, have stayed on bases along the rugged border

85

Royal Thai Police.

Paul Battersby, Border Politics and the Broader Politics ofThailand's Intemational Relations in the 1990s:
From Communism to Capitalism in Pacific Affairs 473-488, Vol. 71, NO.4. (Winter, 1998-1999).

86

[W]ithin the space of two decades, mainland South East Asia passed from being a region characterized by
the presence of fragmented states were governments were challenged form with separatist or revolutionary
forces, to one where a discernible trend towards territorial consolidation is emerging. As it seeks to position
itself as a regional commercial hub, Thailand must contend with a new political challenges arising from the
expanding territorial reach of state power in Cambodia, Laos and Burma, One of the many ironies
globalization, the spatial hardening of states underline the tensions and opportunities that shape Thailand's
border relation and it broader economic and political relations with neighboring countries.
87

See A comparative criminology tour of the world, cited in note 78 supra.
[f]hailand is one of the most successful countries of narcotic crop control programs in the world. Over the
past twenty years, efforts to discourage cultivation and later to penaflZe growers through an active
eradication campaign have proven effective. The eradication campaign is one of the main reasons refineries
no longer operate in Thailand, and has reduced opium cultivation in Thailand to a point where opium must
now be imported to meet the requirements of domestic addiction.

88

Thomas A. Marks, Anatomy of A Counterinsurgency Victory 36-37.
[A]s in other regional conflicts, the Thai conflict grew out of a CommunisLbid for power. In a challenge to the
Royal Government, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) shed its pre-Second World War adherence to
orthodox Marxist-Leninism, embraced Maoism, and adopted people's war as its strategy. From the outset,
SOcietal transformation was the CPT's goal. Its strategy was to negate the state's greater military power by
mobilizing the people against it through the creation of a counterstate. Direct mobilization of a popular base
and indirect mobilizatiori through front organizations were to be the party's main lines of operation.

40

between Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia. These guerrillas, a faction that
contributed to the criminal element of this region when they signed a peace accord with
the Malaysian Government in December 1989, made this region their home 89 despite the
fact that Thailand had been a tool for anti-communist campaigns launched by France and
United States. 90

Even today, the Thai Govenunent continues to struggle with these

dilemmas: For instance, in a recently published report, the National Center Against Illicit
Drugs stated that 400 big-time ?rug dealers and more than 20,000 small-time traffickers
have been at large since 2003.

91

B. Ethnic Conflicts
Ethnic conflict commonly arises when social, economic, religious, or cultural
differences between the dominant ethnic groups or classes of people clash with local
ethnic constructs, spurring the rise of nationalism within some particular etlmic group.92
Ethnic conflict has multiple causes, many of which stem from structural differences
between cultural groupS.93 "Structural" factors including historical concerns, religious

89Th .

all and Islamic Insurgency, available at
htlp:/fwww.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/thailand2.htm (last visited May. 28, 2006).

90

Sam Lightner, Thailand: A Climbing Guideby 53, the Mountaineers 800KS,2005(1967).

91

See A.Charoenpo, cited in note 74 supra.
92

See A. Croissant, cited in note 61 supra.
93

Ibid.
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differences, and social and economic marginalization sometimes result
grievances and latent crises in inter-ethnic relations.

In

local

94

Recently economists have focused on ethnic diversity, or "fractionalization," as a
possible cause of corruption, political instability, and poor economic performance.
Political scientists have argued for years over possible links between ethics, structures,
95

civil violence, democratic stability, and party systems. In addition, a study published in
1999 reviewing Australian evidence on ethnic crime states that: "Criminological

literature over the last several decades shows that socio-economic disadvantage and
disorganized communities contribute substantially to a city's crime problem ... race,
ethnicity, or country of origin has less to do with crime than the environment and the
disorganized communities people live in.

,,96

A study in 1990 found that out of 160 surveyed countries there were 820 ethnic
groups, meaning that on average 1% of each country's population is composed of some
ethnic minority. In Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East, the configuration of ethnic
structure is characterized by splinter groups that clash with a large lowland majority
(Burma, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Pakistan).97 For instance, in Southeast Asia,
nationalist uprisings have all come from the following areas: the Shan, Kachin, Karenni,

94

Ibid.

95

James D. Fearon, Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity around the World: A Cross - National Data Set
on Ethnic Groups, Remarks at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
~s~ociation,Boston (Aug.29 _ Sep.1, 2000)(transcript available in the DEPT. of Science, Stanford
nlversity).
00

.

A Zachariah Matthews, A structure of violence or peace? Address at the University of Sydney
( ug. 22, 2001).
97

See James D. Fearon, cited in note 95 supra.
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Chin, and Rakhinein in Bunna (Myanmar),98 Moro in the Philippines, the Amboinese
Acehnese in Indonesia, and the Pattani in Thailand.

99

As a result of the fight for democratic rights among ethnic minorities as well as
the struggle for cultural identity rights and equal opportunities, Bunna (Myanmar)
remains today as much embroiled in conflict as it ever has been.

These deep-rooted

ethnic clashes have led to resistance movements and have jeopardized any sense of a
um'file'd stat e.

100

In the Philippines, the ethnic conflict stems from the resistance many Muslims
have toward integration.

Fearing that assimilation would wipe out their ethnicity,

religion, and culture, the Muslim community has protested and defied Philippine law.
Today, measures have been taken in order to circumvent such divisiveness.

101

The

Government knows very well the problem of ethic conflict in the country and, after
international pressure, has found legal support for indigenous peoples. Thus, regional
autonomy laws were passed by the Aquino Government, however, the language of the

region had to be changed so that the conflict of autonomy laws would not bring about
conflict between indigenous peoples and government forces .102

98

Chao - Tzang Yawnghwe, Burma and National Reconciliation: Ethnic Conflict and State-Society
Dysfunction, Legal Issues on Burma J., Burma Lawyer's Council, 10 Burma J. 1-3 (2001).
99

S ~hanet Aphomsuvan, Origins of Malay Muslim "Separatism" in Southern Thailand 4, Working Paper
enes No.32, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore 2004.
100

See Chao - Tzang Yawnghwe, cited in note 98 supra.

~Ihplno Muslims Need More Than Economic Development, United States Institute of Peace, Apr. 2002 ,
available at http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/2002l4/filipino.html(last visited Jut. 18, 2006).

101

'"

102

S John ~.Richardson and Jianxin Wang, Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict, (K.M.deSiva and S.w.R.de A
amaraslnghe eds., New York: St. Martin's Press1993) (1992).
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The conflict in Indonesia in the past four years has resulted in about 4,000 deaths
from Christian-Muslim fighting and has displaced 500,000. So although the roots of the
conflict have distinct historical, political, and economic factors, it could be said that the
ethnic conflicts came from a basic structure.

I03

For example, today the roots of ethno-

religious unrest and the most visible signs of armed separatism in Southeast Asia Islamic
dissident movements in Southern Thailand, the Southern Philippines, and Aceh still share
many of the basic factors: insensitivity to local concerns, regional neglect, military
repression, and the contemporary sect ofIslamic militants. 104

As mentioned in an earlier Chapter, four percent of the popUlation in Thailand is
Muslim, which is itself hardly a homogeneous group. At least three types of Muslim
communities can be distinguished in Thailand. Malay Muslims living in the provinces of
Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani in the eastern peninsula of Thailand have a strong Malay
identity and consider Thai culture a foreign imposition. In 1975, records showed that
85% of the village heads in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat were Muslims who could not

read and write in Thai. los However, the Thai-speaking Muslims in Satun adjusted
smoothly to Thai society, probably owing to their proficiency in Thai. Muslims in the

last group are found among the overwhelming Buddhist majority in and around the
Bangkok metropolitan area, where they are tightly integrated into the larger urban milieu
and have more or less adapted to Buddhist social customs. All of these three Muslim
S.
Idney Jones, Executive Director, Asia Division, Causes of Conflict in Indonesia, Excerpts from Asia
Society panel discussion on New Yorl<, Oct. 24,2000, available at
http://WWw.asiasource.org/asip/sidneyjones.cfm (last visited Jun. 30,2006).

103

104

Peter Chalk, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 241-269, Routledge (Tayor & Francis Group) 2001.
105

M Girling, John L.S.Thailand: Soceity and Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1981) cited by Duncan
U c~argo, Southern Thai Politics : A Preliminary Overview 5, POLIS Working Paper No. 3 Feb. 2004,
nlversity of Leeds.
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groupS share the same cultural identity as followers of Islam, whose organization is
radically different from that of Buddhism.

106

These differences within the ethnic group

complicate any government policy that is formulated toward helping the Muslim
minority.

Because the majority of Thais are Buddhist, and the King is the head of State, 107
the Thai Constitution and the basic laws promulgate that the King uphold Buddhist
principles. The Thai legal system itself is built upon such beliefs. 108 Although the Thai
constitution recognizes the rights and liberties of the Thai people to profess any religious
beliefs, and the Constitution prohibits discrimination against person for religious
reasons. 109

for instance, currently, the Thai Government nominated

endorsement of King Bhumibol Adulyadej -

with the

Generel Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the first

Yoneo Ishii, Religion and Law, A Dynastic Realms and Secular States, 453 THAI MUSLIMS AND THE
ROYAL PATRONAGE OF RELIGION, 28 Law & Soc'y Rev. 453, L. & Society R. Part I.
106

107 Constitution of Royal Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997) [hereinafter Thai Constitutional B.E.2540]
sec. 9 [f]he King shall be Buddhist and the upholder of Buddhist faith.

Sompong Sucharitkul, Thai Law and Buddhist Law, American Society of Comparative L. INC.,
XL VI Am. J. of Compo L. 82, Supp.(1998).

108

109 See Thai Constitotional B.E.2550 sec. 4
[T]he human dignity, rights and liberties and equality of the people shall be protected; sec. 5 [f]he Thai
people, irrespective of their·origins,sexes or religions, shall enjoy equal protection under this Constitution;

Thai Constitutional B.E.2549 sec. 3
[U]pon the provisions of this Constitution, the human dignity, right, liberty and equality of the Thai people
protected by the democratic tradition of Thailand with the King as head of State and by the existing
International commitments of Thailand shall be protected by this Constitution;
See also the Thai Constitutional B.E.2540] sec 30.

[~]II persons are equal before the law and shall enjoy equal protection. Men and women shall enjoy equal
nghts. Unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of difference in origin, race, language, sex,
age, physical or health condition, personal status, economic or social standing, religious belief, education or
CO~~titutionally political view shall not be permitted ; sec 38.[A] person shall enjoy full liberty to profess a
religion, a religious sect or creed, and obseNe religious precepts or exercise a form of worship in
accordance with his or her belief; provided that it is not contrary to his or her civic duties, public order or
~OOd mor~ls. In exercising the liberty referred to in paragraph one, a person is protected from any act of the
tate, which is derogatory to his or her rights or detrimental to his or her due benefits on the grounds of
rrofessin g a religious precepts or exercising a form of worship in accordance with his or her different belief
rom that of others.
.
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.Thai Muslim army officer, to the position of Army Supreme Commander, which is the
highest rank and position in the Thai Army. In fact, a number of Muslims in Thailand
have had important positions in the Government both in the present and in the past. Also,
Thai Law on family relations recognizes a pluralistic society wherein persons of different
faiths are subject to different personal laws such as family relations, adoption, betrothal,
marriage, divorce, and succession. Thus, Thailand already recognized a choice of family
laws other than Buddhist even prior to the adoption of the Code on the Conflict of Law in
B.E.2481 (1938).110 However, language and religion are usually considered key elements
in what constitutes an ethnic group.
Data of Population and Religion 2000

III

Area

Population

Muslim

Buddhist

Christian

Others

Pattani

608,246

485,718

119,090

1,173

1,735

2

Yala

358,011

279,705

74,730

2,691

865

3

Narathiwat

671,649

529,398

89,262

1,380

1,987

4

Satun

260,265

200,700

59,234

212

119

Total

1,898,201

1,495,521

342,316

6,016

4,706

No.

Based on data collected by the Islamic Committee ofPattani, 2000.

110

See S. Sucharitkul, cited in note 108 supra, at p. 86

111
M
Sn• Nuryanti, the Landscape of Intellectual's Thoughts: Pattani Identity and the Emergency of a resistance
F ovement 127 - 128, Center f~)f Political and Regional Studies (UPI), Indonesia, the Papers of the 2001 API
ellows, the Asian Face of Globalisation Reconstructing Identities, Institutions, and Resources (2001).
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Trends in the Social Structure ofPattani 112

No.

Main issue
Location

Thai-Buddhist*

Thai-Muslim*

Malay-Muslim*

Urban

Semi-urban

Rural

areas

(southern

part)
2

population Spread

Over most areas of the

Southern areas

Satun

country
3

Social and Economic

Advanced

Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat,

Moderate

Low

High school

Primary

Status
4

Level of Education

High school and upper
levels

occupation

5

Staff and peasant

Sales

and

Peasant or jobless

peasant

*According to the use of language and religion faith.
People in this southern area of Thailand speak a dialect (yavi) and embrace
Islam, and they remain traditionally Islamic and fulfill religious duties by teaching the
l13

Islamic faiths and practices to their children. There are several hundred Pondoks
offering a traditional religious education that does not always provide a strong
preparation for successful employment in wider Thai society.1l4

Moreover, Pondoks

112

Ibid.

113
II

T~e origins of this school can probably be traced back to the Hindu Buddhist ashram

(retreat) in pre -

~s~mlc Southeast Asia. But as the Malay word "Pondok" indicates, it developed into a uniquely Southeast
d~n y.et thoro~ghly Islamic institution. Maintaining such a Pondok can be considered as fulfilling a religious
obI" ' ~lnce takmg care of traveling scholars or students "on the way of Allah is one way to meet the
H

Igabon of Zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam (Carool Kersten: 21 Am.J. Islamic Soc.Sci.2004).
.114
2~un~n McCargo, Southern Thai Politics: A Preliminary Overview 6, POLIS working Paper No.3 Feb.,

,Umversity of Leeds 2004.
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have been blamed for providing the breeding ground for the bloody uprising
long been suspected of having links to Muslim militants.

llS

and have
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* Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand
Thailand had a good record of economic growth in both the GDP117 and the SET
index between 1976 and 2003. There was considerable expansion from 2003 to this
current year. In the view of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Thailand was one
of East Asia's best performers in 2002-04 because of a well-developed infrastructure, a

115

John R Bradley, Islamist schools are blamed for bloody upnslng in Thailand, The Independent
httpflnews.independent.co.uklworld/asia/article60509.ece (last
VISited May.18, 2006).

n~spaper, May.15 2004, available at
116

J Jan McGirk, Thai soldiers search Islamic schools for terrorism suspects, The Independent newspaper 13
2~)~' 2004, available at httpllnews.independent.co.uklworld/asia/article73330.ece (last visited May. 1,
117

9ro~~e rep~rt of National Economics and Social Development Board, Bank of Thailand shows the economic
WOrld (%) 10 Thailand from year 1999 through 2004 are 4.4, 4.8, 2.1, 5.4, 6.8, and 6.1. Meanwhile the
Economic Growth (%) from year 1998 through 2003 are 2.8,3.7,4.6,2.5,3.0 and 4.0.
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free-enterprise economy, and pro-investment policies. Thailand appears to have fully
recovered from the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis despite a sluggish global economy.
Bangkok has pursued preferential trade agreements with a variety of partners in an effort
to boost exports and to maintain high growth. However, ordinary people are more
worried about the rising cost of living compounded by the fear of lay-offs for their newly
graduated sons and daughters. Most Bangkokians still remember the pain of the
economic meltdown in 1997, which toppled many businesses, bled into the poorer
segments of society, and cast many deep into debt. II8

According to studies by the United Nations agencies conducted to find out about
the consequences of those policies, 82% of the southern province's 730,146 people are
Malay-Muslims, who have a poverty rate that is two to three times higher than Thailand's
national average. 119 These provinces have long been at a disadvantage since economic
neglect, little industry, no infrastructure, and a failed tourism campaign (despite extensive
natural beauty)120 have conspired to make this region less prosperous compared to the
central country.l2l However, in terms of revenue, Thai records show that the poorest
provinces lie in the Northeastern region of Thailand. 122 This is completely contrary to the

118

Kamol Hengkietisak, Juling - A Model Teacher, Bangkok post 1, May 28,2006.

119

Marwaan Macan -marker, Armed Conflict report, Asia Times online, Sep. 29, 2008, available at
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In year 2006, unemployment was the highest in the Northeast at 1.87 per cent, but it dropped from 3.2

~e~ cent in the same period last year. Unemployment was the lowest at 1.09 per cent in the South due to the

"1 81n9 price of rubber. Unemployment in the Central region was 1.56 per cent and in the Northem region at

.47 per cent.
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studies by the United Nations Agency, which provide evidence that Pattani,. Satun, Yala,
and Narathiwat are among the least developed provinces of the Kingdom. \23

Poverty in Thailand, 1986-2002
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[T]hailand is among the countries of the world with an impressive record of poverty reduction. In the early
1960s, around 60 percent of the Thai people lived in poverty; in 2002 the proportion was less than 10
percent. However, as recently as 1986 the incidence of poverty, measured by head-count ratio, was still
~ro~nd 40 percent. The pace of poverty reduction has been both rapid and virtually uninterrupted. Only twice
urlng the past two decades has the incidence of poverty increased: first, between 1981 and 1986 when
~mmodity prices plummet and second, after the financial and economic crises of 1997/98, which resulted in
Widespread unemployment.
Of the fiv~ regions, including the Bangkok Metropolitan Area (BMA), the Northeastern region is always the
Inr.;..."S,hn,oMwlng the highest incidence of poverty. The Northern and Southern regions have a comparable
Int'i... ,,~.~~ of poverty, second to the Northeastern region, while the Central region and BMA enjoy the lowest
as in many other countries, poverty in Thailand is largely a rural phenomenon. The rural poor
for around 80 percent to 85 percent of the total poor during most of the last 20 years. The fact
between the rural poor and the urban poor remains largely unchanged amid the
that has taken place suggests that rural poverty declined at a somewhat slower rate than urban
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I
The conflicts that have erupted in this area are the result of the accumulation of
many problems-historical, economic, political, and ideological. It is apparent that the
problem is not simple, but certainly drugs, crime, and religious fanaticism could lead to a
large-scale conflict. All of these issues are central to the current serious crisis in the
southernmost provinces. So long as the State cannot eradicate the root of the conflict, the
violent past will reoccur. This is the reason why Thailand has been continually faced with
escalating violence in its southern provinces since the beginning of 2004 .

.II - 2 Resurgence of Violence
In 1948, a vi Hager from Dusun Nyir,125 Narathiwat Province, rebelled against the
Thai government because the Thai Nationlism policy (so-called Rataniyom policy)
disregarded Islamic religion during the leadership of Field Marshall Pibulsongkram.
This policy caused the death of many Muslim villagers.

Until the last two years, there

have been very few deaths related to this conflict. On January 4, 2004, violence again
erupted in the four Muslim-dominated southern provinces, violence that started with

"t
s eal'mg weapons."

VOrramai Kabinsingha. Dusun Nyir, S.P.S.Printing. 2004.
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A. Weapon Seizing
BBC news posted on January 4, 2004:
Armed raids in southern Thailand; Four soldiers have been
killed and 18 schools burned down in a series of attacks in
predominantly Muslim southern Thailand. About 30 gunmen
raided an army depot in Narathiwat province early on Jan 4,
2004, stealing some 100 rifles.

1. Succession of Systematic Acts of Violence

An unexpected raid at the army depot shocked Pattani into a new era of violence
and terror. Some thirty armed bandits stormed the army depot in Narathiwat and made
off with a cache of 300 weapons including 300 assault rifles, 40 pistols, and two M-60
machine guns. This attack killed four Thai soldiers and stunned the country. Even though
the raid was not an act of war or an armed conflict, the effects were not different from

military conflict, and the attack seemed to be ushering in' a new era of armed conflict.
Whel) in the same area eighteen schools were set on fire using mosquito coils on petrolsoaked sacks, these conflicts seem to embroil more and more Thai citizens in a new
epoch of ethnic war. On the following Monday, January 5, 2004, two policemen were
killed when a bomb they were trying to defuse (planted on a motorcycle parked outside a
shOpping mall in Pattani) exploded. In another incident, an explosion ripped through a
POlice box in a nearby public park killing two policemen and injuring another policeman.

Two more bombs were found and defused, one .
'
m a shoppmg-mall
telephone booth and
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another in a nearby petrol station. 126 The bombs in the shopping mall were perhaps the
most disconcerting because it was clear that the attack was aimed to impact the daily
lives of common people (to say nothing of causing havoc with the Thai economy). These
scare tactics were the result of careful planning in which a series of attacks were to occur
many places within and outside government buildings at the same time.

However, these

acts of violence were focused on symbols of the Government because schools in the past
were seen as anti-Islamic by separatist militants.

127

Furthermore, these attacks not only

aimed at challenging the authority of the government, but also of gaining access to
weapons for the assailants' plan.

Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh

speculated that the assailants were aided by someone inside the military's armory. This
supposition of the Deputy Prime Minister showed the weakness of the armed forces in
areas of security and intelligence as Military units had the guards performed their daily
duties as usual. However, this raid was very audacious and started the wave of violence.

2. Government Response

Initially, former Prime Minister Taksin Shinawatra said most of the separatists in
the area were bandits who ran rackets along the Thai-Malaysian border and described the
violence as the work of only criminals,128 but Police General Sant Sarutanond said
intelligence officers learned that a group of 12 Muslim terrorists had planned to plant

See Globalsecurity, cited in note 89 supra.

Ibid.
MCGivering , Thailand's separatist fears, Jan. 6, 2004, available at
li/a~;ia-l)acifici'33jr29:23.s,tn (last visited Mar. 18,2005).
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bombs in the four Muslim-dominated provinces as part of an ongoing terror campaign. 129
Meanwhile some Thai officials have even suggested that the leaders of the groups of
violence have fled into the Terengganu, Province of Malaysia, but Malaysian officials
. k to deny that suggestlOn.
. 130
have been qUlC

It was not difficult to imagine why former Prime Minister Taksin insisted that this

incident was merely a criminal act. He did not want this incident to become an
international affair and did not want to panic the people even though the gravity of the
raid was unusual as many experts have pointed out.

Subsequent to the violence on January 4, 2004 where there was a robbery of
military weapons at the Army camp in Narathiwat province, the.Thai Government placed
these three southern provinces under martial law, which afterward was superseded by the
Emergency Decree On Public Administration in Emergency Situation, B.E. 2548 (2005).
This Decree is broadly criticized for its neglect of human rights, an issue to be discussed
in another chapter. In the meantime, as a consequence of the army raid, the army offered
a reward of 1 million bath ($25,000 US dollars) for information leading to the arrest of
.....

those responsible 131 and issued special licenses for civil servants to carry guns for selfdefense. 132
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Armed raids in southern Thailand, Jan. 4, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.ukl1Ihilworld/asia-pacificl3366359.stm (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
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h ~ualnoi Thammasathien, Thailand wakes up to southern threat, Jan. 8, available at
ttp.llnews.bbc.co.ukl2lhilasia-paCificl3379345.stm (last visited May. 1, 2006).
131

See Globalsecurity, cited in note 89 supra.
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htt ~ungrawee C. Pinyarat, Gun lessons for teachers in the South, the Nation, Oct. 10, 2004, available at
I p./lWWW.nationmultimedia.com/search/page .arcview.php ?c1id=3&id= 108043&date=2004-1 0-26)
( ast Visited Aug.1, 2006).
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Because the Government knew that it would be blamed for the poor quality of
security and intelligence, they launched strong policies to respond to the attack.
Although it is the duty of every State to protect its citizens, such policies were considered
to be too harsh and the Thai Government resorted to the use of extreme force to perform
the operation,

Finally, the predictions of many analysts and officers that tensions would rise and
continue in this area were accurate', The robbery of rifles was followed by gun shots,
bombings, and random attacks, setting off a second wave of violence on April 28, 2004,
in "Kre Se Mosque" in Pattani Province,

I'
Ii

!i

B. Krue Se Mosq ue

CBSNEWS posted on April 29, 2004:
Angry and grief-stricken villagers buried their dead Thursday a
day after Thai police killed more than 100 suspected Islamic
militants, and the government braced killings happened as police
repulsed coordinated insurgent attacks across Thailand's
Muslim south. Bands of about 20 people each raided about 15
police outposts for revenge attacks amid allegations of excessive
force. The widespread and checkpoints in the provinces of Yala,
Pattani and Songkhla. Security forces shot and kiJled. 108
alleged militants, including 32 held up in a mosque. Five police
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were killed in fights with the suspects; most of them are teenager
armed with knives or other blade weapons. 133

1. Systemic Violence
In another attack focused on symbols of Government authority, thirty members
of an armed Islamic band. started to open fire by launching rifle shots at the police
outpost, killing two security officers in the Pattani Province. After the gun shots, the
Islamic band escaped, carrying off AK-47 and M-16s rifles to the Kru Se mosque, 134 and
continued to fire from the mosque at Thai security forces. This appeared as if the Kru Se
Mosque was deliberately used as a place of their choosing according to a scheme.
Finally, the Thai Security Forces made the decision to execute all of the armed bandits
after waiting for several hours while villagers surrounded the Thai Security Forces and
began to try to assist the armed Islamic band. Although the Thai security said these were
necessary measures for the operation at that time, newspapers from around the world did
not see it in that light. After the Thai Security Forces decided to kill the suspects, it was
found that most of these allied offenders only had machetes and very few were carrying
rifles.

In this case, it is very significant that they were trying to attack symbols of
Government authority by targeting fifteen police outposts again, and this situation was
different from the January 4, 2004 assault because of villager involvement. The Islamic

;;---------------------h ~hais Fear 'Militant' Revenge, CBS News, Apr.29, 2004, available at
ttp.llwww.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/world/maiI614100shtm I (last visited Aug. 1,2005).
134

157Kru Se mosque is one of the oldest mosques in Pattani province which was unfurnished and built in
8 by a Chinese convert to Islam.
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armed band attempted to lead the Thai Security· Forces into misunderstanding that the
band had rifles and to make the situation worse by pushing villagers into pressuring the
Thai Security Forces to resort to the use of force. Moreover, some analysts observed that
the date of the incident coincided with the same period of the Dusun Nyir incident in

1948.
From the incidents, it could be gathered that this act was calculated to start
conflict between the Thai Security Forces and the villagers. This could be seen from the
strange way in which the villagers surrounded the Thai Securities Forces. To complicate
matters, if the Thai Security Forces used force on the villagers, whether it was deliberate
or not, this could easily go beyond the scope of domestic issues. This incident could
spark an international debate and get international attention in favor of the Islamic
militants cause. If it were, in fact, the case that Thai Security Forces used more force than
necessary, it would definitely raise the issue of human rights before the United Nations.
It would be an act of mistreatment of the Government towards its civilian population, and
as a result many sections of international law would be concerned and affected. At this

stage, it could be said that the well-deliberated plan of the Islamic dissidents to die had
Succeeded. Because, beyond doubt, the international community would be outraged by
the needless execution of thirty unarmed Islamic minorities at the hands of the Thai
police.

2. Government Response

Faced with the fact that the Government could do nothing to stop the harshness of
the dissidents, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra finally accepted the theory that the
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raids were linked to a January 2004 attack on a military camp and hinted that these
dissidents received financial support from influential figures, politicians and drug
gangsters. He, however, still did not believe that the attackers had any connections with
international terrorists 135 despite the fact that one of the men killed in the violence was
found to be wearing a shirt with Jl136 emblazoned on the back.137 Meanwhile, widespread
critiques on the war on drugs policy and the arrest of Riduall Isamuddin (so-called
Hambali) at Ayutthaya on August 11, 2003 were perceived to be related to the armed
bandit groups.

138

On the contrary, Defense Minister Chettha Thanajaro said the attacks

were carried out by Muslim separatists who received assistance from abroad.
Furthermore, General Pallop Pinmanee, deputy chief of the Internal Security Operations
Command, said that one of the group's leaders, lehbemae Buteh, was being hunted and
was believed to be hiding in Malaysia. 139 The possibility can be seen that the political
and military operations cannot work together. At this stage, no matter how violent an act
would be -- whether it was committed by gangsters or separatists or any other bandits, the
National Intelligence Agency would blame such attacks on the Muslim dissidents. 140

135

.
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Jemaah Islamiah (JI), a militant Islamic organization was founded in the mid-1990s. This group has the
goal of establishing an independent Islamic State in Indonesia, Malaysia and the southem islands of the
~h~l~pp~nes.136 The goal is to use violence to overthrow the governments in Indonesia, Malaysia, the
hlhpPlnes, Singapore and Thailand.
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Prime Minister Taksin did not take any further steps that would have been helpful
in an effort to establish a link between this incident and the army raid. But Prime Minister

Taksin still insisted that the incident was most likely a criminal act rather than an
international incident because he feared such a connection would enflame the
. international criminal organizations and might inspire another Muslim militant group to
undertake another wave of attacks. Whether to take consolation or to make amends for
the failure of the Government in handling problems in the south, the Prime Minister
promised, after the attack on Kru Se mosque (one of the oldest mosques in Thailand), to
restore the historic temple by ordering the Fine Arts Department to repair the walls that
were tom down or damaged. 141

c. TakBai
After the detention of six men who were accused of providing the stolen weapons
from an Army camp to Islamic militants, later that year, violence erupted again:

USATODAY posted on October 26,2004:
Officials say 78 died after Thailand riot: At least 78 people were
suffocated or crushed to death after being arrested and packed
into police trucks following a riot in southern Thailand over the

Carnage:
n~tllnnrnl

Kingdom

shaken; The Nation, Apr. 29, 2004,
available at.
.arcview.php?clid=2&id=97956&date=2004-04-29 (last visited

PM Promises' to Rebuild Mosque Damaged in Police Attack, Yahoo!News, May. 8, 2004.
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detentions of Muslims suspected of giving weapons to Islamic
.

separatIsts.

142

1. Acts of Violence

Acts of violence began when a crowd gathered at the Tak Bai police station in the
Narathiwat province, and asked for the unconditional release of the six detained men who
were accused of unlawful seizure of weapons in January of 2004. There has been
speculation that this incident had a connection with the preceding story.

The protesters

injured three officers and overturned two military trucks and one police car. Again, this
was not a peaceful riot. Evidence recovered from the area of the protest during their
attempt to storm the police station showed that the protesters had knives, machetes, and
grenades. At this stage, the situation seemed to be getting worse. The Thai Security
Forces were facing a situation that might spiral out of control, but they had to attempt to
make the situation manageable.

However, after being arrested and loaded into army

trucks, at least seventy-eight people died from suffocation. This raises the question: did
the Thai Security Forces cause the death of seventy-eight people either deliberately or out
of neglect? The media reported that there was an unnamed group that tried to block the
riots and failed to get away from the scene. 143 Who was this unnamed group? How
reliable is the media's report? Is it suspicious that this riot also included a group who
failed to leave or was it just a typical protest?

---------------------143
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2. Government Response

Once more, the Government was compelled to resort to the use of force because
the Thai Security Forces failed to exercise enough restraint in handling the protesters.
Lack of experience and negligence in the past by Thai Security Forces have long been
causes of these tragedies even if the capacity of the Thai Security Forces was not at its
highest on the weekend because there were not enough trucks to serve the need. This
incident was understood by the public as an example of government security officials
mistreating protesters who dispersed after the demonstration by using reckless tactics. l44
At this time, Prime Minister Taksin made a statement to the Senate asserting that the
pr<?testers belonged to the Autash group or were teachers at the Ponok School that had
induced the crowd to protest by asking the crowd, their friends, and their relatives to join
in so as to reveal Pattani history. 145 This gave Thailand a bad reputation as a government
that violated human rights. However, Prime Minister Taksin's speech implied that he
knew of no relation between the domestic dissidents and any international terrorist group.
Despite the fact that Prime Minister Taksin had always insisted that the incident was only
confined to domestic affairs, his statement was meant to the explain of the use 9f force by
Thai Security Forces as absolutely necessary. Although Prime Minister Taksin attempted
at first to support the Thai Security Forces because he-realized that the use of force was
not effective enough and accomplished nothing toward the task of relieving ethnic
tensions. At this stage, Prime Minister Taksin launched a policy to reimburse the victims
and ordered the formation of the 48-member commission, known in short as the Thai
144

Thai army criticized over Tak 8ai, May. 4, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/asia-pacificl4512845.stm (last visited Mar.2, 2005).
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National Reconciliation Commission (NRC). The commission was appointed on March
28, 2005 and was responsible for suggesting policies, measures, mechanisms, and
methods to reconcile and bring peace to Thai society, especially the three southern border
provinces, Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, with former

Prime Minister Anand

panyarachun as chairman. The NRC was then appointed to investigate the Kre-Se case.
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Although the appointment of the committee may have made the matter look better for the
time being, it was not the best long-term solution. In this case, the transparency of
criminal justice would be the best indication of any sign of recovery of the soiled
reputation of the country.

D. The Abduction and Murder of the Two Marines
In an unprecedented incident, two marines were held hostage and later killed by
villagers who accused them of shooting customers at a teashop. The marines were part of
a central government plan to support the alliance policy of providing good relations
between Security Forces and the people. In this case, I will focus on why the two marines
were killed in spite of the fact that they had been successful in their mission to become
very friendly with the local inhabitants.

~----------------http~~ ~ational Reconciliation Commission
.

to Help Ease Southern Problems, Apr. 1, 2005, available at
alland.prd.go.th/the_inside_view.php?id=663 (last visited Mar. 18,2006).
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ASIANEWS posted on September 22, 2005:

Two Thai Marines held captive by villagers in the
insurgency - racked south were beaten and stabbed to
death yesterday by young Islamists who rushed into the
house where the two marines were being held. 147

1. Acts of Violence
On Tuesday night (Sep 20, 2005), there were gun shots at a local teashop that
caused the death of two people and injured four. At that time, the two servicemen were
just passing by on their way to another incident but decided to stop after they heard the
shooting at the teashop Their car

ap~eared
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to have broken down at the same time.

Because the villagers accused the two marines of being behind the shooting, hundreds of
villagers took the two marines hostage and locked them in a religious school that night. In
these circumstances, villagers expressed their distrust of the Thai press and their
preferences for Malaysian coverage of the incident. They demanded that the government
set up a committee to investigate the shooting at the teashop and that foreign media be
permitted into the village to document the incident. Why the international media were so
quick on the scene lent suspicions to the incident, begging the question why people
would be thinking about the media when there was an emergency in progress. But no one
would step forward to act as a representative of the villagers.

For the moment,
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conunandos were positioned to storm the village and rescue the marines, but hooded
villagers took advantage of the absence of eyewitnesses to kill the men when people
gathered in the mosque for mid-day prayers. Throughout the entire stand-off, hundreds of
women - their faces wrapped in traditional headscarves - stood on a tiny bridge just
meters away from heavily armed soldiers, as their children played nearby. Also, it is
possible that these children were deliberately put there by people who wished to stage or
choreograph a scene that pulled at the hearts of TV viewers watching the showdown.
The women and children blocked the entrance to the village for 18 hours. Meanwhile,
they put up a large tent that was plastered with messages: "Evil has spread since
Thaksin 's party came to power. Ethnic Malay people have been cruelly killed by soldiers.

They are the real terrorists. " The killings carne amid a desperate attempt by authorities
to negotiate their release from Ban Tanyonglimo in the border province of Narathiwat.
But by the time Malaysian reporters arrived on the scene in the middle of the afternoon,
the two marines had been executed. This incident explains how in some measure the
extremists used violence to draw public attention to the injustices of the Thai
Government no matter how violent and unspeakable the methods were.

An autopsy performed by doctors revealed that the pair had died a gruesome
death after being beaten and tortured. The time of their deaths was about 2.00 p.m. on
September 20, 2005. The bodies of the two marines were recovered by the Thai military
already brutally beaten to death with machetes and sticks with their hands and legs tied
up. They were also gagged and blindfolded.
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Again, this incident is related to the villagers' blockade and the demanding of
foreign media to document the incident. This case leads to the next question: Is that the
real intention of the villagers? If not, who induced them?

2. Government Response

In this case, even though the authorities had the capacity to assist the two
marines, they did not. This begs the question why the authorities let the two marines die.
The authorities preferred to negotiate rather than use force out from the lessons they had
learned in the Tak Bai and Kru Se case. This decision of whether or not to assist the two
marines was ail example of the risk the Government had taken to protect its reputation.
Because the authorities feared that the unnamed group might kill villagers and that even
greater chaos and violence might erupt, they let the two marines die. After the two
marines died and before the discouragement of authorities, the Government tried to win
back the confidence and the trust of the authorities. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
announced his decision to capture the killers of the two marines and launched an all-out
military operation to bring the suspected militants and villagers responsible for the crimes
to justice. On September 23, 2005, the Narathiwat Provincial Court issued arrest warrants
for 11 suspects, including a 48-year-~ld woman, in connection with the brutal murder of
the two marines in a hostage drama, and the two suspects were arrested.

Many of the violent responses from the dissidents in this incident resemble that

the first year of the attack. It was as if the violence continued on as before and in some
Ways was worse since the arrest of 48-year-old woman implied that the members of the
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militant group was composed of all types of people - the elderly, teenagers, and women.
This raised concerns that the dissidents had gained in numbers and suggested that as a
result in the not too distant future boys, girls, or children will be involved. That will be a
tough task for the Government to handle successfully if this militant group is not just a
group but is a society or community. However, this incident underscores that this
approach of using force -

either to suppress behavior or to instill peace- did not work

at all.

E. Assassination of Teachers
THE NATION posted on February 16,2006:

.

Teachers take a week off after five colleagues shot: Some 250
primary schools hit as attacks continue; 3 defense volunteers
killed 149
Resulting from tensions since the army raids on April 2004, more than 1,000
schools in Southern Thailand have closed. A teacher at one school in Pattani province
told The Nation newspaper on January 28, 2004, that she had received leaflets
threatening attacks on teachers and students in the province. ISO Then, no less than 3,000
teachers in southern Thailand held a rally to demand better security after one of their
Colleagues was ShOt. ISI In Yala, teachers at 250 primary schools refused to go to perform
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their duties for one week. The atmosphere in the area was very tense, and the teachers
refused to go to work. Since being targeted by militants during the resurgence of violence
over the past two years, many teachers in the three southernmost provinces have sought
152
transfers to other areas.
From 2004 to May 2006, at least forty-nine teachers and other school staff have
been killed. 153 Although teachers were escorted to and from schools by security forces in
many parts of the border provinces, and the Government allowed them to.carry guns, they
still have been targeted by Muslim separatists. Many teachers (Buddhists and Muslims
alike) have been gunned down while traveling alone. 154

a. Muslim Teachers
On June 21, 2005, a group of killers entered the home of three young Islamic
teachers (ustazs) shot them in their heads, killing them instantly, while they were
performing their nightly prayers (Isha).155

h. Buddhist Teachers
The two most tragic incident of Buddhist teachers occurred on June 24, 2005,
When at least two gunman opened fire by shooting four times - twice in the chest and
152
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twice in the arm--which killed the victim instantly. The teacher was identified as Kobkul

Runsaew~ 47, a female school director, the director of Ban Tua Ko School in
Narathiwat's Rangae district. Because the school director visited her home daily to take
care of her paralysed mother during lunch break, the assailants might have been tracking
her movements just prior gunning her down. This case received attention from all
sectors l56 because Thais customarily respect the teacher and adore the grateful person.
So, there were more than 2,000 people from many areas including northern, eastern and
central provinces came to attend her funeral and cremation.

On the following day (May 19,2006), Juling Panganmoon (or Teacher Juei) and
another female teacher Sininart. Thawomsuk were taken hostage and beaten by villagers
until Juling fell into a comatose state and was taken to Prince of Songhkla Hospital in the
Hat Yai district. As the villagers demanded security officers release two men arrested
earlier in connection with the murders of the two marines in the same district in 2005,157
around 100 villagers stormed Gujingruepo School and abducted the two teachers -an
altercation that appears to have been well-planned.

ls8

In the Juling case, the violent villagers wanted Thai Security Officers to release
two men arrested in connection with the murders of the two marines last year. These were
the same conditions of the Tak Bai case when the rioters demanded the Government
release suspects wanted for the seizure of weapons. After the villagers abducted and beat
the two women Buddhist teachers, more than 100 Government schools in Thailand's
ISS/ '

b Id.

157
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See K. Hengkietisak, cited in note 118 supra.
Three more arrested for attack on teachers, Bangkok Post, May. 24, 2006.
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rebellious Muslim in the far south were closed.

159

These attacks definitely caused

.
· personne1. 160
southern proVInces
to 1ose more goo d ed
ucatlOn

Expert

161

viewed the deaths of these teachers as importarIt for three reasons. First,

Kobkul was killed while trying to perform an act of a daughter's filial duty to her mother.
The moral outrage that was triggered by her murder was therefore comprehensible.
Second, her killing was unique in the history of violence in Southern Thailand because it
was very unusual for a woman to be deliberately targeted for an assassination. Third, the
assassination of the three young ustazs could be seen differently by the killers and
families of those killed as well as ordinary Muslims. 162

These assassinations have a

definite and visible aim; killing teachers would ·attract media attention from around the
world.

Moreover, political analysts 163 say that the reason for killing teachers is because
Muslim radicals prefer an uneducated populace. They do not want the Muslim population

School in Muslim Thai south closed after attack, Reuters, May. 22,2006.

159

160 Interview by The Nation with Pakorn Thepsom, director of Narathiwat's Education Zone 2, Southern
Violence:
School
director
gunned
. down,
available
at
http://www.komchadluek.neUbreaking/read.php?lang=en&newsid=66742 (last visited Jun. 30, 2005).
161

. Dr.Chaiwat Satha-Anand is the professor of political science at Thammasat University, Bangkok and
director of the Thai Peace Information Centre which conducts studies and activism in relation to the Thai
milit~ry and social issues. He is an expert on non-violence theory as well as activism and Islam. He has
rUbhshed numerous articles and book chapters on the military, altemative defense, religion and peace,
~Iam and nonviolence, ~n.d modern political ~hi~osophy. For !l1any years, he directed the Intern~tio~al
. eace Research ASSOCiation's (IPRA) commiSSion on non-Violence, and he serves at the SCientific
Committee of the International University for Peoples' Initiative for Peace, IUPIP, in Rovereto, Italy.
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.B Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Southern Thailand: Beheading citizens: Killing Teachers as the Trap of Violence,
angkok Post, JuI.S, 2005.
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eSldentlal Adviser on Revenue Enhancement.

Pr

69

to be educated, so that this area can eventually become the breeding grounds for
recruitment for terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.

164

The impact of these acts of violence is a great challenge to the Government. But
the important thing is that it affects the feeling of the children that have to be confronted

with the daily killing of indiscriminate targets that happen to be their teachers or people
that they are familiar with. If the Government cannot stop this violence, it should be
concerned about the aggressive characteristics of these children in the next ten years.

1. Government Response

After -a number of threats to teachers and students, as well as arson attacks on
school buildings, the Government has tried to step up security in southern schools, but
fewer than 1,000 soldiers and police have been deployed to the schools.

165

However, the

incidents of teacher assassination suggest that the lack of appropriate security in the
schools demonstrates the Thai Government's inability to respond to the demands ofrapid
operation.

F. Decapitation
The dissident groups use decapitation as a form of assassination not merely because
of its dramatic effect but also to symbolize the act of violence. The main target of this

;;--------------------~Ucille Talusan CBN News Asia Correspondent, Thailand's Islamic Radicals Target Teachers, CBN,
available at http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/news/051104f.aspx (last visited Jun.30, 2006).
165

See Nationmedia, cited in note 152 supra.
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~bol is Buddhism!66 Although various acts of violence have in their own ways sought
to bring about religious conflict, the beheading of a Buddhist village leader in Thailand's
Muslim-dominated south has provoked serious concern throughout Southeast Asia. 167
Besides, authorities believe sometimes decapitated victims were Muslims suspected by
the extremist of cooperating with government authorities.

168

Since most of the dead

bodies were first shot and then followed by the act of severing the head, decapitation as a
form of torture

de~igned to elicit fear or terror would seem superfluous. But this act of

mutilation implies more than a way of inducing fear, but it is also a direct challenge to the
power of the State and is seen as a form of punishment.

169

G. Acts of Terror
BUDDHIST CHANNEL posted on October 17,2005
About 20 suspected Muslim

separatists stormed a

monastery, hacked an elderly Buddhist monk to death and
fatally shot two temple boys Sunday in southern Thailand,
police said. 170
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See N.Go, cited in note 153 supra.
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Berti! Lintner, Yale Global, Yale Center of the Study of Globalization, Nov.24,2004, available at
IUP:llyclleQlob,al.yale.edu/display.article?id=4922 (last visited June 15, 2006).
Insurgents
behead
rubber
tapper,
The
Nation,
Mar.
7,
2006
available
at
nationmultimedia.com/searchlpage.news.php?elid=35&id=20002170 (last visited June 15, 2006).

,1I11l1./IIA" ......

Monk, temple boys murdered, Oct.17, 2005, available at
.l'!'lindex.php?id=1,1823,O,O,1,O (last visited Jun.15, 2006).
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This incident is a straightforward and clear instance of the dissidents group's
endeavor to pressure Buddhists and Muslims into religious conflict so as to provoke
further dissension and disorder. After a monk was hacked to death and two temple boys
were killed, their bodies burned in a raid on a Buddhist temple in Pattani, I7I the local
southern leaders appealed for calm and urged authorities not to take rash action.
However, the· Buddhist community began to protest and ask the Government to take
action against the Islamic dissidents. This violence is not merely intended to spark off
religious conflict but also to choose indiscriminate targets. After the killing of elderly
people, next would inevitably be infants and children.

XINHUA posted on May 27, 2006
A three-year-old infant was shot dead in his mother's arms
in· Thailand's southern province of Pattani by unidentified
gunmen late Saturday, and his parents and brother were
., d. 172
severe Iy Injure

About 7:00 p.m. on May 27, 2006, while a father was riding a motorcycle in
Pattani's district with his wife sitting behind him holding their infant and a one-year-old
little brother in her arms, an unidentified gunman opened fired on them, killing the infant
on the spot and injuring the other three persons.

172
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Infant shot dead-in Thai South, weapons recovered by military, Xinhua, May. .27, 2006 available at
com/englishl2006-05/27/content_4609668.htm (last visited Jun. 15, 2006).
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From these facts alone, it would be hard to say that the violence in this incident
goes beyond the statistically "normal" daily killing. However, if we observed that the
infant's father was a civil servant in the local government, this violence could be
interpreted not only as cruel and wanton act but also an expression of opposition against a
civil servant of the Government who had failed to perform his duty in this area.
Another couple was brutally murdered in Yala. The victims were Jud
Suwanchatree, 52, and his wife Serm Suwanchatree, 50. While they were riding a·
motorcycle with a side car, the husband was shot several times in the body, and his throat
was slit until he was nearly decapitated. The wife's throat was also slit until her head was
almost severed. Inside the side car, their pet dog was found dead with knife wounds to the
body and neck.

174

The act of brutal murder by a militant group reflects a sentiment of a strong
separatist movement and a disregard for human life. Many of them are without
justification for their indiscriminate murderous acts simply because of alleged lack of
effective cooperation between the Government and its people. The goal of brutal murder
is to put terror and fear in the mind of the people with a view to driving those who are not
part of their militant group into leaving their hometown. 175

174

Southern Violence: School director gunned down, Komchadluek, Jun. 24 , 2005, available at
http://www.komchadluek.netlbreaking/read.php?lang=en&newsid=66742 (last visited Jun. 15,2006).
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Kankavi, Fire in the South 198 -199, Animate Group, 2004.
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1. Government Response

Closed-circuit televisions were installed in government buildings, where officials
trained villagers to use weapons for self-defense. 176 It would seem that the State resorted
to many innovations with different tactics and techniques. However, the State must be
fully aware and take care not to release any policy that might cause a reaction to such
measures. For example, when all unregistered mobile phones began to be banned last

year in order to prevent bomb attacks in the region,l77 there was an immediate outburst of
11 bombings, both before the blockade and after. 178

H. The Deportation of 131 Muslims
As Thailand plans to make the country as attractive as possible for tourists and
businesses, a great effort was displayed to show the gentle character and hospitality of the
Thai people who provide a warm welcome for visitors. Thailand has given a safe haven
and afforded asylum to persons fearing persecution from as many as forty States around
the world. No fewer than 100,000 persons have fled their homelands to avoid being
caught in the crossfire of local armed conflicts, and at least 2 million migrants from
neighboring countries are seeking employment in the Kingdom.179 Recently, more than
176
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Slain, School Boss Shot Dead, Bangkok Post, Ju1.25, 2005 Post (Pg. Unavail. Online) 2005
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Thai ban mobile in terror drive, BBCNEWS, Nov, 15,2005, available at
hltp:llnews.bbc.co.ukl2lhi/asia-pacificl4439716.stm, (last visited Jun. 15, 2006).
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M Zachary Abuza, Southern Thailand Still Suffering from Insurgent Violence, Jamestown Organization,
ay. 31, 2006, available at
YIWw.Jamestown.org/terrorismfnews/article.php?articleid=2370013 (last visited Jun. 15, 2006).
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See J.W.Hudguet & S.Punping, cited in note 77 supra.
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neighboring States, including Malaysia, have concluded agreements with Thailand
visa requirements for holders of diplomatic, official, or
that are automatically permitted to enter and stay in the
p' ___

""~,

for 30 to 90 days.180

.....

This was made possible by the fact that Malaysia,

's adjacent neighbor, has had a tradition of Thais and Malays people being on
good terms. So much so, that it is very easy for Malays to enter Thailand even without
any travel documents. Just using the "angkat tangan" practice of raising a hand and
waving at the personnel manning the Bukit Kayu Hitam checkpoint, a border pass is
scarcely ever stamped. The locals have been using the "border pass system" for years to
18
enter Thailand for various reasons. !
On October, 30, 2005, l31 Thais took refuge in mosques in Kelantan, Malaysia,
offered temporary shelter. These 131 Thai Muslims fled across the border because
had lost faith in the Government's willingness or ability to protect them. However,
were blamed for illegally traveling to Malaysia. Malaysian police said they had
,""'U:UUI;;U

131 Thai Muslims, including women and children, who had fled across the

to escape the continuing violence without any travel documents and have handed
over to the immigration department for further action.!82 These situations raised
....vulIII"

about the standard of the pass checkpoints between the two countries. Meanwhile

Malaysian foreign minister also said that there were contemplating an immediate

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand, available at
.mfa.go.thfwebI2381.php#thailand (last visited Jun. 30, 2006).
Bukkit Kayu Hitam, New Straits Times, May. 24, 2006.
More bombings rock south Thailand. BBCNEWS, Sep.1. 2005. available at
.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/asia-pacificl4204028.stm (last visited Jun. 30. 2006).
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repatriation of the 131 Thai Muslims who had effectively left Thailand to avoid conflict

and the acts violence in Southern Thailand. 183

On the other hand, Thailand had a

different view of the incident.

1. Government Response
On September 5, 2005, Dr. Kantathi Suphamongkhon, Foreign Minister, gave a
press conference l84 on Thailand's reaction to the latest development in the South with
regard to the 131 illegal entries of Thai citizens from the 3 southernmost provinces into
Malaysian territory. On September 7, 2005, Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, DirectorGeneral of the Department of Information and Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, also gave a press conference I 85 .at the Press Center of the Foreign Ministry on the

Malaysia risks row with Thailand, BBCNEWS, Sep. 2,2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilasia-pacific/4208094.stm (last visited Jun. 30,2006).
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Kantathi Suphamongkhon, Foreign Minister, address Minister of Foreign Affairs: Thailand's reaction to
the latest development in the south with regard to the 131 illegal entries of Thai citizens from the 3
southernmost provinces into the Malaysian territory (Sep. 5, 2005) as follows:
1. Or. Kantathi Suphamongkhon, Foreign Minister, disclosed that yesterday he had another telephone
conversation with his counterpart, Syed Hamid Albar, the Malaysian Foreign Minister. Both sides understood
each other with regard to the issue. He pointed out that the Thai government intended to treat the 131 Thais
with compassion and understanding and would be working closely with Malaysia at all levels to establish the
facts. Efforts would be undertaken to ensure their safety and protection upon their return to Thailand.
2. With regard to the status of the 131 persons who have entered Malaysia illegally, Dr. Kantathi clarified
that he has been misquoted by the press and pointed out that, according to his information, most of them
~ere likely to be innocent civilians although there may be a few who were driven by hidden agendas which
aimed to create misunderstanding among international community by way of spreading unfounded rumors.
3. Given the present situation and sensitivity involved,it-isoocessary for all sides to be careful and to avoid
Words or statements that may not be helpful or may be interpreted as causing misunderstandings which may
impede efforts to resolve the situation. What is important under the present circumstances is that it is
necessary to act on facts and to engage in constructive exchanges of views and statements.

184

185

.

. ~Ihasak Phuangketkeow, Director-General of the Department of Information and Spokesman of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, address at the Press Center of the Foreign Ministry: The latest developments
reOO9arding the 131 Thai citizens who crossed the border into Kelantan State of Malaysia illegally ( Sept. 7,
2 5) as follows:
1. The governments of Thailand and Malaysia are working closely to resolve the problem. The Thai
a~thorities concerned will deal with the problem on the basis of national reconciliation and will make the best
e Orts to ensure the safety of the 131 Thai citizens.
~. According to Thai intelligence report, in early August 2005, around 10 militant leaders crossed the border
~ the Kelantan State of Malaysia in order to spread rumors tha.t there would be serious incidents in the 3
uthern provinces of Thailand. The rumors were also spread among Thai-Muslims who were employed in
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latest developments regarding the 131 Thai citizens who illegally crossed the border into
. M
I ' 186
{(elantan m
a aysIa.

This is the first time that Thailand officially called an organization by name,
namely, the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo )-as being behind the
terrorizing acts causing the 131 Thai Muslims to flee from Narathiwat into Kelantan.

187

It

is therefore the first accusation against the world's largest body of Islamic nations- the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)- where the organization is accused of
disseminating misperception and misinformation about the unrest caused by religious
conflict. 188 Also Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra believed the departure might have

Tranganu State. With regard to the case of the 131 people who have illegally entered Kelantan from
Thailand, intelligence reports have confirmed that leaders of the militant groups traveled into Kelantan five
days before the incident took place to lay the groundwork, after which the 131 persons gradually fled in
groups into Malaysia on 30 August 2005.
3. The claim that the death of Mr. Satopa Yuso, a villager of Lahan Nua sub-district, Su-ngai Padi district,
Narathiwat Province, on 29 August 2005 was the main cause for the fleeing of the 131 thais to Malaysia was
not consistent with the facts. Most of those who crossed the border to Malaysia actually came from other
areas.
4. The militants have also conducted activities abroad by working with the PULO movement, which
established a front organization called Pattani Malay Human Rights Organization (PMHRO) to spread
inaccurate information through its website www.pmhro.org to tarnish Thailand's irnage. Right after the
incident took place, the PMHRO is believed to have made approaches to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Switzerland with the information alleging that the 131 Thais were
terrified by the Thai government authorities after the implementation of the Executive Decree on Emergency
Situation because it is alleged that these people were involved in the Tak Bai incident last October. The
PMHRO, therefore, asked the UNHCR to render assistance to the 131 persons as well as to coordinate with
the Malaysian Government not to repatriate these people back to Thailand. Moreover. the website of the
organization was updated to report on the incident almost immediately after the report of illegal bordercrOssing.
5. According to the interrogation of the 131 Thais, it is believed that these people entered Malaysia as a
result of the rumors from the militants as well as the fear for their safety and not as a result of any acts
COmmitted by the Thai authorities. In addition, these insurgents had the intention to create misunderstanding
between the Thai and Malaysian Governments.
6. The Thai government stands ready to protect these 131 Thai citizens. The Malaysian government also
recognizes that this incident is Thailand's internal affair. The governments of both countries would work
tOgether closely to resolve the situations as soon as possible.
The spOkesman reiterated that this incident is Thailand's internal matter and that the Thai government has
never resorted to any acts by the authorities that might threaten or endanger Thai citizens in any way.
186

See Minister of Foreign Affairs, cited in note 184 supra.
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Bangkok Post, Sep.7, 2005.
188

Thailand Rejects Criticism from Muslim Nations Over Handling of Unrest in South, Reuters,
Oct. 19,2005.

77

been orchestrated to tum the southern situation into an international issue.

Although

prime Minister Taksin did not specially assert that the situation in the South was related
to the neighboring country, it is implicit in his account of the 131 Thai Muslims found
crossing the Southern border.

Finally, international attention was raised.

This is

consistent with the statement by the director of the Southern Border Provinces Peacebuilding Command who confirmed that the escalating violence in the deep South was
part of the militant group's attempts to get the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) involved. 189

Furthermore, Prime Minister Thaksin blamed the militants for

instilling fear in the hearts of the people, which he claimed eventually led to a state of
panic in the villages of Narathiwat. The Prime Minister also condemned activists who
had lodged a petition with the Thai embassy in Kuala Lumpur for being the villains and
rebels and warned the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees not to get
involved, or they would "become a pawn in the hands of the rebels.,,190 Although Prime
Minister Taksin tried to explain the situations, it was ineffective after the United Nations
refugee agency had begun interviewing the 131 Thai Muslims sheltered in Kelantan, the
Malaysian State bordering Narathiwat since September 6, 2005,191 and the summary of

. UNHCR on September 27, 2005 decided to withhold any public announcement as to the
status of the 131 Southern Thais currently living in Malaysia. At this stage, the important
issue is that the investigation of these 131 Thai Muslims would verify the accuracy of the
information furnished by Prime Minister Taksin. The Thai side had to prove that there

189

See Bangkok Post, cited in note 187 supra.
190

MA~tonio Guterres, Urgent Alert: Get Malaysia and UNHCR to Grant Refugee Status to Persecuted Thai
h~~hms, Islamic Human Rights Commission, ICHR. Oct. 5,
2005,
available
at
P·/lWWW.ihrc.org.uklshow.php?id=1576 (last visited 5 June 2006).
191

See Bangkok Post, cited in note 187 supra.
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was a hidden conspiracy plan on the part of the 131 Thai Muslims. Failure to establish
such a plan beyond a reasonable doubt, this question might function as a violation of

human rights on the part of the Thai Government. Meanwhile, one of the 131 Thai
Muslims was handed over to the Thai authorities and is facing criminal charges. 192

II - 3 Conclusion
The history of violent incidents in Southern Thailand is long and complex. The root
causes of the problems are expressed in the ongoing clash between the push toward
national identity and the pull of ethnic customs, beliefs and traditions. In this respect, the
prevailing concept of the ideology is not the same as it was in the past. These problems
are an extension of, but also different from, the old pre-existing problems. It is far
broader in scope than merely a battle fought by the nation against disgruntled citizens,
but now involves an international group with a deep understanding of media politics.

No one exactly knows whether the strategy of the attacks in the last two years
might well have been planned over hundreds of years or just designed in this era. The
five basic operations of militants, separatist and terrorist, start from day one in the
fOllowing order:

193

1. Falling Leaf Strategy: killing people daily

2. Extinction of Dharma Strategy: killing monks

~--------------------

1IA"~. Arul Rajoo, No Plan For Extradition Treaty With Thailand, Says Najib, Bernama, Jul. 14, 2006
....vv.bernama.com (last visited Jun.30, 2006).
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Kankavi, A true story from Tanyong Limor 191, Animate Group, 2004.
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3. Extinction of Light Strategy: killing teachers
4. Land of Darkness Strategy: blasting power plants
5. Land of Flood: blasting damns

These strategies cover operations in small areas of Southern Thailand. The result is
not much different from armed conflict and traditional or conventional warfare. The
tactical aspects include assaults in various forms of warfare, only it is worse than war or
anned conflict because it disregards any humanity concept or respect for the Rule of
Law.

Without any doubt, it is clear that all of the responses of the Government have

.

abs9lutely failed to deter these acts of violence as exemplified by the coordinated
bombings of government offices, police stations, and Army checkpoints at more than 40
locations in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat by Islamic militants. 194 In this case, there were
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untold physical injuries and damage to Government and private properties. As such, the

,

violence continued on June 15, 2006, a day deliberately chosen by a militant group to

":::I

!

represent the 'national day' of an independent Pattani sultanate. It was designed to
remind the local population that the cause championed by small groups of Malay
nationalists to create a separate homeland in the Muslim-majority region is still very
much alive and that the Government's effort to restore peace and re-establish the Rule of
Law is not working. The recent acts of the last four years were meant to send a message
that "the circle of violence" is approaching as it already has in the form of the Army raid,

----------------------194

h ~ilitants evolve as military wilts, The Nation, Jun. 16, 2006, available at
ttP.llwww.nationmultimedia.com/option/print.php?newsid=30006576 (last visited Jun. 30, 2006).
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or the stealing of weapons in the case at the army camp. The characteristics of these acts
of violence indicate recurrent patterns:
•

Challenge the power of the State;

•

Indiscriminate targets;

•

Villagers involvement;

•

Prelude to a religious conflict;

•

Appealing to international audiences, organizations, and mass media.

From all of these circumstances, violence has persisted for the past two years as if
there were no financial obstacles and as if the money has been sent from external sources
to support local assaults. This raises the question as to the planning, instigation or
perpetration of these acts of violence, and the profits of those who sponsor them. The
Government claimed to have knowledge and to have learned from intelligence
information that the militants were planning a 'major operation,195 on that date but the
Thai Security Forces simply lacked the capability to fight elusive battles with the
militants who have made effective use of hit-and-run tactics, creating havoc and then
quickly blending into the local population. The important thing that the government must
realize is that it may well be just the beginning: As long as the Government cannot
control the violence, "civil war"l96 remains a distinct possibility.
Throughout the history of Thailand and South Asia, untold numbers of people
suffered from extreme acts of violence. The instances I mentioned are hardly
195

46 bomb attacks rock Thailand, Daily News, Jun.16, 2006.
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. ~ war between different sections or parties of the same country or nation (Webster's Third New Edition
Dictionary); A war between factions of the same country; there are five criteria for international recognition

ofthis status: the contestants must control territory, have a functioning government, enjoy some foreign
r~nition, have identifiable recular armed forces, and engage in major military operations. (See
9 obalsecurity cited note 89 supra).
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comparable to the pam and suffering endured by the people. Whether those who

committed these acts of violence were to be later labeled as "rebels," "militants,"
"dissidents," "separatists," or "terrorists," or some combination of two or three of these
classifications, the key is how to arrest or interrupt these acts of violence for good by all
ofthe peaceful means at our disposal. It is everyone's fervent hope that in the long run
reason, wisdom, and justice will prevail.

************
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~ CHAPTER ...J
TERRORISM
111-1 Introduction
Just as so many dimensions of the world we live in today have changed
significantly with the rapid advances in technology so· too have terrorist acts undergone
drastic changes within this period of modem globalization. Recently, terrorism has been
on the rise. Terrorist acts continue to occur in almost every comer of the world -- in
Europe, America, Asia, Africa and throughout Asia. The number of nation states in the
year 200 1 that fell victim to terrorist attacks was no less than 26. The countries that have
the highest rate of terrorist activity are: India, Columbia, Algeria, Russia, Israel, and the
Philippines. 197

Terrorism has become, in some regions, an increasingly advanced operation often
involving networks of small groups of individuals (or cells) in which members are united
through a common cause. These networks of terrorist cells operate in close connection to
each other across great distances and, much like the digital global integration, have
penneated geographic boundaries and state sovereignties. 198 The events of September
II, 2001, directly affected New York and Washington, but not only were US citizens
IInpacted but so too were people all over the world. This incident illustrated how

-----_.----------------197
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'ns~RRI An~ual Report into International Terrorist Activity 2001, Emergency Response and Research
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. Neal A. Pollard, The Future of Terrorism, Terrorism Research Center, available at
terrorism.com (last visited Nov.1, 2006)
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terrorism created a crisis not merely for the United States but an international crisis that
directly involved US allies, detractors and nations who had hitherto attempted to remain
199
neutra.1

The word "terrorism" is a contentious one.

One man's "terrorist" is another

man's "freedom fighter." However, whatever interpretation of the motives for these acts,
it is impossible to escape the fact that the violent acts are a global concern. The United
Nations recently added 'terrorism' to the list of the most significant world problems that
. 1ude200 :
me

•

war between States;

•

violence within States; including civil wars, large - scale
human rights abuse and genocide;

•

poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation;

•

nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapon;

•

transnational organized crime; and

•

terrorism.

Because it is typically innocent people who are killed by terrorists, terrorism,
unlike war, touches the lives of people, regardless of politically affiliation, all around the
world. The whole idea of creating a State of Terror has also had the effect of making
199

Press Release, Secretary-General's message to the ceremony marking the commencement of the work

~f the regional counter-terrorism structure executive committee of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,

G/SM/9372(Jun. 17, 2004) as follows:
strikes at the very heart of everything the United Nations stands for. It is a global threat to
Ne~ocracy, the rule of law, human rights and stability, and therefore requires a global response. The United
atlons has an indispensable role to play in providing the legaUr2mework within which the international
campaign against terrorism can unfold.

~errorism

~

'II Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure

Orld: Our shared responsibility at 2, United Nations 2004.
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IIlore and more people aware of the profoundly global nature of this problem.
comparisons have been made between terrorism and 'SARS' because terrorist acts can
occur anywhere and, like SARS, can never be eradicated once and for all. Both are
global concerns that although they appear within the confines of a particular country,
have ramifications that defy all political, ideological or economic boundaries. 201
Within the evolving political, ideological, social and economic changes that
belong to this era of glQbalization, this chapter attempts to explore and analyze some of
the complexities facing in the world today. In this chapter, I will explore:
1. The use of the term "terrorists" by Thailand and the problems inherent in defining
terms such as "terrorist" by the United Nations;
2. The network of Al Queda in Southeast Asia and the effects on the recent situations in
southern Thailand;
3. The analysis of the violence

In

Southern Thailand

In

terms of terrorist law, self-

determination and the status of prisoners of war;
4. The Thai Government's response to the United Nations.
Before we discuss the issues above, it is important to first give an overview of the
historical background of terrorism in order to contextualize the modem day dilemmas.
201

Tony Tan Keng Yam, Deputy Prime Minister And Minister For Defence, at the Singapore-US Business
Council Plenary Meeting in New York (Apr. 10, 2003) as follows:
l11errorism is similar to SARS in yet another way. The battle against terrorism, like the battle
against SARS, has to be a long and sustained one. Weeks and months may go by without a
~rrorist attack, but it does not mean that the threat is gone. As Bali, Riyadh and Casablanca reminded us.
COuntry can eliminate SARS with robust healthcare measures, but the disease can come
back - perhaps brought back by a traveler who caught it i.O.__g[lOther country. Toronto knows this
only too well. Toronto was declared SARS-free by the WHO in mid May, only to be hit by
another outbreak of SARS less than two weeks later.

ierro~ism.

is also a global menace. With its roots in radical Islamic elements in the Middle East,
erronsm IS now a phenomenon penetrating all corners of the globe.
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Terrorism is not a new phenomenon nor is it a new word. There have been so-called
terrorist acts before the first century [the Zealots- Sicarii202 ]. In more recent history, the
end of World War II marked the beginning of new dividing lines for terrorists. With the
cold war, the idea of anti-Democratic/anti-Capitalist, Marxist-based ideology arose as a
popular motivating factor for many terrorist acts. There were terrorists to be found in
Indochina, the first notable terrorist group known in Asia with trans-boundary activity
was the C.T. (Chinese, or at time Communist, Terrorist).203 Terrorism arose in any place
where anti-government sentiment leads to outright violence. Such "terrorists," however,
tended to wage their wars in the traditional manner of rural guerrillas, sometimes coupled
with urban operations.
It was in this context that "terrorism" has become a historical term variously

associated with French terror, revolutionary Anarchism or the "Mad" bombers. While
anti-insurgency and guerrilla warfare were fashionable terms for academic subjects, this
was not true of terrorism.

Western governments would label any number of group

terrorists for a variety of politically motives. It was common for the government to
blame any political adversary as a 'terrorist.' As a result, the term became a catch all
phrase that, although ubiquitous, is inherently politically suspicious.
The British had fought CTs--Communist terrorist--in Malaya and the "mad"
terrorists of the Mau Mau in Kenya. The French had fought the FKN terrorists in Algeria
and, in the process, had fashioned their own brand of philosophy for counter-terrorism.

----------------------202 A Jewish group in Palestine murdered individua-Is-w-ith dagger and swords. Later, they turned to open
~arfare. Their objective wasto-ereate a mass uprising against the Greeks in Judea and against the

.

that governed both Greeks and Jews. The revolt had unforeseen and devastating consequences,
lea°~ans
ding to the destruction of the Temple and to the mass suicide at Masada.

203

V, I Sompong Sucharitkul, International Terrorism and the Problem of Jurisdiction 148, Syr.J.lnt.l. & Com.,
0.14 No.2, winter 1987.
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Also, the Thai Government had fought local Malaysian communists (mostly Chinese)
who made their home base in the border between southern Thailand and northern
Malaysia. Thailand made a law banning Communism (the Communist Act) at that time
to justify its military presence in this region and has since disbanded this law.

Such violence, however, was commonly perceived by the world within the
imperialist context in which rural guerilla warfare was seen as an effective response to
institutionalized injustice and centralist despotism. 204 However, ideological terrorism
was more often than not the most modem incarnation of ethno-religious conflicts in some
centuries-old disputes, the terms of which now took the form of terrorism, insurgency,
regional instability, and civil war. 205

III - 2 The Use of the Term "Terrorism"
A. Problems defining the term "Terrorism" as articulated by the
United Nations
Although terrorist acts have occurred among states for centuries and today we
have twelve major

multilateral conventions

and, protocols

related to

States'

responsibilities for counter-terrorist acts,206 there are still problems with defining,
classifying and formulating terrorism as a legal category. These problems with defining
the term have impeded meaningful endeavors to suppress acts of terrorism on an
--~-----------------204
B ~.Bowyer Bell, A time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence 58,
aSlcbooks, Inc., Publisher 1978iffi31).
20s

See N. A. Pollard cited in note 198 supra.
2(JG

htt ~onventions against Terrorism, The United Nations, available at
P.//WWw.unodc.org/unOdclterrorism_conventions.html(last visited Aug. 1,2006).
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international scene. 207 However, even if no universal definition of terrorism has yet been
defined the United Nations, there are generally accepted ideas of what terrorism means.
When walk about terror, everybody knows, broadly speaking, what this means.
The first attempt to define terrorism was made under the League of Nations, the
draft in 1937 was never ratified.

However, the United Nations did not ignore the

importance of terrorism. Twelve Conventions and Additional Protocols were negotiated
from 1963 to 1999. Most are penal in nature with a common format. Typically, they
defined a particular type of terrorist conduct as an offense under the convention, such as
seizure of an aircraft in flight by threat or force. The convention also called upon State
parties to penalize that activity in their domestic law; identified certain bases upon which

the relevant state parties are required to establish jurisdiction over the defined offense,
such as registration, territoriality, or nationality; and entitled the State party in which an
accused offender is found to establish jurisdiction over the offense and to refer the
offense for prosecution if the party does not extradite pursuant to other provisions of the
.Convention. 208
Obviously, terrorists do not call themselves terrorists. The rhetoric of freedom
'.

replete with images of liberation, military structure, self-defense, righteous
self-determination,

has made these unclear definitions more complex.

one of the problems of finding a proper definition of "terrorists" is that
can be applied downwards as well as upwards. In other words, certain groups can
as an attempt to influence government decisions (or public approval of

See S. Sucharitkul, cited in note 203 supra. at p. 141
. Country Reports on Terrorism, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Apr. 27, 2001, US
of States, available at www.state.gov (last visited Nov.1, 2006).
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govenunent decisions) or even to demolish the structure of a State. On the other hand, the
spread of fear can be applied to the government itself (used "downwards") against its
own citizens as a method of retaining power (Chile under Pinochet was a clear example
ofthis use ofterror).209
However, if there is no agreed-upon definition to the term, the violence will
inevitably continue.

Of course, the violence may continue with or without such a

definition but formulating a legal term might better help stem the acts of violence (even if
it does not squelch anti-government sentiment).

B. Efforts to Define "Terrorism" by Nations
All States, in every region -- large or small, strong or weak -are vulnerable to terrorism and its consequences. They all stand
to benefit from a strategy to counter it. They all have a role to
play in shaping such a strategy, in implementing it, and in
ensuring that it is updated continuously to respond to challenges
as they evolve.

210

Terrorism, unlike manslaughter, takes as its target the State not an individual.

211

Accordingly, States have a duty to guard their sovereignties by maintaining their powers

of determination through legally defining what constitutes terrorism in their countries.

-

-----------------------2f:td Nici Keijer, Terrorism as a crime p119 0Nybo P .Heere, ed, Cambridge University Press 2003).
210

GI ~he Secretary-General, Address on the Launch of Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a
h o. al Counter - Terrorism Strategy, New York (May. 22006), available at
1tp./Iwww.un.org/unitingagainstterrorism/sgstatement.html(last visited Nov1. 2006)

·211

Isr S~mpong Sucharitkul, Terrorism as an international crime: Questions of responsibility and complicity 247,
ae Yearbook on Human rights.
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The principal judicial statement following comes from the principles in customary
international law namely, Lotus case,212 which can be categorized the aspects of
jurisdiction such as:
1. Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the power of a State to
make its laws applicable to people, events and things,
whether by legislation, administrative rule, executive order,
or sometimes judicial ruling.
2. Adjudicative jurisdiction refers to the power of a State to

subject a person to the process of its courts
3.

Enforcement jurisdiction refers to the power of a State to
ensure through coercive means that its legal commands are
·h 213
· d Wit.
compI Ie

Howsoever, the five basic fundamentals that international law recognizes for the
sovereign rights of States are214 :

1. The Territorial Principle 215
2. The Nationality Principle 216

3. The Protective Principle 217
212
213

France v.Turkey, 1927 PCIJ, ser.A, No.10.

. .
Junsdlction and Immunities, Public International Law, Part IB, 2005-6; available at

http://www.law.cam.ac.ukldocslview.php?doc=2893.(last visited Nov.1, 2006).
214

Thomas Buergenthal & Harold G.Maier, Public International Law 163-174, West Publishing (1985).
2Is/bid.

[S]tates have jurisdiction over their nationals, even when those nationals are phy sically outside the
~untry's ~orders. This is so both because the national owes allegianceto his own country no matter where
net~r she IS located and because each nation has both responsibility to other nations for the conduct of its
a lonals and an interest in their welfare while they are abroad.
2Is/ ·

bI.
d

~ach sta~e has the right to define who are its nationals.

Nationality may be acquired "naturally" as the

paSUIt of birth, either by being born within a state's territory (jus soli) or through the nationality of one's
rents (jus sanguinis) or both. It may also be acquired "artificially," by naturalization.
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4. The Universality Principle 218
219
5. The Passive Personality Principle

Because States

have

self-sovereignty,

territorial integrity

and

political

independence, they also have jurisdiction over all acts committed by as well as upon its
nation (despite whether _acts against the nation were actually committed within the
nation's boundaries). When there is terrorist activity that threatens the State's security,
States have the right to ascertain their jurisdictions to establish and enforce their laws.
Recently, over 170 nations continue to participate in the war on terrorism by
taking terrorists into custody, freezing terrorist assets and providing military forces and
other support. International organizations are also adapting to meet the threat. There have
been numerous steps taken to eliminate underlying circumstances that foster terrorism. 22o
Because the US faces many terrorist acts, many US organizations have attempted to
. define the term "terrorist" in relation to various ideologically motivated acts of violence.
Such definitions have been generated by: the U.S. National Counter Terrorism Center

217 Ibid.

[T]his principle permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over conduct outside its territory that threatens its
security, as long as that conduct is generally recognized as criminal by states in the international community .

/bid.
[T]h: 'universality" principle recognizes that certain activities, universally dangerous to states and their
Subjects, require authority in all community members to punish such acts wherever they may occur, even
absent a link between the state and the parties or the acts in question.

. 2lB

219 Ibid.

[UI~der this principle a state claims jurisdiction over acts committed abroad solely because they injure a
:tionai of the claiming state. This principle is related to the universality principle in that it is invoked only
ere the state claiming jurisdiction has no other connection with the act.
220

The U.S. Department of State.
[T]he U.S. Department of State defines "terrorism" tobe "premeditated politically-motivated violence
~rpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to
uence an aUdience".
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(NCTC),221 the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 222 the United States Department of
Defense,

223

the USA PATRIOT Act 224and the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI).225

No States, however, are able to stay for the UN to arrive at a definition since the
threat to State sovereignty is often urgent and pressing. Many States do not hesitate to
adopt a definition of "Terrorism" that hopes to quell any threat to national security.
The US White House's report on September 11,2002, divided the global war on
terrorism into three parts:

1. Attacking Terrorist Networks at Home and Abroad;

2. Securing the Homeland; and
3. Strengthening and Sustaining the International Fight
against Terrorism.
'I::'")

.,..::lCrJ"",'

The first section focuses on defeating terrorist leadership and personnel, denying
terrorist haven and sponsorship, and eradicating sources of terrorist financing. The
second section is concerned with reorganizing the federal government -- especially
creating the Department of Homeland Security- by reducing America's vulnerability to
221

The U.S. National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC): [A] terrorist act as one which was: "premeditated;
pe~etrated by a sub national or clandestine agent; politically motivated, potentially including religious,
philosophical, or culturally symbolic motivations; violent; and perpetrated against a noncombatant target"
~

The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. [T]he unlawful use of force and violence against persons or

,:ope.~y to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance

.~.• pollttcal or social objectives.

United States Department of Defense. fTlhe calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear;
to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political,
or ideological.
PATRIOT Act. [A]cts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
Or of any State.
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). [T]errorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons
to intimidate or coerce a govemment, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
of political or social objectives.
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I"

,,

terrorists through enhancing emergency preparedness and response capabilities. The third
part is devoted to global and regional efforts of fighting terrorism by attempting to
remedy the underlying social, cultural and economic conditions that terrorists exploit?26

226 See

us Department of State cited in note 220 supra.
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The British Terrorism Act 2000· of the UK227 , the Philippines228 , and Australia

-

The British Terrorism Act 2000.
(1)
terrorism means the use or threat of action where(a)
the action falls within subsection (2),
(b)
the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
(c)
the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political; religious or ideological cause.
(2)
Action falls within the subsection if it (a)
involves serious violence against a person,
(b)
involves serious damage to property,
(c)
endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,
(d)
creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or
(e)
is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
(3)
T~e use ?r threat of action falling ~ithin su?sect~on(2) which involves the use of firearms or
explosives IS terronsm whether or not subsectlon(1 )(b) IS satisfied.

'}27

The British Terrorism Act 2006.
Amendment of the definition of "terrorism" etc.
In each of.(a)
section 1(1 )(b~ of the Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11) (under which actions
and threats designed to influence a govemment may be terrorism), and
(b)
section 113(1 ) (c) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
(c. 24) (offence of using-noxious substances or things to influence
government or to intimidate), after "government" insert "or an international governmental organisation".

.i

Anti-terrorism, Grime and Security Act 2001.
Dangerous Substances
(113)

Use of noxious substances or things to cause harm and intimidate

(1)

A person who takes any action which-

(a)

involves the use of a noxious substance or other noxious thing;

(b)

has or is likely to have an effect falling within subsection (2); and

(c)

is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, iis

guilty of an offence.

228

Act of Terrorism, Republic of the Philippines House of Representatives(2002).

sec.3. [T]errorism refers to the premeditated use or threatened use of violence or means of destruction
against innocent civilians or non-combatants, or against civilian and government properties, to instill a state
of common danger, panic or fear intended to influence and audience, regardless of motivations.
Ibid.at sec.3 h)
!C]yberterrorism refers to unlawful act and threat of attack against computers, networks, servers, and
~nf?rmation and communication system resulting in violence against persons or property when done to
Illtlmidate or coerce a government or its people using available and sophisticated instrument in cyberspace.
Ibid. at sec.5.
[AJn act of terrorism is committed when an individual acting for, or an aggravation, organization,
con~regation or band of people come together to create or sow common danger or a state of terror, fear
paOlc and chaos on the general public, or in order to coerce or intimidate the public in the government,
through the use of force, intimidation, or violence, or by means possible and by every method available
~esulting in the deprivation of personal liberty, or destruction of lives and property to achieve any of
,allOWing:
1)
To threaten or cause death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use of violence or to
cause a serious risk to health or safety of the public or any segment of the public;.
2)
To threaten or cause substantial damage to infrastructure or property, public or private; and
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Criminal Code 1995 of the Commonwealth)229 defined terrorism not only as a
act but any act that is potentially considered to perpetrate violence upon the State

its citizens (such as shutting down a website or security system), whereas the Penal
of Indonesia23o and Thailand231 and the Internal Security Act (lSA) of Malaysia232

To threaten or cause serious interference with or serious ~isruption of an essential service,
or system, whether public or private, other than as a result of lawful advocacy, protest dissent or
stoppage of work.
·AdofTerrorism, Republic of the Philippines House of Representatives(2007).

'Sec.3 [T]errorism is the premeditated or threatened use of violence of force or any other means that
deliberately cause harm to persons, or of force and other destructive means against property or the
.' environment, with the intention of creating or sowing a state of danger, panic, fear, or chaos to the general
public or segment thereof, or of coercing or intimidating the government to do or refrain from doing an act.

229 The Criminal Code 1995 ofthe Commonwealth, sec. 100.1.
'';. 'terrorist act • means an act, or threat of action, that is done or made with the intention of advancing a
'. political, ideological or religious cause; and done or made with the intention of advancing a political,
~: ideological or religious; and done or made with the intention of either;
'':
coercing or influencing by intimidation the Government of Australia or of another country; or
,;, '.
intimidating the public or a section of the public.
'
·~:The act or threat of action, must also cause a person serious physical harm or death, or involve serious risk
• 0 public heath or safety, serious damage to property, or interfere with an electronic system.

Government Regulation in lieu of Legislation of the Republic of Indonesia No 1/2002 on Combating
Acts of Terrorism. sec.1 .
. A criminal act of terrorism is any action having the elements of a criminal act in accordance with the
of this Government regulation in Lieu of Legislation.
is any individual or group of persons, either civilian, military or police, who is responsible
'U'VIUUQIIV or as a corporation.
A corporation is an organized group of persons and/or properties, whether or not in the form of a legal

nrnIJi!:.i/,n<:

is any act of misusing physical strength with or without the use of unlawful means, which causes
to the body, life and freedom of a person, including causing a person to become unconscious or
lOWEirles;s.
A threat of violence is any action intentionally committed to give a sign or warning about a certain
that tends to Cause widespread fear for a person or for the community in general.
hl'\V"'r'nrn.ont of the Republic of Indonesia is the government of the representatives of the Republic of
laOI''''<:;", Overseas .
Representatives of foreign countries are foreign diplomatic and consular representatives and their
intemational organization is an organization within the structural scope of the United Nations or any
organization outside the United Nations or any organization undertaking its duties representing
United Nations. Assets are any movable or immovable, tangible or intangible objects.
A vital and strategic object is any place, location or building that has very high economiC, political, social,
and defence and security values, including international facilities.
A public facility is any place used for the interests of the general public.
An explosive is any material that may explode any type of ammunition, bomb, burning bomb, mine, hand
or any explosive material made from chemicals or other materials used to create an explosion.
The Penal Code Amendment Act (No. 13) B.E.2546 (2003). sec. 13511.
SCOpe of terrorism would treat terrorist acts as serious offences, and criminalize all steps in the
process: the preparation, the aiding and abetting, and the actual commission of acts of terrorism.
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cover any and all acts that could be construed as terrorist acts. Yet, Australia launched
the Australian Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 to extend the Criminal Code 1995 of the
Commonwealth relating to terrorist acts such as an extension for the definition of a
terrorist organization, an allowance for monitoring of terrorist suspects, a grant of
controlling a person for up to 48 hours without charge. 233

[A) conduct made with the intention to -intimidate a population, to threaten or compel the Royal Thai
Govemment or any government or international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.
Ibid. at sec. 135/2.
[A)ny person providing forces, arms, properties or any support for the commission of terrorism is considered
to be committing an act of terrorism.
Ibid. at sec. 135/3.
[C]nminalizes - stockpiling weapons, providing or compiling property, or organizing any preparation or
conspiracy in order to commit a terrorist act. (availaDle at www.interpol.int, last visited nov.1, 2006).
232 Koninklijke Brill N.v 2004. The Internal Security Act (lSA) 1960, Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights
and the Law 1 :86-203, 2004.
· P.I, sec.2 defines "terrorist" as meaning a person who:
· by the use of any fire- arm, explosive or ammunition acts in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or to
the maintenance of public order or incites violence or counsels disobedience to the law or to any lawful
order;
• carries or has in his possession or under his control any fire - arm, ammunition or explosive without lawful
authority; or
- demands, collect or receives any supplies for the use of any person who intends or is about to act, or has
recently acted, in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order

[1]he ISA prohibits a wide variety of conduct, apparel and objects including:
· P.tl, sec.3 and sec. 7. manufacture, use, sale, display or possession of uniforms, other dress or emblems
of political or quasi-military organization;
· P.tl, sec.5quasi- military organization;
• P.II, sec.6 illegal training in the use of arms;
• P.II, Chap.lIl, sec.22, 25, and 27. possession, printing, sale etc of documents and publications or the
POSing of placards that incite violence, counsel disobedience to the law, is likely to lead to a breach of the
peace, is prejudicial to the national interest;
oP.tI, Chap. IV, sec.35. holding of any entertainment or exhibition detrimental to the national interest;
• P.tl, Chap.v, sec.41 B. use of a school or educational institution for a purpose detrimental to the interests of
Malaysia or the public, for instruction detrimental to the interests of the public or pupils, or as a meeting
place of an unlawful society;
• P.III, Chap. III, sec.57 and sec.58. offences relating to fire-arms, ammunition and explosives, including
COnsorting With, or being a person who, carries or has possession of arms or explosive; and
• attempting to commit any of the above acts.
233

See AUstralian National Security, available at, www.ag.oov.au.

~he Anti-Terrorism Act (No.2) 2005 is an act to amend the law relating to terrorist acts, and for other
urposes. The principal features of the Act are:

~ an .extension of the definition of a terrorist organisation to enable listing of organisations that advocate
rronsm;
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Although Thailand does not specifY what types of acts constitute terrorism, her
does not exclude the possibility of cyber-attacks or infiltration of security
systems as forms of terrorist attacks. Further the Money Laundering Control Act
B.E.2542(1999) states "terrorist offence" to be "predicate offences" in the Act. Further,

it could be observed that the Penal Code of Singapore does not contain an offense ofcommitting a terrorist act," but covers the planning, preparation, and perpetration of
terrorist acts that involve murder, causing injury,. hijacking, kidnapping and other
offenses covered by the criminal.2J4

. A number of States define terrorism in terms of criminalization because the act of
terrorism is clearly seen bY' many as a criminal act even without this additional element
that links the act of violence to the State through the "undertaking," "assisting,"
"encouragement" or "tole~tion" by State authorities?35

a new regime to allow for 'control orders' that will allow for the overt close monitoring of terrorist suspects
pose a risk to the community;
.
a new police preventative detention regime that will allow detention of a person for up to 48 hours without
where it is reasonably necessary to prevent a terrorist act or to preserve evidence of such an act;
updated sedition offences to cover those who urge violence or assistance to Australia's enemies;
. strengthened offences of financing of terrorism by better coverage of the collection of funds for terrorist

,

new regime of stop, question, search and seize powers that will be exercisable at airports and other
places to prevent or respond to terrorism;
new notice to produce regime to ensure the AFP is able to enforce compliance with lawful requests for
that will facilitate the investigation of a terrorism or other serious offence;
nArlrln'''n'~ to ASIO's special powers warrant regime;
amendments to the offence of providing false or misleading information under an ASIO questioning
to authorize access to airline passenger information for law enforcement and intelligence
,
creation of a legal basis for the use of video surveillance at Australia's major airports and on aircraft;
additional implementation of FATF Special Recommendations covering criminalizing financing of
altemative remittance dealers, wire transfers and cash couriers.

at, HYPERLINK "htlp:llwww.interpol.intlPubliclBioTerrorism/NationaILaws/Singapore.pdf'
.intlPubliclBioTerrorismlNationaILaws/Singapore.pdf (last visited Nov.1, 2006).
S. Sucharitkul, cited in note 203 supra at p.14S.

97

According to the attempt to identify such criminals through available investigative
tools, granting liberal permission for intelligence gathering in order to target those who
commit or support terrorism.

Often States authorize a military response (in certain

circumstances), allocate resources, create and refine legal responses and call upon
. 1and'IIIt eragency cooperatIOn.
.
236
internatlOna

One of the central reasons for defining terrorism in such a way is to consecrate the
offense with a seriousness that elevates it. from an ordinary crime made punishable under
domestic law to the top category of the gravest international crimes, an "offence against
the peace and security of mankind," with all the grave consequences that inevitably
follow.

237

Without a definition from the United Nations, the ICC cannot adopt terrorism as a
separate crime in the Statute. The reason for this was the lack of a definition that was
generally acceptable and would not include acts committed in the context of a people's
struggle for self-determination.
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III - 3 The Al Queda Network in Southeast Asia and its efforts
on Southern Thailand
Because of the events of September 11, 2001, the term "terrorist" has been
indelibly linked to Al Queda and Osama Bin Laden. I wish to take a few moments to

-

236 J .---.-.- - - - - . oint US mlhtary Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAG THAI).
Zl7
See S. Sucharitkul,cited in note 203 supra. at p.145.

;H~CO kOijer, Terrorism and the Military International Legal Implications, Terrorism as a Crime 125 0/Vybo
re ed., Cambridge University press 2003).
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explore the complex history of this Al Queda terrorist organization in order to better
explicate the circumstances in Thailand and the problems in southeast Asia.

239

Al Queda is an international organization founded in 1979, a virtual clearinghouse
for Muslims opposed the invasion of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. After one

year, the Services Office-run by Bin Laden and the Palestinian religious scholar
Abdullah Azzam-recruited, trained, and financed thousands of foreign mujahadeen, or
holy warriors, from more· than fifty countries. 24o After the Afghan war was over, Bin
Laden returned to Saudi Arabia where he inherited a fortune estimated at US $300
million. However, he was expelled in 1991 and has his political status revoked as a result
-of his political activities. He then moved to Sudan, where he established training camps
for his followers who were incensed by the presence of America troops on Saudi soil
during the Gulf war. Under pressure from the US, Sudan expelled him. He then headed
back to shelter under the new Taliban Government in Afghanistan. 241 Al Qaeda worked
out of Pakistan along the Afghan border, or inside Pakistani cities during 1991 -1996.
Until today Al Qaeda is still an international terrorist network run by Osama bin Laden.

The goal of this international organization was to rid Muslim countries of what
Was

seen as the profane influence of the West and replace their governments with

fundamentalist Islamic regimes.

242

One of the principal goals was to pressure the United

States armed forces out of Saudi Arabia and Somalia. 243

Even though the terrorist

~-----------Barb·
.

Ie Zeltzer, Journalism After September 11 22, Routledge Pub~r 2002.

l~

http~ on Foreign Relations: A Nonpartisan Resource for Information and Analysis, available at
.cfr.orgl (last visited Aug.1, 2006).
l41An

Sllllthd~eWTan, The 'New'

Terrorism: How Southeast Asia Can Counter It 89, (Uwe Johanannen, Alan
• ames Gomez eds., Select Publishing Pte, 2003).
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violence occurred around the world, the most prominent and desirable target has always
been the infrastructures of the US?44 However, many countries (even those which are not
strong US allies) have been the victims of terrorist threats.
Al Qaeda has strong connections to other "terrorist organizations that operated
under its umbrella." To further its objective of a global Jihad Al Qaeda has had a
longstanding interest in utilizing leaderless terrorism245 such as: the al Jihad group based
in Egypt, the Islamic Group, formerly led by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, and other jihad
groups in other countries. 246 Moreover, Al Qaeda has an underground branch connection
to no less than 100 countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy,
France, Spain, Germany, Albania, Uganda, and elsewhere. 247 The list of major groups in
Asia and several groups have been accused of the linking with Al Qaeda and the
movements in the region are : Jemaah Islamiah (JI), Laskar Jihad (Ll), The Front
Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front-FPI), Abu Sayyaf (Bearer of the Sword), The
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MIL F), and The New People's Army (NPA).248
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245 Dennis Pluchinsky, Live Webcast: The Global Jihad: Leaderless Terrorism? Former Senior Intelligence
Analyst, Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Department of State.
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248 Frank Frost & Ann Rann, & Andrew Chin, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade Group, Parliament of Australia, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/librarylintguide/FAD/sea.htm (last
visited Aug.1, 2006).
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Because Al Queda uses a religious connection and Muslims have a long history of
contact with co-religionists in Southeast Asia and the Middle East,249 there are longstanding economic and trade connections between Southeast Asia and Middle Eastern
and South Asian countries.

Many of them are connected to each other by way of legal

financial channels without any formal government links.

For example, the U.S.

Department of the Treasury designated the Philippine and Indonesian branch offices of
.the Saudi-based International Islamic Relief Organization (lIRO) for facilitating fund
raising for Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groupS.2S0
These have facilitated the transfer of funds from the Middle East and South Asia
to radical groups in the region. 2SI The Asian Financial crisis in 1997 put pressure on
regional governments to stimulate the economy but spending on crucial areas such as
education remained restricted. Because local schools were under-funded, there was an
increase in the popularity of religious schools (for instance, Ponok school in Thailand).
Furthermore, well-funded Islamic radical movements have been able to offer
financial support both to adherents and their families (for example, in the event of death
in combat). This has had considerable appeal to those in outlying and economically
disadvantaged areas. Meanwhile, socio-economic factors have fostered further support
for radical Islamic groups in the region. Efforts to attain autonomy by Islamic movements
have often either been resisted by central governments or have been implemented

_ August 2003, Asian Analysis, Asian Focus Group, the Faculty of Asian Studies, The
Australian National University. http://www.aseanfocus.com/asiananalysis/article.cfm?articleID=668(Iast
visited Nov.1 2006).
249 Thailand

250 Treasury DeSignates Director, Branches of Charity Bankrolling AI Qaeda Network, The U.S. Department
of the Treasury.

251See F. Frost & A. Rann, & A. Chin cited in note 248 supra.
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ineffectively (as in the southern Phllippines)?S2 In addition to these factors, domestic
security lost funds, borders were porous, and immigration control became weak.
Malaysia, for example, has not until recently required visas for anyone from Muslim
countries who is a member of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). Another
example of weak immigration control is Thailand, where there is an influx of illegal from
Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia. The system in the Philippines is similarly lax;
there it is easy and common for foreigners to marry Filipino citizens so as to effectively
change their identity. Administrative requirements can also be circumvented through
corruption, graft being an all-too common result of drug trafficking, traditional ethnic
allegiances or both. 253
It initially appeared to many experts that the terrorist organization responsible for

the hijackings of September 11 had used Southeast Asia as a transit zone between
Al Queda's base in the middle east. 254 However, 'British-based terrorist's experts have
calculated that 20% of Al Qaeda's organizational strength has always been in Asia,
including volunteers from Central Asian, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines?55
Most notably, the geographically extensive and porous archipelagos of Indonesia
and the Philippines afford a suitably remote base for training camps. Southeast Asia is
also home to nations with large Muslim populations sympathetic to Al Qaeda's hostility
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Hadl Soesastro: Global Terrorism: Implications for State and Human Security 76, (Uwe Johanannen,
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Alan Boyd, Jakarta blast a sign of what's to come, Asia Times, Sep. 11; 2004, available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SoutheasLAsia/FI11Ae01.html(last visited Aug.1, 2006).
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towards western culture, and some of Ai Qaeda' s views have gained popularity with the
great numbers of individuals living below the poverty line. The bombing in Bali in 2000
caused panic not only in Southeast Asia, in the US and abroad but it was also an
irrefutable sign that modem terrorist activities are expanding across the Asia-Pacific
region.
The Bali bombings in Indonesia on October 12, 2002, have directed attention to
the issue that Southeast Asia is a region that continues to cultivate both indigenous. and
international terrorist groups. The two are closely interlinked. 256 Shortly after the
September 11 th attacks, for instance, the Indonesian police raided the safe house of
Jemaah Islamiya (1I) senior member Noordin Mohammed in Wonosobo, Central Java. 257
Although there has been great suspicion that JI is linked with Al Queda, arrests of many
members of JI have weakened its power in this region. Despite these arrests, JI was
responsible for terrorist acts, twice in Jakarta and in Bali. So even though a lot of JI
member have been arrested, JI has survived partly because of its financ.ial backing of
At Qaeda and the fact that it is held together by an intricate pattern of kinship bonds. JI
members tend to cement ideological bonds by marrying the sisters and daughters of their
comrades-in-arms. This is a unique tool utilized for recruitment and for further
engagement in the JI cause, thus limiting disengagement options for JI members and
blocking effective counter-terrorism tactics. Generally, people do not gravitate to JI due
to some individual pathology. Indeed, most recruits look, dress and behave like normal
individuals, at least until they are given a deadly mission or are deeply engaged with the

-

;;--------------------See F. Frost & A. Rann, & A. Chin, cited in note 248 supra.
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J Southeast Asia's most wanted terrorist. (see Noor Huda Ismail, The Role of Kinship in Indonesia's
I emaah Islamiya, available at http:/~amestown.org (last visited Nov.1, 2006) and see also Terrorism in

~~~oneSia : Noordin's Network , International Crisis Group available at http://www.crisisgroup.org (last
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103

n ideology and group. The choice to become a terrorist or engage in terrorist activities is
a gradual process with many routes toward this type of political violence.
It becomes difficult for a member to defect from 11 without seeming to betray his

family in the process of disengagement. Kinship ties help to keep the network secure
from infiltration. 11 as a case study offers several examples that highlight the complexity
of kinship links in terrorist organizations (such relationships include: two or more male
siblings, in-laws, fathers and sons, as well as more distant kinship relations)?58 These
familial connections demonstrate that far from terrorism tearing connections between
individuals apart, it is precisely those close bonds that allow a terrorist network to
undertake jihadi operations. 259 Even the Indonesian Government's attempt to lunch
-counter-terrorism measures has not been entirely successful because the central
government is unable to fully control what goes on in its far-flung outer islands.
In the Philippines, the Government keeps an eye on the Abu Sayyaf rebels in the
southern Philippines, given that they have closed links to Al Queda?60 The group has its
base in the Basilan Island in the South, and these rebels have plagued the Government in
Manila for decades. Abu Sayyaf's link to Al Queda has not been questioned, although
more recent reports suggest that there are stronger ties between the MILF (Moro Islamic
Liberation Front) members and Al Queda. Abu Sayyaf has about 2000 members, some
of whom have trained in Afghanistan, and are fighting to establish an Islamic State. The
group is responsible for bombings, killings and a multitude of kidnappings, where the
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Noor Huda Ismail, The Role of Kinship in Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiya, available at http://jamestown.org
(last visited Nov.1, 2006).
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ransom money was used to buy weapons and speedboats. 261

However, the current

cooperation between the Philippines and the United States, in which joint military
exercises have been able to strengthen the capacity of the Philippine military for
counterterrorism, has seen by many as attempting to stem the violence but not the
underlying deep-seated problems responsible for the terrorist acts. 262
Singapore has a long history regarding anti-government violence, beginning with
communist terrorists active from 1950 to 1970. It is not surprising why the Singapore
Government believes that there are many more members who are hiding and planning to
carry out more attacks. Moreover, Singapore, with its weak immigration control, has been
a safe haven for those terrorists in the region. During the JI arrests, those JI members
able to return to Singapore managed to escape lSD's arrests. Even though there were
more than 200 11 members arrested in Southeast Asia, the regional 11 has been recruiting
more members to fill the ranks of those who have been arrested, seeking cooperation with
other terrorist groups. This group has the manpower and resources to continue their terror
plans in Southeast Asia and Singapore. Although Singapore supports the policy to
provide information to neighboring governments on the 11, which led to the JI members
there being arrested, Singapore also fears that 11 would take revenge on their "brothers"
Who have been caught as a result of Singaporean operations?63
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Ibid. at 76.

262 Filipino Muslims Need More Than Economic Development, United States Institute of Peace,
Vol. VIII, No.3, available at http://www.usip.org/peacewatchl2002l4/filipino.html(last visited Nov. 1,2006).
263

Mr Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs, The Official Launch of The Counter-Terrorism Security
Briefing for Taxi Drivers at Yio Chu Kang Community Club (Jul. 11, 2005) as follows:

[T]errorism has posed a threat to Singapore for many years, even before our independence. We fought the
COmmunist terrorists in the 1950s to 1970s, and dealt with other terrorist groups in the following years.The
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group was plotting to bomb key installations in Singapore, which would also
have killed many Singaporeans. The JI wanted to use violence to overthrow the governments in Indo~esia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. The JI's plot against Singapore was prevented by ISO,
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Given the network of terrorist acts in Southeast Asia in the age of global
terrorism, it is reasonable that the Thai Government would be concerned that 1I and Al
Qaeda would choose Southern Thailand as the new home for terrorists operations.
Thailand would seem to be a desirable target for Al Qaeda operations because of its large
Muslim community that might provide support as well as asylum for those dissidents

hi·d·mg ou.t
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Furthermore, the arrest of Hambali, who was nicknamed the "Osama bin Laden of
Southeast Asia," in Thailand as well as the JI member at Ayutthaya caused the Thai
government to panic (justifiably) that terrorists have found Thailand a place to elude
authorities in their own country. According to police intelligence networks in Singapore,
Malaysia and the Philippines, Hambali was involved with (if not orchestrated himself)
. the foiled terrorist assaults at the US Embassy in Singapore. 265 Intelligence experts also
pointed out that Hambali was not only a mastermind and operations planner for the
region but also one of the key links between the regional terror group Jamaah Islamiyah
(JI) and Al Qaeda. 266

Also, the arrests of Jemaah Islamiah (11) associates in Thailand and Cambodia,
where members were attempting to buy radioactive material for making a 'dirty' bomb,

and its network in Singapore has since been crippled, but this does not mean that Singapore is now
completely safe. The JI network across Southeast Asia still views Singapore as a target, and they will
COntinue to try to attack us. One reason is that we have arrested more than 30 JI members in our security
OP~rations, and placed many others on Restriction Orders. Singapore also provided information to
neighbouring governments on the JI, which led to the JI members there being arrested as well. The JI,
therefore, would want to avenge their "brothers" who have been caught as a result of our operations against
them. Additionally, radical elements in the region, including the JI, who see the US as their principal enemy,
aSSociate Singapore as a US ally, because of our strong support for US actions against terrorism.
264
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have dramatically raised perceptions of a terrorist threat in Thailand. This group member
were reportedly planning a Bali bomb attack on major centres for foreign tourists, and
against five embassies (Israel, the US, Britain, Australia and Singapore )267 as well as the
Thai detainees accepted that there are contacting with a Singapore J1 member detained in
268

Bangko k.

Even the British Embassy warned British tourists that there is a high threat of
terrorism throughout Thailand

269 and

the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism

in the u.S. Department of State also mentioned that Thailand's Muslim support of
Afghanistan's Muslim popUlation makes Thailand a possible terrorist-safe haven (even
though British-based terrorists experts do not mention Thailand as a possible place for
.such asylum).27o
The pattern of violence in southern Thailand created a new phenomenon. Before
the presence of terrorist networks, violent acts were typically the result of individual
conflicts. Even when there were moments of anti-government sentiment, such violent
outbursts were contained in discrete episodes.

Subsequent to the attacks in southern

Thailand, there is not only an ongoing threat to public safety and a serious risk to the
damage of property but there is a threat to the infrastructures of the Government. Even

267

B.Raman, Muslim Anger: The Thai Dilemma, South Asia Analysis Group, Nov.1, 2004, available at
http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1156.html(last visited Aug. 1,2006).
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symbolic targets as in the September 11 attacks, the close proximity in time between the
attacks in southern Thailand (2004), the Bali attacks (2002) and the incidents of
September 11, 2001, suggest that a growing global terrorist threat has a connection to
Southeast Asia. Although the British-based terrorist experts have concluded there is no
basis of an international terrorist group located in Thailand, the very serious incidents of
violence in the southeast region suggest that Thailand might someday serve such a
purpose.

All of these are the reason why the Thai Government has concerns that

International groups may have already started laying the groundwork for operations in
Thailand.
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A. Terrorist

Not only Thailand has been active

III

arresting a number of nationals with

suspected links to these organizations27I but the weak of legal process attracts the
terrorist-related activities such as: trafficking in drugs, persons, and weapons, organized
crime, official corruption.

272

The connection between Al Qaeda and JI is all the more

likely if the Thai Government cannot stop a multitude of criminal activity of any sort. 273
Furthermore, although there has been no terrorists group on this scale, Thailand has had a
long history of internal violence and many groups that operated in her country since
1959. These include:

1. Barasi Revolusi Nasional (BRN/ 74
2. Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPPIBIPP/ 75

3. Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULa)

271

272
273
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Ibid.
See U.S. Department of State cited in note 220 supra.
See Asian Focus Group cited in note 249 supra.

274 The

Barasi Revolusi Nasional (BRN) was founded in 1960. Its goal is to achieve Self-Determination in the
southern provinces against the central government of Thailand. It is an underground operation. However, it
was separated in two groups because of interest and ideological conflicts. Then, it was further split into
three groups: the BRN Coordinate (not active in Thailand but carrying out political activity in Malaysia), the
BRN Congress (chaired by Rosa Burako conducting military affairs), and the BRN Uram (the most active
group headed by the late Hajji Abdul Karim consolidating the entire armed units). The last group still
Operates in southern Thailand but its headquarters are in Malaysia.
275

In the Dsungnyor rebellion, Adul Saiburi, the leader was arrested and imprisoned. After he was released,
he fled to Kalantan in Malaysia and founded the Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP) in 1959;
however, the name was changed to the BIPP. The group ceased its activity for a while. Until 2002, it was
thought to have been involved in the acts of violence in southern Thailand.
276

The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) is the largest and most active organization that
operates in southern Thailand. It was founded in 1968 by Tuanku Biyo Kodoniyo. This organization also
~perates in various Mi~dl~ Ea~tem countries. It joined the vio~ent. activitie? in Libya a~d S~ria by sending
fieenage~s to operate Within their groups. However, the organization split Into two factlons.1n 1992: 1. The
rst faction was headed by Dr. A-rong Muleng. Its logo is a symbol of a dagger crossed With a sword. Its
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4. United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bersatu)
5. Mujahideen Pattani Movement (BNP)

277

278

6. Gerkan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP)I Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement 279

Even though there is no firm evidence that these groups are connected to
international terror groups operate in Thailand, there is strong suspicion. In joint military
exercises to strengthen the capacity of the military for counterterrorism, the Thai Corps'

and the Government officials are preparing for the possibility of activity by those rebel
groupS in the southern region whether or not there are concrete ties to international
terrorist organizations.

militia unit is called the "Caddan Army." However. this faction was split again and set up a new organization
called "PULO 88" or the Abu Jihad PULO, 2. The second faction was lead by Hayihadi Mindosali who is the
founder of PULO army Command Council [MPTP). It has an eagle for its logo and the name of its army is
"Abudaban," and its militia is called Caddan Army. This group supports Tuanku Abdul Kade i~ southern
Thailand. Both factions have headquarters in Malaysia and have joined forces with the military and political
operations in a few areas of the three southern border provinces.
The United Front for the Independence of Pattani, also known as Bersatu, was established on August 31.
1989, by joining of the United Liberation Organization Mai (New PULO). the original PULO, the Barisan
Revoluis Nasional Melayu Pattani (BRN), the Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP) and the
Mujahideen Pattani under an umbrella organization. At first the name of this group was Payong
Organization. In 1992. it adopted its current name. Bersatu was founded in order to unify many terrorist
groups into a single entity in order to avoid any confusion in accepting money from foreign countries.
Operating both political and military activities, Bersatu carried out guerrilla actions by using ambush tactics
on the government officers and positions and conducting sabotage in public places. Moreover. it has issued
propaganda blaming the Thai government for mistreating Muslim citizens. The group might have intended its
action to cause serious rifts between Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims and bring foreign intervention.
Nowadays, a part of Bersatu is conducting activities in Sweden hoping to get help from the Nobel
Foundation.
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Intending to fight for the independence of the southern border provinces, the Mujahideen Pattani
Movement was formed on September 16. 1985. Its mission was to try to combine many separatist
?rganizations and emphasize personal training and political cooperation. The Mujahideen Pattani Movement
IS headquartered in Malaysia. Most of its important leaders have left the BIPP in part because the BNP's
performance has not been particularly successful. It was then subsumed by other separatist allies to
establish Bersatu.
279

til This group was founded in 1995 and is possibly the only significant armed force conducting activities in
cae !ower south of Thailand. This group does not have a unique pattern of organization. However, it has
t3a~ed out so-called moderate terrorist acts such as urban sabotage and theft. As with the GMIP, the
rnil~san Revelusi Malaysia (BRN) was supported by the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia and Malaysian
itants, and they have been revived and transformed into insurgency groups.
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The incidents of September 11 280 brought about three significant changes

ill

international relations such as:
1. Economic globalization
Despite advances in technology, science and industry, economlC globalization
continues to polarize the world into the haves and have-nots, between the informationpoor and the information-rich, between the premodern, the modernizing, and postmodem
worlds. Religious, ethnic, and political ideologies are often

employ~d

in this warfare

largely to mobilize sympathizers, but it would be a serious analytical error to consider
this warfare between the Islamic world and the Western, Christian, and secular world,
even though the geographic boundaries coincide with that definition of the problem. The
Islamic world as the rest of the less-developed world is itself deeply divided between the
have and have-nots demonstrating corresponding pro and con sentiments vis-a- vis the

West.
2. Technological globalization
The drastic changes in technology have created a global communication network
(computers, satellites, telephony, internet) employed by transnational corporations,
territorial states, civil society movements, as well as terrorist and counter-terrorist
organizations. In contrast to the previous state-centric wars, the new "netwar" is global in
reach and employs both conventional and unconventional weapons. In this war, smallscale conflicts such as that in Afganistan become globalized while global issues, such as
Weapons of mass destruction and biochemical warfare, play important roles in what

Majid Techranian, The Center cannot hold: Terrorism and Global Change 53-54(Uwe Johanannen, Alan
,James Gomez eds., Select Publishing Pte, 2003).
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would have been seen a hundred years ago as a smaller-scale conflict (such as those in
the Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan).

3. cultural globalization
This change has brought about a consciousness of the interconnected nature of
world economy and with it a consciousness of the ever-widening divide within and
between nations. It has also created a global dual pathology focused on commodity
fetishism and identity fetishism, consumerism and envy,

~rrogance

and anger. At the

same time, cultural globalization has also gotten governments to focus on the promotion
of international security through cooperation rather than competition, democratic
participation, sustained and sustainable development, and global unity in diversity.
Dr. Sompong Sucharitkut2s1 claims that international terrorists p_ersist in their
relentless efforts to inflict untold pain, sorrow and sufferings through a menacing reign of
terror that strikes indiscriminately at countless members of the international community,
regardless of their creed, religion, belief, gender, age, nationality or political ideology and
affiliation?82 Further, the targets of modern terrorism generally are not the actual victims
of the terrorist acts, but government infrastructure and public safety. The hope is that
such violence will trigger fear, repulsion, intimidation, overreaction, etc. 283 The desired
outcome is to make people remember the incident as long as possible and consequently,

an important element is that the terrorist commits suicide rather than surrender. The word

;----------------------Ll A~sociate Dean and Distinguished Professor of Intemational and Comparative Law, Director, SJO and
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cademy of International Law, of the Middle Temple, Barrister at Law.
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See JUSMAG THAI cited in note 236 supra.
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'terrorists' is synonymous with a violent act in which both innocent people and the
terrorist him or herself are killed.
Still in this modem era, the main characteristics and elements of terrorism are not
dramatically different from the past because the character of terrorist acts can be seen as
bearing similarities to the basic methods of the Zealots-Sicarii case, even if in that case
the weapons were daggers and 'swords not guns and grenades.
The modem terrorist acts have obviously much more far-reaching means of terror,
examples not the least of which include weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks or
bioterrorism. Even violations that are not directly violent can be construed as terrorist
actions if they are related to tactics and strategies that are intended to cause terror. The
classic characteristics of terrorism can be said to involve the following attributes. A·
terrorist act

- involves serious criminal actions to public, major targets or irifrastructure;

- the use of violence against innocent people or the government for political and social
purposes;

- a racist or religious motivation;

- a method by which public fear is instilled by a psychology strategy.

113

The violence in southern Thailand raises the question about whether or not these
acts are, in fact, acts of terrorism or not. The patterns of violence in this region could be
characterized by the following elements. All of the acts have challenged the power of the

State, taken as their targets indiscriminate and helpless people (e.g., infants, teachers,
either Muslim or Buddhist), involved villagers (e.g., the incident at Takbai), lead to
religion conflict (e.g., killing monks) and aimed to capture international attention through
the media.
It is not difficult to argue that these acts of violence seem to be terrorist acts by

the classic characteristics of terrorism or by the standards many have become familiar
with as a result of the incident of September 11. 284 The elements of these crimes
correspond closely to the description of acts of terror in· the Thai Penal Code Section 135:
A conduct made with the intention to intimidate a population. to
threaten or compel the Royal Thai Government or any
government or international organization to do or abstain from
doing any act.
Ji"'·'""

Given these class characteristics, the violence seems to be the conduct of terrorists.
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However, according to section 59 of the Thai Penal code:

;:~!!i!

A person shall be criminally liable only when such person
commits an act intentionally ...

In some cases, it is impossible to say such acts are, strictly speaking, terrorist acts
since it is very difficult to prove the intentions of the criminal. Even if the acts of
violence look like they meet the criteria for terrorism, the Thai -Penal Code makes it clear
that proof of intention through the process of the court system is still necessary. Namely,
~-----------------See M. Techranian cited in note 280 supra.
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a terrorist group must operate as a ranking organization. The group must have a strict
chain of command and framework which are able to operate as a chain network.
Bowever, if the terrorist section in the Thai Penal Code does not apply, other serious
crimes still shall apply to these acts. It is just more difficult to prove in a court of law the
intentions of a criminal who has in his or her mind the attack is an attack against the State
but it does not mean that the offender will be not be punished.
Whether or

~ot

one can truly distinguish between a terrorist organization and a

group seeking self-determination, such groups are nevertheless still beholden to Thai
domestic law. So when perpetrators of acts of violence are tried in Thailand even if those
crimes do not meet the standard of Terrorist section (they do not apply by the offence in
terrorist section), it ·is unavoidable that those convicted will be tried for equally serious
cnmes.

B. Self-Determination
The question why the United Nations failed to reach consensus and has not
accepted a terrorism definition is understandable. It is impossible to distinguish in many
cases "one State's "terrorist" from another State's "freedom fighter." These arguments
inevitable come up against the word "Self-Determination," a concept crucial to the
origins of so many different nations (including the US). The scope of self-determination

has been expanded since 1945 285 and as a result, neither the definition of Terrorist nor
Self-Determination had ever been ultimately established. Within the framework of the
United Nations, the concerns of State powers have come into the conflict with the equally

---------------------285.
C E~lzabeth Chadwick, Self -Determination, Terrorism and the International Humanitarian Law of Armed
onfllct 3-4, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996.
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jrnportant need of equal rights and self-determination of the people. 286

For example,

united States, Canada and Australia, the initial concerns voiced by or on behalf of the
indigenous peoples can be seen four steps:

they would like to have their collective indigenous rights
recognized;
they would like to have their territorial rights restored and their
land returned;
they would like to have right to self -determination as an
autonomy or

a

self-government within

the

established

community;
they would like to have their status recognized by the
international community. 287

It is no surprise why there is no singular definition of "Self-Determination." The

widespread use of the expression "Self-Determination" has made it a catchall phrase that
is an expansive rather than a restrictive term. 288 This is unavoidable given that the term is
used in so many different contexts and in relation to such div~r~~ ethnic, cultural and
national problems. Even when States concede that people's right to self-determination
exists, giving "Self-Determination" a distinct legal definition could undermine the way in
which conflict is resolved through traditional mechanisms of the sovereign State's

-

~/b-'-------------------

td.

287
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coIJ1lIlunity.289 That most nation states are more comfortable to exercise and make a
definition for "terrorism" than "Self-Detennination" suggests that the term terrorism is

itself heavily weighted towards the point of view of State sovereignty.
One of the reasons that suggest the violence in the South is not purely a result of a
coherent separatist movement seeking Self-Determination is that there have many
instances of Muslims killing other Muslims. For instance, Muslim tree farmers were·
killed by Muslim extremists when they were caught working on Friday, a day deemed to

be a holy day of rest. 290 In another instance, Muslim extremists killed other Muslims who
had close relations to Buddhists or to members of the Thai Government. In these cases,
moderate Muslims who did not obey the strictures of the Koran or follow the ideological
path of the more extreme separatists were considered heretics, obstructionists or
supporters of the Thai Government.
In the public eye, however, Muslim extremists wish to make their cause seem to
be one uniformly supported by moderate and extreme Muslims alike. For instance, on
June 15, 2006, a date representing the 'national day' of Pattani rebellion, there were
several bombings in towns, villages and government buildings. This made it seem as if
such a day had the support of the entire Muslim community because it seemed like a
well-coordinated attack on symbols of the Thai Government and expressed political and
ideological aspirations.
So although the Thai Government is concerned about the separatist movement,
the right of self-determination will be left open to question someday.

Although the

United Nations states that everyone has the right to a nationality and that no one should

See Kankavi cited in note 175 supra, at p.166.
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be arbitrarily deprived of a nationality or denied the right to change nationality, the
situation in southern Thailand is not one unambiguously driven by self-determination. It
. remains to be seen to what degree these acts of violence are the result of a powerful but
small minority of Muslim extremists and to what degree these acts of violence are the
necessary steps towards reclaiming the cultural and ideological independence of a
separate nation-state.

C. The Status of Prisoner of War

The situation in the South raIses the question about POW status. Are those
arrested by the Thai military authorities to be tried as criminals or do the laws of war
apply to these cases, in which case the individuals would be considered prisoners of war?
Ifthe dissidents are local groups and the level of the conflict in southern Thailand has not
risen to the level of armed conflict then these cases are tried under the Thai Penal Code.
However, the situation is more complex if -- The violence is wide-spread and protracted
and the Thai Government cannot control the situation; -- The perpetrators were under a
chain of command within an international network of organized terrorists (such as Al
Queda, which has support under the new Taliban Government in Afghanistan) or any
international organization that took as its ambition the downfall of the '-Government.
Therefore, I will explore the question of whether the situation in the south of Thailand
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Even though there is no settled definition of "armed conflict" in international law,

and a case by case analysis has often produced unsatisfying results,291 many international
organizations agree that the laws of war do not apply to situations of internal disturbances

·and tensions such as riots, sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. 292
The violence in the south of Thailand does not fit prevailing conceptions of "war" or
"armed conflict" because the acts of violence were not overtly carried out by
transnational criminal group acting on behalf of any State. The attacks were seemingly
sporadic and infrequent, even though they were clearly well-planned and organized to
create fear and terror in the public eye. Importantly, the group responsible for the attacks
did not seek-at least not explicitly seek-- to administer or control any part of Thailand.

Moreover, recently there is no precise evidence that the dissident groups operated
within a chain of command under Al Queda or J1. Moreover, it is not clear that those
who committed the acts of violence in this region have anyone clearly formulated center
of command. The acts of violence were quite possibly perpetrated by various groups
with a similar ideological stance. Their connections, therefore, are at times unstable and
in many instances members of these groups acted like common criminals.

For these reasons, I do not believe that the status of POWs pertains to the
situations in Southern Thailand at this moment. However, if the violent situation reaches

291

Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of wars, 28 Yale J.lnt'L.1, winter 2003.

292

. See paragraphs 215-220 of the ICJ decision in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986I.C.J. 14 (Jun. 27). Also, for a lucid assessment of
the difficulties in establishing when Protocol II applies, see Arturo Carillo, Hors de Logique: Contemporary
Issues in International Humanitarian Law as Applied to Internal Armed Conflict, 15 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 1,
at 66-97; No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 66-70 (Oct. 2, 1995), 351.L.M. 32 (1996). The
leTY Appeals Chamber provided useful clarifications regarding the appropriate geographic and temporal
frames of reference for internal armed conflicts.
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to the scope of an international armed conflict, the law of war will be applicable.
According to Article 4 (1) and (2) of Geneva Conventions III defmes prisoners of war as:

-- Members of the armedforces of a Party to the conflict, as
well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of
such armed forces.
-- Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
-their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided
that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized
resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that ofhaving a fIXed distinctive sign recognizable at a

distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.

These groups in Southern Thailand, therefore, does not seem to automatically
qualify for POW status. However, the content of Geneva Convention is so broad and the
of what constitutes armed conflict is always changing, the Article goes on to

Anderson, Law of War and Just War Theory Blog, available at
.blogspotcom/2004/12/wsj-editorial-on-icrc.html (last visited Nov.l, 2006).
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Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed
a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy,
belongs to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention
until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent tribunal.

The Thai Government has to maintain that no doubt.could arise with respect to

any dissident prisoner, or it must preserve the option of a determination by a tribunal if
there are suspicions concerning a group or an individual.

But whatever status is accorded to these dissident groups (whether they qualify as
. POWs according to the law of war), there is no doubt that the law and actions issued from
Thailand's central government cannot contradict to the concepts of Humanitarian Law
Human rights Law which I will discuss in detail in the next chapter.

- 4. Action Taken by the Thai Government Responding to
United Nations
The Resolution l373 in Chapter VII of the United Nation Charter of September
2001, created the principle known as "no safe haven for terrorists"

294

in response to

attacks of September 11. The counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate
which was designated by UNSCR 1535 to enhance their powers to monitor the
- Conventions Against Terrorism, The United Nations, August 7,2006, available at
.unodc.org/unodclen/terrorism_convention_overview.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2006).
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implementation of Resolution 1373, also adopted certain 'measures to combat
.international terrorism, given that the attacks in the US threaten international peace and
security. These measures were intended to prevent and suppress the financing and
. preparation of any act of terrorism in a State's territories through all lawful means. The
resolution reaffirmed support that all States are obliged to supplement international
agreements by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress terrorist activity in
•

.,

theIr terntones.

295

Indeed, Thailand has the cooperation with the United Nations against terrorism
since 1963, Thailand was a party to three Conventions and one Protocol such as: The
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963),
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), and The
, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,

. (1971), and The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 1988. 296 Even though there
twelve terrorist Conventions today and Thailand cannot be Party all of them, it does
mean that Thailand disputes the other Agreements. Rather, Thai domestic law must
made to abide by the Conventions and that could take a lot of time.
Adel Maged, Terrorism and the Military International Legal Implications: International Legal Cooperation:
Essential Tool in the War against Terrorism 178-179 rNybo P.Heere ed., Cambridge University Press
See also Surakiat Sathirathai, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand (Sep. 16, 2001) as follows:
the terrorist acts against the United States, a long time friend and treaty ally, Thailand has
clear our position. We condemn in the strongest terms such acts of terrorism and join the United
General Assembly in adopting unanimously the resolution ·condemning the attacks and calling for
ltlm"ti"',n~1 cooperation to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the outrages of 11
~ptembE~r 2001."
will join any international coalition to combat terrorism.
time friend and treaty ally, Thailand will render all possible assistance to the United States as
has done consistently in the past.
Report on Thailand's Implementation of Counter - Terrorism Activities, Ministry of Foreign
. ~ingdom of Thailand, available at http://www.mfa.go.th/internetldocumentfTerrorism%20Report.doc
VIsIted Aug. 1,2006).
I
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Concerning the effects of terrorism in Thailand, the Govemment has adopted laws
protecting terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. On December 21, 1999, the Thai
Cabinet resolved, pursuant to Security Council 1267 (1999) and Security 1333 (2000), to
instruct all authorities concerned to comply with these Resolutions.
According to the freezing of transfer of funds or financial resources belonging to
the Taliban, Osma Bin Laden, persons or entities associated with him as identifie"d by the
security council committee including Al Queda network, the Bank of Thailand has
circulated a note to all commercial banks and financial institutions requesting their
cooperation to comply strictly with the said Cabinet reso lution. 297

For instance, all

financial institutions are required to report any transfer of funds in cash equal to or
greater than 2 million Baht, or transfer of assets equal to or greater than 5 million Baht
(approximately $125,000 US dollars), and any suspicious financial transactions by their
clients to the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO),298 which requiring all persons or
entities to report any remittance in the amount equal to or over US$ 10,000 to the Bank
of Thailand and will soon have to report to AMLO, which maintains these financial
records in its electronic database. 299
Moreover, the Exchange Control Act of B.E. 2485, which sets out the principles
of control under which Notifications and Notices for documenting all major financial
transactions, is an important tool for monitoring terrorist activities. Also, the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of B.E. 2542 calls for imprisonment as punishment for the offence of

---

'29"/

.•.
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See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
The Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) is now acting as the Thai national financial intelligence unit
and has become a member of the EGMONT Group of Financial Intelligence Unit since 2000. AMLO is
to sign an MOU with all 69 members of the EGMONT to help facilitate the exchange of information on
finanCing and tracking of blacklisted groups.(See www.mfa.go.th • last visited Nov.1. 2006).
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited in note 297 supra.
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money laundering300 and the amendment of the latest Penal Code B.E.2546 (2003)
stipulates that a terrorist act is a serious crime with severe punishment.
Because the Government has attempted to stop the transfer or funds or. financial
resources of alleged terrorists and their collaborators, the punishment outlined in the
Penal code is not only intended for perpetrators of the crimes but also their accomplices,

300 The Anti-Money Laundering Act of B.E.2542 (1999), Peeraphan Prempooti version sec.60.
[A]ny individual who is found guilty of the crime of money laundering shall receive a tenn of imprisonment of
one to ten years, or a fine of twenty thousand to two hundred thousand Baht, or both.

Ibid. at sec 61 .
[A]ny juristic person who is found guilty of an offense under section 5, 7, 8, or 9 shall receive a fine in the
amount of two hundred thousand to a million Baht
A Director, Manager, or any person responsible for the operation of the .juristic person under the first
paragraph which is found guilty of an offense shall receive a term of imprisonment of one to ten years, or a
fine of twe·nty thousand to two hundred thousand Baht, or both, unless he can prove that he had no part in
the commission of such offense of the juristic person.

Ibid. at sec 62.
[A]ny individual who is found guilty of an offense under section 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 35, or 36 shall receive
a fine not exceeding three hundred thousand Baht
Ibid. at sec 63.
[Wjhoever reports or makes a statement according to section 13,14, 16, or 21 paragraph two with the
assertion of a falsehood or the concealment of the facts which should be revealed to the officials shall
receive a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years, or a fine of fifty thousand to five hundred
thousand Baht, or both.

Ibid. at sec 64.
[A]ny individual who fails to appear or refuses to testify, or to submit an explanation in writing, or to submit
the aCCOunt document, or evidence required under section 38 (1) or (2), or who obstructs, or fails to
COOperate under section 38 (3) shall receive a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year, or a fine not
eXceeding twenty thousand Baht, or both.
Any individual acts by any means to leak restricted information to others under section 38 paragraph four,
except in the course of doing one's job or according to the law, shall receive penalty set forth in paragraph

one.

.• Ibid. at sec 65
. . ~]ny person ~ho diverts, damages, destroys, conceals, take away, loses or renders useless the document,
. emoranda, information, or asset which has been ordered seized or restrained by official action, or which
knows or should have known will be forfeited to the State according to this Act, shall receive a tenn of
not exceeding three years, or a fine not exceeding three hundred thousand Baht, or both.
person who knows or should have known confidential govemment information in proceeding
to this Act, acts in any means to let others know or may have the knowledge of that confidential
··VIII laru-", except in the course of conducting one's work or according to the law, he or she shall
a tenn of imprisonment not exceeding five years, or a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand
Or both.
.
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including persons or entities making funds or financial assets available to them.

301

This

policy aimed to prevent terrorist organizations to use Thailand as a base for operations of
the terrorist attacks within or outside the country. According to the Ministry of Interior,
Thailand has tightened its registration procedure at all temporary shelter areas to ensure
that displaced persons seeking shelter in Thai territory are not members of any terrorist
organization according to the Immigration Act B.E.2522 (1979).302 All of these laws and
policies suggest that Thailand has endeavored to take action pursuant

U~ited

Nations

Security Council such as Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1269 (1999), 1333

31)1

See Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited in note 297 supra.

3:i2The Immigration Act B.E. 2522 (1979), Immigration Bureau version art. 12
(A]liens which fall into any of the following categories are excluded from entering into the Kingdom.

1. Having no genuine and valid passport or document used in lieu of passport; or having a
genuine and valid passport or document used in lieu of a passport without Visaing by the Royal Thai
Embassies or Consulates in Foreign countries; or from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, excepting if a visa
is not required for certain types of aliens in special instances.
Visaing and visa exemption will be under the learn and conditions as provided in the Ministerial
Regulations.
2. Having no appropriate means of living following entrance into the Kingdom.
3. ~aving entered into the Kingdom to take occupation as a laborer or to take employment by
uSIng physical without skills training or to work in violation of the Ministerial Regulations.
4. Being mentally unstable or having any of the disease as prescribed in the Ministerial
Regulations.
5. H~ving not yet been vaccinated against smalllpox or inoculated or undergone any other
medical treatment for protection against disease and having refused to have such vaccinations
administered by the Immigration Doctor.
6. ~aving been imprisoned by the judgement of the Thai Court; or by a lawful injunction; or by
th~ Judgement of the Court of foreign country, except when the penalty is foe petty offense or negligence
orlsp~ovided for as an exception in the Ministerial Regulations.
7. ~avlng behavior which would indicated possible danger to the public or likelihood of being a
~u~ance or.constituting any violence to the peace or safety of the public or to the security of the public or
8 Re securIty of the nation , or being under warrant of arrest by competent officials of foreign governments.
. ~as?n to believe that entrance into the Kingdom was for the purpose of being involved in
:~tltutlon , the trading of woman of children, drug smuggling, or other types of smuggling which are
9 ra~ to the public morality.
10~v~ng no money or bond as prescribed by the Minister under him
11' Be~ng a person prohibited by the Minister under Section 16.
~ .elng deported by either the Government of Thailand that of or other foreign countries; or
the ~~ht of stay in the Kingdom or in foreign countries having been revoked; or having been sent out of
S/talllngd~m by competent officials at the expense of the Government of Thailand unless the Minister
.1'he cons~der. exemption on an individual special case basis.
,E Opete~amtnal1on and diagnosis of disease of a physical or mental nature, including protective
.~,
a Ions as against disease, shall be conducted by the Immigration Doctor.
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~oot), and 1373 (2001) by launching her domestic laws intended to suppress acts of
terrOrism and comply with counter-terrorist measures.

Ul - 5 Conclusion
Many countries and organizations around the world have terrorist laws, yet
terrorist activity has hardly decreased. Obviously, laws are not enough.

Solving the

problem requires more than changing the laws. However, this doesn't mean that these

laws are not meaningful, only that the reasons for people not respecting and obeying
these laws need analysis. In this chap.ter, I not only examined the act of the terrorism but
the Government response (the legal, 'political and military response) to such acts that are

inneed of being examined as well. In the next chapter, I will analyze more details about
the applicable of Thai law and the action of Thai Security Forces in relation to
international humanitarian law.

*****
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~CHAPTER IV1
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
IV - 1 Introduction
A.

The Incidents
When compared to armed conflicts in other parts of the world, the conflict in the

Pattani region of Thailand would likely be classified as a lower-intensity armed conflict.
This classification would likely be based upon the understanding that the conflict is
essentially an

interna~

armed conflict with little outside news coverage. An important

consideration for making such a classification would be the fact that the death toll and the
number of individuals injured from Pattani incident is relatively small. 303 This
characterization seems appropriate when one considers that during the armed conflict in
Bosnia 200,000 people died or went missing, and more than one million people left the
country and were scattered throughout the world. 304 However, in the four years since the
conflict began, the level of violence in the Pattani province of Thailand has increased
steadily which has, in tum, caused the Thai Government to become increasingly
Concerned with the likelihood of a separatist movement growing in the south. Further,

;;---------------------h Srisomphop Chitpiromsri, head of research team of Prince of Songkhla University. province of Pattani
~ OWed total of dead and injured people in Southern Thailand from year 2004 through 2006 were 1.730 and
.510. International Herald Tribune. Sep.3, 2006.
304

Bosnia and Herzegovina from Recovery to Sustainable Growth 3, USA World Bank Publications1997.
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the nature of this conflict also has caused the Thai Government to become increasingly
concerned with unconventional tactics associated with this conflict. 305
To address these concerns and in response to violence on January 4, 2004 where
about thirty gunmen raided an army depot in Narathiwat province to steal a cache of 300
weapons to commit arson on 18 schools in the same area, and the subsequent theft of
military weapons at the Army camp in Narathiwat province,306 the Thai Government
declared martial law on the provinct?s ofNarathiwat, Pattani, Yala307 and Songkhia 308 To
replace martial law, the imposition of martial law was followed soon after by the
Emergency Decree On Public Administration in Emergency Situation, B.E. 2548
(2005)(the "Emergency Decree") which came into force on July 16,2005. 309
During this period of martial law (January 5, 2004 until July21, 2005),310 several
incidents took place that give rise to questions of a state's obligations under international
law when dealing with domestic unrest. Specifically, on April 28, 2004,

30 Muslim

dissidents were killed by Thai Military Forces during a demonstration at the Krue - Se
mosque in Pattani. Then, on October 25, 2004, 80 Muslim demonstrators who had been
arrested and loaded into government transport vehicles after a demonstration at the Tak

305

F .

or Instance, the Thai Security Forces arrested of Riduan lsamuddin (so-called Hambali), an Indonesian
suspected of being the operations chief for Jemaah Islamiah (JI), a group allegedly linked to AI Qaeda and
blamed for last year's Bali bombing and other attacks.
306
307

See more details in Chapter 2.
On 05 January 2004 at 6 a.m., Lieutenant General Pongsak Ekbannasingh, Fourth Region Army

~ommander, declared martial law in the provinces of Narathiwat (Districts of Rueso, Takbai, Su-ngai Padi ,
I-ngo and Su-ngai Kolok), Pattani(Khok Pho District)and Yala (Raman District).
30s

On 03 November 2004 at 10 a.m., Lieutenant General Kwanchart Klaharn, Fourth Region Army

C(T~mmander, declared martial law in the provinces of Songkhla (Districts of Chana (Chenok) and Thepha
Iba)).

309

Government Gazette vol 122, part 58a Ju1.16 B.E.2548 (2005).
310

Ibid.
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Police station were later found to have suffocated while in the custody of Thai

Security Forces. 311 While there have been no other major incidents, the region remains
under martial law and Emergency Decree. The violence continues, and as of this writing,
there have been more than 2,000 casualties.

B.

312

The Legal Issues
These incidents raise several questions as to whether the Thai Government may

have violated its obligations under international law. Specifically:
(I) Were the Martial Law and Emergency Decree consistent with
Thailand's obligations under human rights law, humanitarian law,
and the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of
Asphyxiating,

Poisonous

or

Other

Gases,

and

of

the

Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and of the 1993 Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction?
(2) Were the actions of the Thai Military Forces in suppressing the
demonstrations at Kru Se Mosque in Pattani province and Tak Bai
Police Station in Narathiwat province consistent with their
obligations under international humanitarian law (or the law of
armed conflict) as specifically defined in the Geneva Conventions,

--311

the Hague Conventions, and customary law?

---------

See more details in Chapter 2.
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See S.Chitpiromsri cited in note 303 supra.
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In short, we must ask the difficult question of whether the military operations by

the Thai Armed Forces respect the "law of war."
According to Prime Minister Dr. Taksin Shinawatra, Foreign Minister Dr.
Kantathi Suphamongkhon, and Director-General of the Department of Information and
Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, the most
disturbing aspects of the southern violence are the attacks on civilians by the group of
dissidents3!3 and the failure of the Thai authorities to protect Thai citizens. 314 Although

the Thai Government has stated that "Thai Muslims are not mistreated and enjoy all
rights as Thai nationals, as enshrined in the Thai Constitution,"

315

there is growing

concern by many international organizations regarding alleged human rights violations
. which have arguably increased in recent years as a direct result of this conflict, namely,
Human Rights Watches, has been paying close attention to the violence in the southern
provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat where Thai Security Forces have committed
widespread human rights abuse. 3 !6 Further, the Organization of the Islamic Conference
has been critical of Thailand's efforts to end Islamic militant violence in the largely
Muslim provinces in the country's south. As the speech of H.E. Prof. Ekmeleddin
lhsanoglu, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference has said on
March 15, 2005 that "the recent abuses of human rights against a section of Muslim Thai

313
314
~

See more details in Chapter 2.
See Kankavi cited in note 175 supra at p. 186-187.
.

. ~rit Garnjana-Gooncbom, Press conference, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MlllIster of foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Tnadand (Jun. 7, 2004); See also Thai Constitution BE
2540( 1997)secA.
{T]he Human dignity, rightafld liberty of the people shall be protected.
316

Thailand: Blacklists Create Climate of Fear, available at
http://hrw.org/er:glish/docS/2005/12/16/thaila12317.htm (last visited June 26, 2006).
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citizens in Southern Thailand are another source of concern. "

JI7

Further still, the United

Nations has criticized certain provisions of the Emergency Decree which granted
emergency powers to the Thai Armed Forces to combat insurgents in the three
predominantly Muslim provinces. JIS This use of military force, according to the United
'I,

Nations, violated the terms of international human rights which protects the basic rights
of peoples.

Since Thailand is a party to many Conventions which enhance well

cooperation among the Parties, the United Nations and several other organizations, not
,

only Human Rights Watches and OIC, but the Asian Human Rights Commission,
Amnesty International and mores, have voiced concern that the Emergency Decree
violates Thailand's international legal obligations as a signatory to an international
agreement.
In order to propose more effective peacekeeping means in southern Thailand, I

will discuss the interplay?f international and domestic law while focusing not only on
the alleged violations of international humanitarian law but also on whether or not the
Thai Government's actions are consistent with its obligations under applicable human
rights standards. This chapter will attempt to explain the complex issues at stake in
Thailand's peace-keeping force by examining: (1) the applicability Thai domestic law,
(2) the applicable of international humanitarian law and international human rights law,
and (3) the nature and extent of any violations. I will conclude this Chapter by analyzing

;;--------------------Speech, H.E. Prof. EkmeledffiifTfiSanoglu, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic

~~ference, before the sixty-first session of the United Nations commission on human rights, Geneva wlizerland(Mar.15,2005).
318

...... Warren Hoge, World Briefing

cc,2005.

.

I Asia:Thailand:U.N.Criticizes Emergency

Powers, New York Times, Jul.
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step by step both the facts (Kru Se and Tak Bai cases) and the law that was practiced in
southern Thailand.

IV - 2 Applicable Laws
The following is a discussion of those laws pertinent to the Thai Government's
response to the aforementioned incidents in Southern Thailand.

A.

Domestic Law

1. Thai Criminal Law
Since Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 1932, the effects of a
democratic system upon the Legal and Judiciary systems have been profound and farreaching.

The Constitution is vested by the judiciary power of the Courts. Judges

perform their duties on behalf of the King and are free from political influence when
working on cases according to the law. 319
The Thai Penal Code was first promulgated in 1908 during in the Period of King
Rama V. This first version was founded by Prince Rabi of Ratchaburi who played a
leading role in introducing a modem system of judicial administration according to the
politics of Gradual Reform. 32o Up to now Thai laws have been changed many times
towards improving the recent situation of the country. The Thai Penal Code was renewed

;;---------------------

.
The
Judiciary
of
Thailand,
The
court
of
Justice,
http://www.judiciary.go.th/englthejudiciary.htm#t1 (last visited Jul 18, 2006).

Thailand,

available

at

320
111 B.J.Terwiel,

Thailand's political History from the Fall of Ayutthaya to recent times 203, River Books 2005.
lllhe changes that were to take place in 1892 have been called the" great transformation," and a "general
reOrganization of government", statements that give the impression of a sudden metamorphosis.
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21 times, and the Code of Criminal procedure was amended 29 times. Due to both, laws·

have undergone many structural changes. 321 For instance, Section 135/1-3 of the Thai
Penal Code has been proposed to define the scope of terrorism which would treat terrorist
acts as serious offences, and criminalize all steps in the terrorism process which came
into force on August 9, 2003.

Furthermore, some sections of the Thai Criminal

Procedure Code which abridged the rights and freedom of people guaranteed by the Thai
Constitutional at that time were abandoned and amended to be consistent with the
. .
1.322
ConstltutlOna

Section 4 of the Thai Penal Codes states: "whoever commi1s-m1 offence within

the Kingdom shall be punished according to the law

n323

even if such. a crime is only a

partial offence. 324 This is the principle of jurisdiction which is applied in all Thai courts.
However, the "offences within the Kingdom" refers to crimes committed not only within
the territorial boundaries of Thailand but also to those crimes committed in another
jurisdiction outside the country but where the effects and consequences of those crimes
:vould be felt within the country.325 The jurisdictional reach of Section 4 and Section 5 of
the Thai Penal Code extends to the acts of a co-principal; as such, a supporter or

321

See Government Gazette, Thailand.

322

Government Gazette vol 121 , part 79a Dec.23 8.E.2547 (2004).

323 Thai Penal Code sec.4, Lueng Dulyasath·Pathiweth' s version (Suchart Jiwachart ed.).
l'N)hoever commits an offence within the Kingdom shall be punished according to Thai law.
324 lb'
Id. at sec.5.

~e~e~er
..
.

any offence is even partially committed within the kingdom, or the consequence of the
mm~sslon of which, as intended by the offender, occurs within the kingdom, or, by the nature of the
mmlssion of which, the consequence resulting therefrom should occur within would occur within the
it shall be deemed that such offence is committed within the Kingdom or it could foreseen that the
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inStigator (as opposed to a perpetrator) of a crime within the Kingdom326 or a crime in a
foreign jurisdiction that has effects or consequences within Thailand would, according to
Section 4, be punished according to Thai law. Further, under Section 7 and Section 8 of
the Thai Penal Code, the punishment of such crimes must be administered in the country.

2. The Martial Law Declaration Act B.E. 2457(1914)

Although Thailand has codified criminal law principles into the Thai Penal Code

and the Thai Code Criminal Procedure Code, there are certain provisions in both statutes
that are applicable to the security of the country and, as such, are relevant to the incidents
at K.ru Se Mosque in Pattani Province and Tak Bai Police Station on Narathiwat
Province. Specifically, Section 2 of the martial law provides for the imposition of martial
law in the event of circumstances that could be considered as a threat to the security of
Thailand.
Accordingly, on July 5, 2004, martial law was imposed on the southern area of
Thailand in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat Province. Unfortunately, the imposition of
martial law had profound effects in these thre.e provinces, especially during periods when
confrontations between demonstrators and government officials became violent incidents.
Martial law existed in Thailand before the Thai Constitution was drafted, 327before
the adoption of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and before the four Geneva
,''''"'------------~/b·Id. at sec.6.

any offense is committed within the Kingdom, or is deemed by this Code as being committed
the Kingdom, even though the act of a co-principal, a supporter or an instigator in the offence is done
the Kingdom, it shall be deemed that the principal, supporter or instigator has committed the offence
the Kingdom.
Constitution law has long practiced in Thailand since1933.
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conventions were ratified by Thailand.

Martial law, as it is used in Thailand, was

adapted from French martial law and has been periodically imposed in Thailand over the
last 90-plus years. Currently, martial law can be imposed in exceptional situations where,
the Government perceives a threat to the security of the nation (either within or outside of
the country, such as a time of wars and riot).328 Pursuant to Section 6 of martial law, the
provision provides the Thai military personnel with law enforcement and riot control
capabilities that are greater than those normally available to the civilian officers at
arms. 329 For example, under martial law, Thai military personnel may ask police officers
or civilian officers to assist for the peaceful mission. In essence, martial law potentially
provides military full authority to the civilian officer, and arguably, the imposition of
martial law could give rise to questions of it limiting some of the rights and liberties of
the Thai people. However, the imposition of martial law is supposed to be

a temporary

measure. 330
In fact, martial law has been imposed from time to time throughout the twenty
provinces of Thailand33 ! but to place this law has not been broadly criticized by the
media and human rights organizations until martial law was imposed in the provinces of
328

The Martial Law Declaration Act B.E. 2457(1914), translated by the author [hereinafter Thai Martial Law 1

sec. 4.

PIn the time of war or rebellion, the military commander who is responsible for military personnel no less
than a battalion or who is the commander of a citadel or of a military base, shall have the power to declare
martial law in his military jurisdiction and shall report to the government promptly.
329 Ibid. at sec.6.

[II~. any region under martial law, military officers shall have authority over civilian officers as relating to

m~l~tary affairs, ban, maintenance of peace, and public security. Civilian officers must follow the order of
military officer under martial law.
330 This law shall be applicable only emergency situation.
331

p G.overnment Gazette vol 108, part 77 2 May B.E.2534 (1991) .
. C~ovinces of Kanchanaburi, Chanthaburi, Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, Trat, Tak, Narathiwat (only districts of
." anae, Ra-ngae, Waeng, Si Sakhon and Sukririn), Nan, Buriram, Prachin Buri, Phayao, Phitsanulok,Mae
Son, Yala (Than To, Betong, Bannang Sata,Yaha), Loei, Sisaket, Songkhla (Na Thawi, Sadao, Saba
(Sebayu)), Satun, Surin, Uttaradit, and Ubon Ratchathani.
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Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala. Even when martial law was replaced by an Emergency
Decree, this law was widely held as damaging to Thailand's record of human rights.
However, this martial law could be construed as appropriate to the southern area. The
Government announced the Emergency Decree to be applicable on July 16, 2005 instead
of martial law.

3. Thai Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation

B.E.2548 (2005)

The public outcry ill'.eL possible human rights abuse as well as the deprivation of
basic legal rights under martial law forced the Thai Government to announce the
. Emergency Decree on July 16, 2005.

This came about when martial law lent itself to

civil disobedience. Thai citizens had the feel of a dictatorship, whereas laws instituted
and executed by the state were more likely to be obeyed because of the popular view that
these laws maintained a tenable connection to democratic ideals. When the Emergency
Decree was set in motion, it invoked Section 218 of the Thai Constitution332 in which a
comprehensive system of statutory laws was called upon for necessary measures to
manage internal security.

However, martial law and the Emergency Decree often

~;'

.•~ amounted to the same type of rules. Some international organizations 333 still blame the

Thai Constitution B.E.2540 (1997), at sec 218.
the purpose of maintaining national or public safety or national economic security, or averting public
, the King may issue an Emergency Decree which shall have the forces as an Act.

~~ International Federation for Human rights (FIDH) and its member organization in Thailand, the Union
CIVil Liberties of Thailand (UCL), expressed their deep preoccupation at the various infringements of
human rights obligations within the Decree which can be applied to the whole, or any part of the
(avail~ble at www.figh.org, last visited Jan 1, 2006).
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emergency Decree for exacerbating the conflict and deem it to be a threat to public
safety, arguing that a change in terminology will not help stem further conflicts. 334
The above-mentioned Thai laws were applicable in the situation in southern
Thailand with both the Islamic dissidents (Kru Se Mosque case) and the riots at the Tak
Bai police Station. Both of these incidents violated the Thai Penal Code, which has
jurisdiction over all individuals involved pursuant to Sections 4, Section
8,336

7,335 and

Section

and which asserts what in the provinces of Thailand still can impact or threaten the

nation as a whole.
Because Thailand has sovereignty and jurisdiction over their citizens, the Thai
Penal Code and the Thai Criminal Procedure Code are applicable in such situations even
though these incidents occurred during the declaration of ·martial law and Emergency
Decree. This is because Thai Criminal justice aims to impose sentence within properly
determined petitions. The question is whether or not the provisions of Thai laws that had

an affect on this situation defy the concept of human rights and humanitarian law.

See Thai Martial Law, at sec.7.
commits an offence outside the Kingdom shall be punished in the Kingdom, namely:
Offences relating to the Security of the Kingdom as provided in Section 107 to 129;
Offences relating to Counterfeiting and Alteration as provided in Sections 240 to 249,
254, Section 256, section 257, and Section 266 (3) -(4).;
relating to Robbery as provided in Section 339, and Offence relating to Gangas provided in Section 340, which is committed on the High seas.

Ibid. at sec.8.
commits an offence outside the Kingdom shall be punished in the Kingdom,
that:
the offender be a Thai person, and there be a request for punishment by the
of the country where the offence has occurred or by the injured person; or
offender be an alien, and the Thai Government or a Thai person be the injured
and there be a request for punishment by the injure person.
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International Law
A court of justice (IeJ) has the task of deciding legal disputes between states and
'assisting the operations of international organizations by giving them its opinions on legal
questions. The disputes cover the most varied aspects of .public and private law, concern
all parts of the globe, and often call for a re-examination of various legal systems and of
wide-ranging state practices including those domestic policies connected to international
organizations. However, not every case with which this court deals has to be of
paramount significance, and not every aspect of a particular case which has to be
-submitted for -its decision is considered. What matters is that the court should help in
resolving disputes and thereby contribute to the maintenance of peace and to the
.:~')

development of friendly r~lations among states. 337

:::)
::;:11
'."\1

Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice which has the function
of making decisions in accordance with international law on such disputes as are
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...
~~i

~~

"".~I

,

~,tI~·

~!;,::

I

:;:~.

::i'i

submitted states:

"The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international

law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:

:11·
':ll

...",Ii;1:
I~'I '

!:
i,'"

A. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly

I'

recognized by the contesting states;
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

D. subject to the provisions ofArticle 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary meansfor the determination of rules
a/law. "

The Court is an organ of international law, available at http://www.icjklBbookchapter7.HTM (last visited Mar. 1,2007).
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This court order asserted the rule of international law and shown that it was the
product of one or more of three law-creating processes: treaties,338 international
customary law, or general principles oflaw organized by civilized nations. 339 As a result,

in principle, international law will govern the situation where there is a relationship
among States, or where States are deemed to have rights and obligations that are
internationally recognized as being regulated by international law.

34o

Further, although

customary international law is not written, it reflects state practice because the rules of
customary law govern questions not regulated by the provision of the present convention.
Many rules of treaties have become part of customary international law, and many
. provisions of international law are now accepted as customary law. 341 That is, as all
states are governed by internationallaw,342 then Thail~nd is a country whose rights and
obligations are governed by international law regardless of internal or international
affairs so long as political authority is restricted by international law. It is entirely
possible that the provisions of a treaty and conventions could apply to conflict within
existing domestic law yet international law has no direct application to Thailand's
particular situation.

338

6 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UN Doc NConf 39/28, UKTS 58(1980),8 ILM

79.

~eaty' means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
International law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
,Ylhatever its particular designation.
~339

}

th

D.J.Harris, Cases and Material on Intemational Law 20, Sweet and Maxwell 1991 (4 ed. 1991)(1973).
nd

Thomas Buergenthal and Harold G.Maier, Public International Law 2-3, West Publishing 1990(2
1990).

Treaties and customary international humanitarian law, available at
.icrc.orglweb/eng/siteengO. nsfliwpList2/H uma nitarianJaw:Treaties_and _customaryJaw?OpenOo
(last visited Jun. 26, 2006).
See T. Buergenthal and H. G.Maier cited in note 340 supra.
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'1. International Humanitarian Law .
Professor Warren E. Sma1l343 views international humanitarian law as a subset of
human rights law, and international humanitarian law is also known to be part and parcel
to a main body of rules for the laws of war or the laws of armed conflict {often
abbreviated to "LOAC") which is concerned with the relation between States that are in a
State of armed conflict. Principles of international humanitarian law are only applicable

in cases of armed conflict because its objective is to limit the effect of armed conflict.
Basically, international humanitarian law is not meant to pertain to the conflicts occurring
within states or to non-international tensions. The main purpose of international
humanitarian law is to reduce the damage and pain and suffering from such conflicts, to
.

save the combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering,

344

and to protect

persons who are not or who are no longer participating in the hostilities. The main bodies
of the humanitarian law can be found in:

345

Captain Warren E. Small, Esq. spent his twenty - five years in the U.S.Navy as a commissioned officer.
earned his J.D.from Golden Gate University, where he specialized in international law. He joined the
faculty in 1996 to complement his private practice which specializes in all aspects· of domestic and
II ....,'~" •• -

law.

Joint Publication 1-02 (2001), DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
Operational Law Handbook 31, The Judge Advocate General's School Charlottesville (2003).
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•

the Hague Conventions 346

•

the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (4 Conventions) m

•

the Geneva Protocols I and II of 1977

•

Customary International Law

•

Treaties

•

Regulations

348

349

The basic concept of "Law of the Hague" and "Law of the Geneva" are generally
based upon the concept of a universal humanity.

The nature of these conventions

provides not only recommendations for military procedures, but also concern for the
victims. This simple concept forbids any attack on an enemy that causes unnecessary
suffering, injury, or destntction. The use of force must not exceed the minimum required.
to achieve that basic objective. That is to say, the Law of the Hague is a term used to

Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May
1954, 249 U.N.T.S.240 - 88 (entry into force Aug.7, 1956) [hereinafter 1954 Hague Cultural Property
Convention]; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, T.S.539, including the
regulations thereto [Hereinafter Hague IV]; Convention M Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907,36 Stat.2310, 2 A.J.I.L.(1908)
Supplement 117-127; Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, The
Hague, 18 October 1907, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 8 ILM 68; Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954,249 U.N.T.S. 358 [hereinafter Protocol I to the 1954
Hague Cultural Property Convention.

346

me
. onvention

-

for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Force in the Field,
Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.1950 31 - 831949
(entry into force Oct 21, 1950)[hereinafter
Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick and
?hipwrecked Members of Armed Force at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.1950 85 - 133 (entry
~t? force Oct 21, 1950)[hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of
nsoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.1950 135 - 285 (enlty into force Oct 21,
~950)[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to Protection of Civilians in Time of War,
ceneva, 12 August 1949,75 U.N.T.S.1950 287 - 417 (entry into force Oct 21, 1.9(0) [hereinafter Geneva
onvention IV].

34a

Vi ~rotocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
I.~ctlms of International Armed. Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 Ju.ne 1977, : ~25 U.N.TS.1950 (1979) 3-6~~, 16

toi~·(1977) 1391-441

(entry mto force Dec 7, 1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional
and relating to the Protection of:V.fCtims of Non-International
I.l~d Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.1950 (1979) 609-99,172 A.J.I.L.457 (1978) 16
.(1977) 1442 - 9 (entry into force Dec 7,1978)[hereinafter Additional Protocol II].

Arm e Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
349

See Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, cited in note 338 supra.23.
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denote an attempt to regulate the means and methods of warfare (prohibiting the use of
certain weapons such as poison) that promote war-time humanitarian concerns (such as
warning the civilian population before bombardment). The primary rule is derived from
regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land,35o Meanwhile the Geneva
conventions and their additional protocols provide an extensive legal framework for the
protection of persons not or no longer participating directly in hostilities.

351

Recently, more than 190 States of the world have agreed to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 are customary international law (although the Geneva Protocols I
and II of 1977 are still being debatable). However, it could be addressed that the Geneva

Conventions and their additional protocols are, in fact, international treaties of a sort
since they make the most important contribution in limiting the barbarism of war.

352

The

Geneva Convention and additional protocols mark the most significant development from
"a 'legal perspective toward an attempt at international legislative response to armed
conflict. These four Geneva Conventions were intended to apply to all international
anned conflicts, regardless of whether or not war has been declared, or whether there is a
partial or total occupation of another state's territory.353
As Thailand has lead an ongomg effort to promote and cooperate with
peacekeeping forces that follow these principles laid out by the Charter of the United

~~Nations, Thailand has ratified the

four Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions.

lft~

See Operational Law Handbook cited in note 345 supra.
Jean - Marie Henckaerts, The law of armed conflict: problem and Prospects, Chatam House, Apr. 18-19
available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/researchlillllParmedconflict.pdf (last visited Jun. 26,

Geneva Conventions: the core of international humanitarian law, available at
.icrc.orgM'eb/Eng/siteengO.nsf/htmllgenevaconventions (last visited Jun. 26, 2006).
The Conventions had changed the use of technical term of 'war' to 'armed conflict cited by Leslie C.
the contemporary law of armed conflict 43-44, Manchester Jurist Publishing 2000 (1993).
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;.ccordingly, it is legally bound to comply with the standard law of anned conflict
required by these Conventions.
After reviewing the four Geneva Conventions, there is another question regarding
whether the two additions to the protocol of the Geneva Convention are universally
customary or not.
In recent times, Additional Protocol I has been ratified by more than 160 states,
meanwhile Protocol II also

~as

been ratified by almost 160 states. There are only a few

states in which non-international armed conflicts are taking place (including Thailand)
that have not ratified such protocols. Although Thailand has not ratified Protocol I and II,
many of the provisions of the protocols may be applicable as customary law. 354 That is,
the main source of humanitarian law for centuries has stated that no States shall violate
international humanitarian both in international and in non-international anned conflict.
355

Since customary international law consists of rules of law derived from the

consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that
way,356

it is in Thailand's best interest not to be contrary to the rules which are derived

from its very own legal tradition.
354

ass

See Operational Law Handbook cited in note 345 supra.
The rule of customary international law is derived from state practice and has developed out of conflicts

Iha~ fall within customary law rather than in treaty law, which is exemplified in military manuals, national
~Islation, official statements [protests, declarations, uprises de position"], positions adopted by States in
International conferences [unanimity in adopting some provisions, or the prohibition of reservations] , official
reports on battlefield behavior and case law [decision of the courts].

As Such, the rule of customary international law normally binds on all States even in those cases when the
!tate is a not a party to such treaties. Under article 38 of Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties states:
Nothing in Article 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third as a
CUstomary rule of international law, recognized as such." Also, article...38-{1) of Statute of the International
COurt of Justice established the court's function as E means to decide whether international law applies to
SUch disputes: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
~~gnized by the contesting states; (b) intemational custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
aw, (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
3S6

Rosanne Palmer, Practice and Methods of International Law 55, 1984
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Although the latest violence that erupted in Thailand occurred within its national
bOrders and appeared to be the result of internal conflict, it is difficult to establish
whether these incidents reached the level of armed conflict in which the Hague and
Geneva treaties apply. In general principle, the scope of international humanitarian law
is limited to what is considered to be internal armed conflict. However, under Common
Article 2 and Common Article 3, the laws of armed conflict still are not limited to war
between States. The law appears to apply to many situations because Common Article 2
ofthe Geneva Convention provides:
The law of armed conflict applies to all cases of declared war or
of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
mor~

of the High Contracting Parties.
;~:~

....:::~
,,'"

This formulation establishes that a State of war may exist even if the State· does
not officially recognize the other party and it also applies to all cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory by a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets
with no armed resistance. Because internal armed conflicts lead to extreme violence and
cruelty, many States accept that they cannot treat some situations as merely internal
conflicts. And Common Article 3 goes on to state:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum
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This Common Article 3 provides an exception to the law of war that otherwise
to be devoted solely to international conflict insofar as Article 3 carves out a
area for domestic as well as international human rights. This Article could be

. read to pertain directly to the case of internal anned conflict occurring within the territory
of one of the High Contracting Parties. Therefore, the internal incidents, which involve
either regular armed forces fighting groups of armed dissidents or armed groups fighting
each other, could be governed by this Common Article 3.

357

Since these two Articles were repeated in all four Conventions, it could be said
that all these rules are intentionally deemed customary.

The situation in Thailand,

however, will be governed under Geneva Convention.s if the violence goes beyond the
scope of internal disturbance because the conventions fonnulated in the four Conventions
can be applied to the level of internal armed conflict. But Thailand does not need to be
contrary to the fundamental law of Hague Convention or any law which seems to be
~'

r

customary law.

,"

2. Human Rights Law
Human rights have emerged as a significant moral and legal force in modern
domestic and international relations and universally apply as much to individuals as to
govemments. J58 Apart from obligations undertaken by a treaty, a State is entitled to treat
both its own nationals and stateless persons equally, but how civilians and stateless

----------------------The Law of-Armed Conflict: Non-International Armed Conflict, ICRC, available at
357

http: //WWW.icrc.orgNVeb/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/5P8EX4/$FileILAW10_final.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2006).

35a
Jeffrey F. Addicott, Terrorism Law 306-307, Lawyers and Judges Publishing Company, Inc.,(3 rd

ed.2006).
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persons are treated is not a matter with which international law, as a rule, generally
concerns itself. Human rights law has developed from international law and seeks to
become binding across States as customary law. They apply to all States that are not
subject to the party of such treaties. The hope is that each state will establish protective
measure to diminish any violation of the basic concepts of human rights, such as
deprivation ofliberty, torture, inhuman treatment, murder, and other cruelties. Even if the'
applicability of human rights law is different within different States, every State has to be
concerned with violations of human rights.
Today, Thailand is a party to international human rights instruments and has
already acceded to five core United Nations human rights instruments. 359

It

IS

unavoidable that Thailand must not violate the human rights fundamental.

3. Treaties
The distinguishing factor of the law of treaty is that it has garnered the consent of
those States that have been increasingly turning to treaties as a source of international
law. The law of treaties penn its a State to make a reservation if such a reservation is not

---------------------359Thailand has been proactive in becoming a Party to international human rights instruments and has
already acceded to five core UN human rights instruments as follows:
~Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), G.A. res.
1180,34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. N34/46, (entered into force Sep. 3,1981)
CEDAW] ; 2) Convention on the Rights of the Child, NRES/44/25 (entered into force Dec. 12,
[hereinafter CRC] ; 3) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 29 January 1997, GA
22QOA (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPRj ; 4) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
(CESCR), GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966), 993
.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. [hereinafter CESCR] ; 5) International Convention on Elimination
UForms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at
.N. Doc. N6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4,1969) [hereinafter CERDj.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand available at www.mfa.go.th/web/24.p\1p. last visited Jan1 , 2007).
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prohibited by the treaty that the State has signed.

36o

This means that traditional

international law emphasizes the respect of State sovereignty and fundamental freedoms.
States can have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources and enjoy their rights so
long as their policies ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to any other States or areas beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction.
When States sign and ratify any treaty, it means that they are expressing consent to be
bound by such treaty and must refrain from acts that would defeat the objective and
purpose of such treaty. Therefore, not only considering the four Geneva Conventions and
customary law, Thailand has to bear in mind other treaties that the country has signed and

its duties regarding the implementation of such treaties.

C. Conclusion
'.

That is to say both domestic law and International law are applicable to the
violence in Southern Thailand. Although some Treaties and Conventions of international
law are not applicable at this moment, Thailand has to realize that the Thai Security
Forces shall not violate either Thai law or international' law especially human rights.
Furthermore, to operate in hannony for the peace of the country and the world, Thailand
should inspect its law against the concept of international law. I shall examine further
how Thai law and the actions of the Thai Security Forces comply with the international
law in human rights and humanitarian law and treaties in the following discussion.

;--------------------See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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IV - 3

Is Thai Domestic Law inconsistent with International

I1umanitarian Law and Human Rights Law:
What is the Applicable of Thai Law regarding Pattani?
In Southern Thailand, the domestic laws applicable to the situation are: Thai
criminal law, martial law and the Thai Emergency Decree. There have been questions as

to whether these laws violate fundamental humanitarian law and human rights law
because Thai law has set up a system of tribunals empowered to impose punishment for
serious offences, punishments that include the death penalty, long-term prison sentences,

and severe restrictions on rights and liberties.
Although the concept of martial law was replaced later by the Emergency Decree,
the statutes are not strikingly different. Both place a prohibitive framework upon normal
civilian life and allow for responsive military action in the event of a threat to national
security. Both have the potential to impact human rights and set dangerous precedents.

All of the above regulations can generally be justified in the scope of international law.
But are these laws endangering individuals and jeopardizing public support for
Government authority?
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punishment to Ensure a Measure for Safety

1. Death Penalty
Punishment in Thai la~61 is strongly weighted toward retribution as opposed to
rehabilitation, and the most

extr~me

form of punishment that the Thai Penal Code

provides is the death penalty. The death penalty, however, does not apply strictly to
threats to the well-being of individuals. A recent Penal Code includes the death penalty as
also applicable to those acts of terrorism warranting maximum punishment. The
amendment, therefore, that pertains to terrorist activity is in keeping with the domestic
legal tradition.
The meting out of punishment through criminal procedure is determined by court
penalties according to the degree of individual guilt and the background of the offender.
Although there are campaigns geared toward eradicating the death penalty for any
person, the campaigns are not popular among Thais. Many believe the death penalty is
still necessary for a developing country and that what limited budget the government has
should not be spent on rehabilitating criminals but on compensating victims. 362

361

Th al. Penal Code B.E.2499 (1956).

(O]ffenses include Regicide; Sedition or Rebellion; Offenses against the external security of Thailand;
Offenses against the friendly relations with foreign States; Bribery; Malfeasance in Judicial Office;
terrorist(cited in Chapter 3); Offenses relating to causing public dangers; Arson; Rape; Offenses against life
and body; Kidnapping; Robbery resulting in death.
Military Code B.E.2454«1911).
(O]ffenses include Desertion; Absence without leave during war time or before the enemy; Disobeying a

~mmand.er; Duties-and-Orders Offenses; Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation; Combat-related
ffenses Include Misbehavior before the Enemy; and Misconduct as a Prisoner.
·Narcotics Act B.E.2522 (1979).

~]ffenses include Produce,

Import or Export for the Purpose of Disposal; Use of Force against Other
ersons to Consume Narcotics.

362

~ Seminar on Death Penalty in Thailand, JUI.3-4, 2006, The National Human Rights Commissions,
Th alland.
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a. Human Rights Law
Socialists view the concept of human rights as being based on the proposition that
rights are guaranteed by the State. This view shifts the emphasis from individual
to social and economic rights (that is, those freedoms an individual enjoys
the context of the community).363 The question becomes: what is the limitation of
right? Does the death penalty violate human rights laws?
Recently, there are 137 countries that have abolished the death penalty,364and

organiza~ions365have campaigned to abandon this punishment because it is deemed
be an act of cruel and inhuman punishment. 366 Another reason is that to many human
activists view, the death penalty does not solve the root of the problem because
is no causal relation between capitol punishment and serious crimes. 367
If, however, we scrutinize the Universal Declaration of Human 'Rights and the
,"'llllUUVll....

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights article by article, there are no rules

the death penalty. In keeping with the socialist view, the death penalty can be
a way to ensure the protection of certain freedoms rather than as a basic
.~, . .t:;'-'>J"'-'lll

of human rights so long as it is just punishment for a capitol crime. This

Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law 210, Routledge, Taylor and
Group1997 (1970).
,.,w."w"",w.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty (last visited Aug. 11.2007).
have abolished the death penalty in law or practice; 60 countries retain and use the death
most often as a punishment for people convicted of murder; At least 1,252 people were known to be
in 24 countries during 2007. The true figure was certainly higher; 88 per cent of all known
in 2007 took place in China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the USA.
Amnesty, Human Rights Watch and World coalition organization.
declaration of the 3rd World Congress Against the Death Penalty, available at
.worldcoalition.org/bcoaldecla.htm (last visited Jan 31.2007).
Penalty Q&A, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/dp_qa.html(last visited Jan.31,
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perspective takes the goal of the social world as more important than individuals and that
certain freedoms must be sacrificed in order to maintain a healthy and functioning
society.
There have been movements dedicated to abolishing the death penalty, such as the
second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Aimed at Abolishing the Death Penalty. In this case, the protocol was undersigned by 50
countries, a number that is too low to justify it as customary law. Thailand was not party
to this protocol. We might compare this to Human Rights instruments and International
Criminal Court(ICC) , both of which do not prohibit the death penalty and are customary
laws because there are more than 190 countries party to those treaties.

h.

Humanitarian Law

The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols have not banned the
death penalty outright. The regulations of those Conventions regarding the death penalty
establish rules that ban capital punishment for those individuals less than eighteen years

of age at the time they committed the offence. 368

Although Thai law provides the punishment of death penalty for serious crimes,
provisions in Section 288 of the Thai Penal Code prohibit the execution of a person
is under eighteen years.369 In addition, this Section also bars the execution of any

.

Geneva Convention IV, at art 68.
any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced on a protected person who was under eighteen
of age at the time of the offence.
Additional Protocol II, at art 6 (4).

~eath penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of eighteen years at the
o the offence and shall not be carried out on pregnant women or mothers of young children.
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woman at the time of her pregnancy.370 In this respect, Thailand has made a deliberate
effort to make domestic laws compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or Geneva
conventions (to which Thailand is Party). For example, in 2003 the Thai Criminal
Procedure Code, was amended so that the "conventional" form of execution was by the
use of lethal injection (as opposed to firing squad). In making these changes, Thailand

has attempted to make certain laws compatible with the generally agreed-upon concepts
of human rights. Therefore, even though Thailand continues to have the death penalty, it
is legally still in keeping with humanitarian law insofar as it bans execution for those
under the age of eighteen and bars the execution of pregnant women.

2. Arrest, Detention and Imprisonment
As most countries have a law prohibiting dangerous acts. Certainly, Thailand

does. The body of Thai criminal law deals with crime and the legal punishment of
criminal offences. The Thai criminal law permits an authority to arrest, detain, and
imprison suspects in response to a criminal offence. If we focus on both of the laws tnartiallaw and the Emergency Decree - that were used to respond to the waves of
in attempt"to maintain stability in the Southern area, Section 15 (bis) of the
law provides that so long as there are reasonable grounds for suspicion, a person
be arrested and detained, although no more than seven days. Also, Section 12371 of

Thai Penal Code, at sec.288.
cases of murder offences. the penalty options that judges may select to impost
for life or imprisonment of fifteen to twenty years.

are death,

Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation, BE 2548 (2005), Thai Law Reform
Version [hereinafter Thai Emergency Decree] sec.12.
f
and taking suspected persons into custody under section 11(1), the competent official shall
Or leave of a court of competent jurisdiction or the Criminal Court. Upon obtaining leave of the court,
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the Emergency Decree permits an authority to arrest and detain any person who is
suspected under Section 11 (1) 372 of its provision. The overseeing official shall ask
perIl1ission from the court to arrest or detain the individual for a period not exceeding
seven days. If it seems necessary, competent officers shall ask the court's permission to
extend such a detention period by seven days at a time but the total period shall not
exceed thirty days. The suspected person shall be taken into custody at a designated place
that is not a police station, detention center, penal institution, or a prison and shall not be
treated as convict. 373 Although the Emergency Decree aimed to revise and refine martial

law, it still provides the authorities with the power to arrest, detain, and imprison a
suspect. The question is do such laws violate human rights law and humanitarian law?
There are two legal issues involving detention of suspects in Thai law and international

law covered here. The first issue is whether the detention of criminals in Thai law is
compatible with human rights and humanitarian law. The second issue is whether
detention lasting longer than seven days is still within the accepted understanding of
"promptly" and "reasonable time" as those tenns are used in the framework of human

rights law.

the competent official shall be empowered to arrest and take the suspected persons into custody for a
pe~iod not exceeding seven days. The suspected persons shall be taken into custody at a designated place
Which is not a police station, detention centre, penal institution or prisons and shall not be treated as a
COnvict. Incase where it is necessary to continue the detention in order to remedy the emergency situation,
th~ competent official shall apply for the leave of the court to extend such detention period by seven days at
~ time: provided that the total period shall not exceed thirty days Upon the expiration of such period, if the
etenllon is still required, the competent official shall proceed under the Criminal Procedure Code.
372

I~id. at sec.11 (1).
[TJo ISSue a Notification that a competent official shall have the power of arrest and detention over persons
:uspected of having a role in causing the emergency situation, or being an instigator, a propagator, a
s~PP~rter of such act or concealing relevant information relating to the act which caused the emergency
~uall?~, provided that this should be done to the extent that is necessary to prevent such person from
fa mmlttmg an act or participating in the commission of any act which may cause a serious situation or to
ster cooperation in the termination of the serious situation.
373

See Thai Emergency Decree, at sec.12 cited in note 371 supra.
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a. Human Rights Law
According to Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "No one

shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention ... "

Also, Article 9 (l) of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to

liberty and security ojperson. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with

such procedure as are established by law. "
In these provisions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
guarantees the rights and liberties of the individual and human rights law allows States to
arrest people suspected of crimes so long as it is done according to the rules and
regulations of the law of that country. The Universal Declaration of.Human Rights also
considers the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention. What this means is that the
State is entitled to judge who can be subject to this law, and why and how they should be
handled so long as the treatment is fair, legitimate, and customary.374

So although

detention itself is compatible to human rights law, Article 9 (3 )of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights restricts the rights of States regarding the nature of
this detention: "Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought

promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and

shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release."

The person who has

been arrested, charged, or detained shall have the right to due process of law without any

delay. Because human rights law uses the word "promptly" and therefore does not

r

ify the exact amount of time, the law is open to interpretation. Thus, Thailand must

H Weston, Human Rights in the World Community 96-97: Issues and Action, Richard Pierre
ed., University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992.
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~e it upon itself to see that detention of suspects follows a procedure this is standard

and customary compared to other countries.

However, if the period of allowable

detention in Thailand is longer than periods in other countries, it does not necessarily
JIleaIl there is a violation of human rights because each country has its distinct problems

that require different types of solutions. But Thailand has to prove that the process is
necessary and reasonable and the government has to support significant efforts (and
intends on continuing these efforts) to improve laws to. meet the international standards,
compared to other developed countries.

h. Humanitarian Law
The Geneva Conventions do not prohibit detention, internment or imprisonment
as exemplified in Article 89 (4)375 of the Geneva Convention III and Article 119 (4) 3760 f
the Geneva IV, which states confinement shall be permitted for disciplinary punishment.
Article 68

377

of the Geneva IV allows internment or imprisonment for the person who

commits an offence.

Even Article 70 378 of the Geneva IV states that the protected

375

See Geneva Convention 111, at art. 89.
[T]he disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners of war are the following :
(1) ... , (2) .... (3) ... , and (4) Confinement.
376

See Geneva Convention IV. at art. 119.
fTlhe disciplinary punishments applicable to internees shall be the following:
(1) ... ,(2) ... ,(3) ... and (4) Confinement.
In.

Ib/d. at art.68

[~rotected persons who commit an offence which is solely intended to harm the Occupying Power. but
'NhIC~ . does not constitute an attempt on the life or limb of members of the occupying forces or
:m~n~strat~on, nor a grave collective danger. nor seriously damage the property of the occupying forces or
ministration or the installations used by them, shall be liable to internment or simple imprisonment.
provided the duration of such internment or imprisonment is proportionate to the offence committed.
-378 Ibid. at art.70
persons shall not be arrested. prosecuted or convicted by the Occupying Power for acts
III mmltted or for opinions expressed before the occupation. or during a temporary interruption thereof. with
e
exception
of
breaches
of
the
laws
and
customs
of
war.

~rot~cted
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persons shall not be arrested, prosecuted or convicted by an Occupying Power when such .

an act is committed before

the time of occupation or temporary interruption. Article 70

also provides for the ability of the state to detain suspects during the period of occupying
power if the law of the occupied State justified extradition in time of peace. Therefore,
such persons can be arrested, prosecuted or convicted under Geneva Conventions. Article
117 379 of the Geneva IV also respects the laws in force in the territory in which these
individuals are detained. This Article .only limits the punishment to disciplinary
punishment in the case where those same criminal acts were committed by persons who
were not internees. These fundamental rules are not different from their Additional
Protocols. 380 Those provisions are supported by the theory of state sovereign immunity,

Ibid. at art. 117.
[S]ubject to the provisions of the present Chapter, the laws in force in the territory in which they are detained
will
continue
to
apply
to
internees
who
commit
offence~
during
internment.

379

380 See

Protocol Additional I , at art.75.
(3) Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict shall be informed
promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken. Except in
tases of arrest or detention for penal offences, such persons shall be released with the minimum delay
possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have
ceased
to
exist.
4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found guilty of a penal offence
related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly
!:<Instituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, which include
following:
the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence
against him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights and means
defence;
no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility;
no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account or any act or omission which did
constitute a criminal offence under the national or international law to which he was subject at the time
it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time
the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commissionuf1he offence, provision is made by law
the
imposition
of
a
lighter
penalty,
the
offender
shall
benefit
thereby;
anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law;
anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence;
no one
shall
be
compelled
to
testify against himself
or
to
confess
guilt;
anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
.
as
witnesses
against
him;
no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in respect of which a final
acquitting or convicting that person has been previously pronounced under the same law and
procedure;
anYone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the judgement pronounced publicly; and
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which holds the basic principle that just jurisdiction belongs solely to the State under
Article 2(7).381 However, the provisions of the Geneva Convention state that the place of
detention must be in buildings or quarters that meet the appropriate health and safety
standards during acts of war. 382 These laws also state that there should be no forms of
cruelty during the imprisonment 383 and such detained persons shall be treated humanely
during the period of detention.

384

Ol aconvicted person shall be advised on conviction or his judicial and other remedies and of the time-limits
within which they may be exercised.
Charter of the United Nations with the Statute of the International Court of Justice annexed thereto, 26
June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 , T.S.993, 3 Bevans 1153 (as amended, Dec.17, 1963, T.I.A.S.5857; 557
U.N.T.S.143 Dec 20, 1965, 19 U.S.T.5450; T.I.A.1.6529 and Dec.20, 1971, 24 U.S.T.2225; T.I.A.S.7739)
(entry into force Oct.24, 1945) [hereinafter UN Charter] art.2(7).
[N]<rthing contained in the present Charter· shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the ~Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chap~er VII.
381

382 See Geneva Convention IV, at art.85.
fnhe Detaining Power is bound to take all necessary and possible measures to ensure that protected
persons shall, from the outset of their internment, 'be accommodated in buildings or quarters which afford
every possible safeguard as regards hygiene and health, and provide efficient protection against the rigours
of the climate and the effects of the war. In no case shall permanent places of internment be situated in
unhealthy areas or in districts, the climate of which is injurious to the internees. In all cases where the
district, in which a protected person is temporarily interned, is in an unhealthy area or has a climate which is
harmful to his health, he shall be removed to a more suitable place of internment as rapidly as
circumstances
permit.

The premises shall be fully protected from dampness, adequately heated and lighted, in particular between
dusk and lights out. The sleeping quarters shall be sufficiently spacious and well ventilated, and the
internees shall have suitable bedding and sufficient blankets, account being taken of the climate, and the
age,
sex,
and
state
of,
health
of
the
internees.
shall have for their use, day and night, sanitary conveniences which conform to the rules of
and are constantly maintained in a state of cleanliness. They shall be provided with sufficient water
soap for their daily personal toilet and for washing their personal laundry; installations and facilities
for this purpose shall be granted to them. Showers or baths shall also be available. The
time
shall
be
set
aside
for
washing
and
for
cleaning.
it is necessary, as an exceptional and temporary measure, to accommodate women internees
are not members of a family unit in the same place of internment as men, the proviSion of separate
quarters and sanitary conveniences for the use of such women internees shall be obligatory.

forms

of

cruelty

without

exception

are

forbidden.

persons who are confined pending proceedings or serving a sentence involving toss of liberty,
dUring their confinement be humanely treated.
.
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Because human rights and humanitarian law have no provlSlon to prohibit
attention, detention can be seen as a potentially necessary peace-keeping measure even if
aJllight appear to violate the concept of basic human rights. However, Martial law made

no stipulations about the place that suspects were to be detained (so as to risk violating
interoationallaw), whereas the Emergency Decree provides a designated place that is not

a prison cell.

Then, the Emergency Decree has a better solution not against any

intemationallaw. _

3. Expulsion
Section 15 of the Martial law has the authority to expel a person who has no
domicile or who has a temporary resident status if he or she has, on reasonable grounds,
been suspected as someone who has jeopardized the security of the state. Also, section

11(8) 385 of the Emergency Decree allows authorities the power to instruct an alien to

leave the Kingdom in the case that such a person is deemed to be a supporter of the group
:,lIausing the emergency situation. Although an international judicial body has yet to judge
issue, the expulsion could be regarded as a crime against humanity under international

as the International Criminal

Court stands today.386 I will consider then whether the

. n of someone from a country by either Martial law or Emergency Decree can be
"tted by human rights and humanitarian law or not.

•S~e Thai Emergency Decree, at sec.11 (8).
ISSue a Notification that a competent official shall have the power to instruct an alien to leave the
in the case where there are reasonable grounds to believe that such person is a supporter in
the emergency situation, provided that the law on immigration shall apply mutatis mutandis.
ExPUlsion of Germans after World War 11 Expulsion of Germans after World War II, available at
wikipedia.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
.
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a. Human Rights Law
Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: "No one shall

be subjected to arbitrary exile ... " Also, Article 9 (1) of the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as
are e~tablished by law. "
It was seen that Human rights law basically prohibits forced exile but it also

provides exceptions in cases that jeopardize the security of the State. These laws (Martial
Law and Emergency Decree) were intended to protect the integrity of the country and to

. stabilize Southern Thailand, and they do not contradict the concept of human right laws.
But the question as to whether it is appropriate to use the expUlsion measures is a
question that needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis and should not be regarded
.asa general principle that applies to any and all instances.

h. Humanitarian Law
Even if Geneva Conventions has no provision prohibiting forced exile, Article 45
Convention IV states that protected persons shall not be transferred to a country that is
a party to the Convention, or to any country where he or she may have reason to fear
"--~UllUll

for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs.

Martial law and Emergency Decree also do not designate a place of exile but
Decree ensures extradited persons are sent to countries where they are not
for political or religious beliefs.

Further, it does include language that
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teCDgnizes treaties with other countries because it provides the condition to expel
individuals by following the "mutatis mutandis" of immigration law that is consistent to
Geneva Convention and holds states accountable to the treaties they signed as
International agreements. The effectiveness of the ratification of Geneva Convention can

be enhanced Thailand, such as the Senate issued the Geneva Act, B.E.2S22, in 1990.
~\though

Thailand supports initiatives toward achieving this objective, it is important to

stress that each military officer has an obligation to comply with the Geneva
Conventions. The implementation and compliance with this Act is required by every
military member to perform their duties.
Because Martial law does not specify the scope of expUlsion there is a risk that
such a law could violate the- Geneva Conventions and this broad provision of Martial law
(even justified for peaceful purposes) should be amended.

4. Enlistment

Not only Thailand but almost every country in the world (including civilized
countries such as United States of America, Canada, and the United Kingdom) has a
means by which citizens are recruited as military members. 387 Thai law also allows for
Martial law, which takes effect when there is a threat to national security, and which
authorizes military officers with the power to enlist civilians to assist any military effort
In

protecting the country. In fact, enlistment has been practiced in Thailand before the

period of the Sukothai Kingdom (1238-1438).388 Even the Emergency Decree does not

Pairoj Nuchaja, Relationship between the military and politics in Thai history 68-69, Royal Thai Army War
1990.
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the provision of enlistment, although it could be implied that Section 11 (6)389 allows
enlistment because it empowers the Prime Minister to perform such an act if it is
necessary and is for the security of the country. Is enforced enlistment, in other
words, a form of servitude as it is defined by Article 4 of the Universal Declaration?
Does the provisional status of national emergency make enforced enlistment a necessary

steP toward stabilizing a country and ensuring the peace or might these laws serve to
justify forms of slavery and abuse?

a. Human Rights Law

Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states that: "No one shall

be held in slavery or serv.itude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their

forms." The Article was meant to guarantee minimum standards of protection and·
support for the freedom of people, standards that are consistent with fundamental rights
,articulated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Also Article 8
prohibits any person to be held in slavery in any form, including servitude. It might be
[argued that enforced enlistment is a type of servitude but the covenant includes an
distinction between military service and other forms of service in those periods
national emergency: "Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity
the life or well-being of the community. " This exception under Article 8 in

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights understands the real meaning of
S~e Thai Emergency Decree, at sec.11 (5).
ISsue a Notification the prohibition of any act or any instruction to perform an act to the extent that is
for maintaining the security of the state, the safety of the country or the safety of the people.
See Thai Constitu.tional B.E.2549 at sec.59.
person shall have a duty to defend the country, serve in armed forces, pay taxes and duties, render
""'''''n,._ to the official service, receive education and training, protect and pass on to conserve natural
and the environment, as provided by law.
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peace, not an ideal state of goodwill and community (enlistment impacts people's
Uberties), but rather a long-term political stability in which certain measures must be
taken in order to ensure that longevity.
Although no provisions prohibit particular forms of enlistment that Martial law
deems as appropriate, there are laws that prohibit the State from arbitrarily enlisting
citizen or doing so without legislation. The military has to respect basic human rights for
this reason regardless of whether recruitment is "necessity" or "regular." Thailand must
ensure that all individuals are treated equally, even when the issue at stake involves the
security and national interest of the country.

h. Humanitarian Law
Humanitarian law also prohibits slavery or servitude under Article 4(f) of the
Additional Protocol II states: " Slavery and the slave trade in all their forms. " As well as
Article 7 of the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court stated that enslavement is

one of the acts designated as a "crime against humanity." But these do not include the
term "enlistment" as a form of servitude. Then, enlistment, which is provided by the
legislation of State, seems to be a reasonable demand so long as the measures uphold
principles of constitutional law, protects State sovereignty, and obeys international
standards of human rights law.
For that reason, martial law and Emergency Decree do not violate human rights

~and humanitarian law because there are the system of laws that take effect in the period
.. an emergency, and the body of law imposed by the military over any and all civilians
discrimination. Normally, Martial law shall not allow persons to be enlisted
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unreasonably except by the standards of the Thai Constitution. But because of these
~treme

circumstances, the law provides that it is a duty for everyone to protect the

country. Enlistment is a "necessary" practice in an urgent situation.

5. Search, Seizure, Demolition, and Modification
A right of ownership assures the owner the right to dispense with property in a
manner he or she sees fit, whether to use or not use the property, or to exclude others
from using it. As John Locke said: "Every man has a property in his own person. This

nobody has a right to, but himself" 390 Generall)'J2roperty rights are protected by Thai
laws found in the form of Thai Constitutions and the Civil Codes.

In some cases,

however, the laws allow the officer, against the right of'ownership of person, to search
without a warrant as Thai criminal law authorizes the issuance of a search warrant to
search and seizure so long as there are reasonable grounds. 391 For example, Martial law

390 John Locke (Aug.29, 1632 - Oct.28 , 1704) was an influential English philosopher. His ideas had an
enormous influence on the development of political philosophy, and he is widely regarded as one of the
most influential Enlightenment thinkers and contributors to liberal theory. His writings reflected in the
American Declaration of Independence. (available at www.wikipedia.org, last visited Jan' 1,2006).
391 The Thai Criminal Procedure Code of Thailand, Such art Jiwachat & Lertchai Jiwachat 's version
[hereinafter Thai Criminal Procedurej sec. .69.
[TJhe grounds upon which a warrant of search may be issued are as follows:
(1) to discover and seize any article which may be used as evidence in the course of an inquiry, preliminary
examination or trial'
(2) to discover and' seize any article the possession of which is an offence, or which has been unlawfully
obtained or which is reasonable suspected to have been used or intended to be used for committing an
offence'
(3) to di~cover and rescue any person who is wrongfully restrained or confined;
(4) to discover any person against whom a warrant of arrest has been issued;
(~) to discover and seize any article according to the judgment or order of a Court, in the case where such
discovery or seize cannot be otherwise effected.

Ibid. at sec.92.
INjo search may be made in a private place without a warrant of search, unless it is made by an
administrative or police official and in the following cases;
(1)where there is a cry for help emanating from the private place;
(2)where a flagrant offence is evidently being committed in the private places;
(3)':"here a person having committed a flagrant offence has, whilst being pursued, taken refuge; or there are
senous grounds for suspecting that such person is concealing, in the private place;
.

163

provides that military officers have full power to carry out searches, or inspect suspicious

itemS, seize property that may have been possessed by illegal means or without any prior
consent by a Government officia1. 392 Furthermore, Section 8 of Martial law also provides
military officers with the full power to demolish any buildings or to enter people's
dwellings if it seems appropriate for military interest. They also have the right to use all
vehicles, animals, foods, armaments, and any appliances' of person or company for
military affairs. Section 11 (3)393 and Section 11(4i 94 of the Emergency Decree provides

that competent officials shall have the power to issue search warrants.

Also, Section

11(4) of the Emergency Decree permits competent officials the power accompanied by a

notification from the Prime Minister to issue a warrant for removal, withdrawal, or
demolition of buildings, structures, or obstructions. However, these provisions of the
Emergency Decree are different than martial law because the Emergency Decree permits
competent officials such power only on reasonable grounds to seize items if they are

(4) where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an article obtained through an offence is
concealed or to be found inside, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that by reason of the delay in
obtaining a warrant of search the article is likely to be removed;
(5) where the person to be arrested is the head of the household of such private place and there is a warrant
for his arrest, or the arrest is to be made under Section 78
When the search is made by superior administrative or police official acting in person, no warrant of search
is necessary but it must be a case where a warrant of search may be issued or where a search may
'otherwise be made under this Code.
392

00

o

See Thai Martial law, at sec 9.
[Mjilitary officers have full power to inspect persons, vehicles, and buildings for any reason, at any place,
and at any time. They may also inspect letters, telex, parcels, or censor books, broadsheets, newspapers,
advertising pictures and articles.
See Thai Emergency Decree, at sec. 11 (3).
iSsue a Notification that a competent official shall have the power to seize or attach arms, goods,
products, chemical products or any other materials in the case where there are reasonable
to suspect that such objects have been used or will be used to commit or support an act which
an emergency situation.

I~;d. at sec. 11(4).
ISSue a Notification that a competent officials shall have the power to issue a warrant for the search,
, withdrawal or demolition of buildings, structures or obstructions as necessary for the exercise of
in order to promptly terminate a serious situation where a delay might render the situation beyond
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suspected of having been used or suspected of being used in the future to "commit or
support an act which causes an emergency situation." But the Emergency Decree does
not have any provision to permit an officer to enter a dwelling without a warrant, modify

any building, or commandeer property. However, Section 11(6) of the Emergency Decree
still provides that the Prime Minister shall have the power to issue a notification to
prohibit or allow any act, ·if such an act is deemed necessary and is for the security of the
country. Although this power can accrue to the benefit of the military, permission from

the Prime Minister is required, not from a military commander.

a. Human Rights Law

Article 17 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his

privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation. " 395

Basically human rights law prohibits "arbitrary interference" in order to protect
-.

individuals against the abuse of those laws (such as Martial law) that have ostensibly
peaceful intentions. 396

Traditionally, those rights include: L control of the use of

property,' 2. the right to any benefit from the property (examples: mining rights and rent);

3. the right to transfer or sell the property; and 4. the right to exclude others from the
~------------------1 J.G A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European Convention on Human Rights
38, Manchester University Press 2001.
39s

U .Parvez Hassan, The Word (Arbitrary( As Used in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Illegal Or
MnJust?,( 10 Harv. Int'l L. J. 225 (1969); Christopher Keith Hall, Contemporary universal jurisdiction, in
A?b~en Bergsmo, ed., Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden: Essays in Honour of
s J0rn Elde11 0 n.3 (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003).
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property.397 Thus, everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association

with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her property.398

h. Humanitarian Law
According to the fundamental provision of "grave breaches," under the Geneva
Convention, any act that was committed against the property, if it was extensive
appropriation and not justified by military necessity, is deemed to be carried out
unlawfully and wantonly.399 Namely, Article 85 (3) (b)400 of the Additional Protocol I
prohibits making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of an

.

indiscriminate attack. Moreover, Article 52 (2)40.1 of the Additional Protocol I provides
. that attacks shall be limited strictly to military objects, and the Hague Convention,402

397 Available

at www.wikipedia.org ( last visited Jan.1, 2007).

398 Available

at www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/declaration/17.asp (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).

399 See Geneva Convention I, at art. 50.
IGlrave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if
COmmitted against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman
including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried
unlawfully and wantonly.

See Additional Protocol I, at art.85 (3).
. an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that
attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.

Additional Protocol I, at art. 52 (2).
shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
,offers a definite military advantage.
1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, at art.19.
not of an international character:
CeVent o.f an armed conflict not of an internatio~al character occurring within the territory of one of the
, ontractmg Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions of
Convention which relate to respect for cultural property.
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vides protecting of cultural properties as a whole, irrespective of origin or ownership,
pcO

and prohibiting acts of aggression toward historic monuments, works of art, or places that
do not directly aid military support. 403 Although international law permits each State to
have the right to protect its citizens, it was noted that the process of the law has to be
followed by a humanitarian legal framework as well.
Considering Martial law, the law attempts to provide how to use military power as
a necessary means only in the emergency situations. Although martial law authorizes
military officers to demolish and modify any buildings, the provision-- consistent with
the fundamental aims of Geneva Convention-permits this only in the cases of military
necessity. But these considerations are not enough because this law does not prohibit the
using of extra power by the military officers. The provision does not limit the time period
in which this might be carried out nor does it clearly define the phrase "full power." The
scope of the provision does not allow for the military to wage war; the actions taken by
the military might, actually, fan the flames of enemies of the State because the operatives
are not deemed to be legitimate, and these might violate humanitarian law.

Moreover,

the permission to use all vehicles, animals, foods, armaments, and any appliances of
person or company for military affairs might violate Geneva Convention IlI. 404 Even

--------------~/bid.at

art.16.
[P)rotection
of
cultural
objects
and
of
places
of
worship:
~thout prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
h.ven~ of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, it is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility directed against
~tonc monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of
oples, and to use them in support of the military effort.
404

(A See Geneva Convention III, at art.18.
c

Shlilieffect~

and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military equipment and military documents,
al remain in the possession of prisoners of war, likewise their metal helmets and gas masks and like
iSsued for personal protection. Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall likewise
in their possession, even if such effects and articles belong to their regulation military equipment.

167

¢cle 97405 of the Geneva Convention IV permits this authority if it is in accordance
with established procedure, but the issues and details in martial law are not sufficient and
do not cover for the operation and risk to causes effects on the violation of proportional
fulldamental.
These problems were resolved, in part, by Emergency Decree, which, although
having the basic premise as Martial law, uses different terms for the operation. It added
the phrase "necessary and promptly" and did not include the phrase "full power," as this
law was explicitly designed to be a provisional set of rules in times of emergency.
The Emergency Decree permits only the reasonable grounds to seize the suspected object

and obeys the concept that searches must be conducted for a reason

406

and that such

'.

reasons can be articulated and based on general principles of law. The scope pf the
Emergency Decree is much narrower than· that of Martial law in that the power it
authorizes the military is not justified merely on the grounds that such acts benefit the
military as a whole but so long as acts such as search and seizure might work to prevent
prolonging the emergency situation. Then, this provision suggests that such seizure and
search might not violate human rights law if the search is implemented pursuant to the

SCOpe of impartiality and could not be categorized as an arbitrary act. Moreover, the
transferring of military power to Prime Minister Power was intended to make such
Operations accountable and to limit the use of this exception as it exists by military

See Geneva Convention IV, at art.97.
shall be permitted to retain articles of personal use. Monies, cheques, bonds, etc., and valuables
elr POssession may not be taken from them except in accordance with established procedure.

th .

Law of Armed conflict, Lesson 12 23,ICRC.

168

One concern is that such laws will be either unjust or merely the prerogative of a
dictator or other powerful political figure. Therefore, when the Government declares
martial law, it must ensure all concerned that the action is to promote the welfare and
safety of the general populace, and not to further the objectives of any exclusive or
special interest group. If the government meets this standard, a declaration of Martial

laW and Emergency Decree will not be contrary to the edicts of humanitarian law.

B.

Prohibitions
Although the Thai Constitution of 1997 was given extensive power to regulate

and control

gov~rnment

and public agencies as well as to provide and protect individual

rights and liberties,407 Martial Law and Emergency Decree still were in effect during that
period.

Thus, although the Thai Constitution of 2006 continues to affirm the right and

liberty of people, it continues to allow for the possibility of Martial law' and 'Emergency
Decree.

1.

The Assembly or Gathering of Persons
Ordinarily, Thai .Constitution of 1997 provides for freedom of assembly and

association, and the government generally respects these rights in practice. 408 However,
Martial law states that the assembly or gathering of persons shall be prohibited,409

---------------------407

Thanet Aphornsuvan, The Search for Order: Constitutions and Human Rights in Thai Political History,
Faculty of Liberal Arts, Thammasat University, Bangkok Thailand.

4il8

.. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
",ar.B, 2006.
4il8

See Thai Martial law, at sec.11 (1)
[B]anning of public meeting and suspension of the activities of associations:
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whereas Emergency Decree

410

states the assembly or gathering of persons shall be

prohibited only if such an assembly or gathering seems to be unruly. But these provisions
were not used during the year 2005.

411

a. Human Rights Law
Dr. Manfired Nowak noted freedom of assembly as a fundamental human right
and functioning of democracy: "As a political right, [freedom of association} is
indispensable for the existence and functioning of democracy, because political interests

can be effectively championed only in community with others (as a political party,
professional interest group, organization or other association for pursuing particular
public interests}."

412

Freedom of assembly is guaranteed by Article 20 (1) of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that: "Everyone has the right to
freedom ofpeaceful assembly and association. " Also the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights provides: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association

with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his
interests. "
As a fundamental of human rights, the right of peaceful assembly without arms is
recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights and every person has the right to assemble and maintain a
~------------------See Thai Emergency Decree, at sec. 9 (2).
-\T]o prohibit the assembly or gathering of persons at any place or the commission of any act which may
cause unrest.
411

See Country Reports cited in note 408 supra.
412

1999 Reports, Human Rights Watch
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public group without any prejudice. To restrict such a right must be prescribed by law

and is only necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the interests of national
security, public safety, or public order. According to the emergency situations, Article 21
oflntemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: No restrictions may be
placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law
and which are 'necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security or
public safety, public order (ordure public), the protection of public health or morals or
the protection of the rights andfreedoms of others.

Although every person has the right to organize meetings or to take part in
meetings in a peaceful way, the provision of martial law can suspend such meetings if the
peace of the country is deemed to be at stake. Such restrictions on public gatherings may
be imposed for the preservation of security. This provision appears potentially tyrannical
and can be seen to restrict people's liberties. However, if the State cannot control people
during an emergency period, it is hard for the State to aid, shelter, and protect their own
citizens. Therefore, this prohibition to assemble and gather during martial law may limit
the human rights but only insofar as it intends to re-establish safety through peaceful
means. However the provisions of Emergency Decree seem to be more lenient.

h. Humanitarian Law
There are no provisions to restrict any states that seek to institute martial law in
response to a group gathering to protect their people.
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press Release
Even though Thailand has had a democratic system for no less than 75 years,
censorship remains in place in a whole country as a result of the emergency
instituted in the southern area. The injunction given by the Thai Government to
media was to report all the news and events in a constructive and honest manner in
to create the harmony and reconciliation in the South. 413
Section 11 (2) and (3) of the Martial law prohibits the release, sale, distribution of
release, book, newspaper, or article, and prohibits the freedom of the
including receiving and sending radio or television waves. Section 9

(3)414

of

Emergency Decree prohibits the press release, distribution, or dissemination of letters,
, or any means of communiQation, which may cause fear amongst the people
have the intention of providing information that intentionally misleads the public
the emergency situation. The Government may restrict print or broadcast media by
legislation in times of crisis. The Decree empowers the Government "to prohibit
/UUI.l\,<l,UlJ1ll

and distribution of news and information that may cause the people to panic

with an intention to distort information." The Emergency Decree also authorizes the
to censor newspapers and ban publications, although these powers have not
used since 2005. 415

, Thailand: Coup Leaders Must Restore Fundamental Rights, Oct. 2, 2006, Human Rights Watch.
Ibid.at sec. 9 (3).
prohibit the press release, distribution or dissemination of letters, publications or any means of
containing texts which may instigate fear amongst the people or is intended to distort
which misleads understanding of the emergency situation to the extent of affecting the security
state or public order or good moral of the people both in the area or locality where an emergency situation
been declared or the entire Kingdom.
See Country Reports cited in note 408 supra.
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a. Human Rights Law
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: Everyone

haS the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontier.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

Also Article 19 of the International

Everyone shall have the right to

freedom. of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless offrontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. These provisions
recognize the freedom of expression, but in the name of protecting national security and
preserving public order, the statute of International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights allows the State to restrict such freedom. This restriction is provided by law and is
derived out of necessity: The exercise of the rights ... may therefore be subject to certain

restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary.
Democratic principles require that the people shall have the freedom to express
ideas in public because the fairness system depends on the free flow of information.
People shall enjoy the freedom to express whatever they like without political
interference. However, during this emergency period, media expression might cause
more violence and more chaos. Protecting security as a nation remains a priority because
it is in the national interest to maintain the economic stability, protect citizens' rights, and
preserve the democratic system within the country. If national security is not consistent,
no one shall enjoy their cherished freedom again. Therefore, these provisions of martial
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law and Emergency Decree do in fact work to preserve rather than erode the concept of
human rights law.

h.

Humanitarian Law
Article 79 416 of Additional Protocol I is a measure to protect journalists but

because the law states that every person is entitled to humane treatment, it stipulates the
standards for international law in humanitarian concerns. It does not limit the right of the
State to prohibit any press release but it does protect certain rights and duties of a
democratic system of the people. Thus, these provisions are consistent with humanitarian
law.

3.

Freedom of Movement
In general practices, authorities respect citizens' rights by the Constitution law.

Thus, people can change their homes and workplace at their will, or travel freely within
the Kingdom. However, there are with some exceptions. 417 Namely, Sections 11(4)

418 and

(6)419 of the Martial law prohibit any person to use public transportation and to depart

416

See Additional Protocol I, at art.79.
[M]easures
or
protection
for
journalists:
1.Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as
civilians
within
the
meaning
of
Article
50,
paragraph1.
2. They shall be protected as such under the Conventions and this Protocol, provided that they take no
action adversely affecting their status as civilians, and without prejudice to the right of war correspondents
aCcredited to the armed forces to the status provided for in Article 4 (A) (4) of the Third Convention.
~. They may obtain an identity card similar to the model in Annex \I of this Protocol. This card, which shall be
~Ssued by the government of the State of which the Journalist is a national or in whose territory he resides or
In Which the news medium employing him is located, shall attest to his status as a joumalist.
417

See Country Reports cited in n0te408 supra.
418

See Thai Martial law, at sec.11 (4).
[B]anning of using public transport either on land, water or air including by train and tram.
419

Ibid. at sec.11 (6)
[B]anning the leaving out of dwelling during determined period.
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from a dwelling place during the period of martial law. Sections 9 (1),420 (4),421 (5),422 and
(6)423 of Emergency Decree prohibit any person from departing from a dwelling place and
the use of routes or vehicles. They also prescribe conditions on the use of routes or
vehicles and the right to enter into or stay in any place. Moreover, such provisions call
upon the State to specify the chosen area of safety for people to stay. Up to this day,
Thailand extends a State of emergency in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat to Cleal with the
escalating violence. The Decree extends the period for which suspects can be detained,

and limits freedom of movement.

a.

Human Rights Law

Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states that: "Everyone

has the right to freedom of movement ... " The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
the first international document that explicitly recognizes the rights of persons to freedom
of movement. Normally, all people are entitled to the recognition of this inherent dignity,
which is a "foundation of freedom and justice in the world." Freedom of movement is

part of the "liberty of man" (Jagerskiold) and creates one of the most basic human
rights.

424

However, Article 12 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

420

See Thai Emergency Decree, at sec.9(1).
[TJo prohibit any person from departing from a dwelling place during the prescribed period.
421

•

IbId. at sec.9(4).
[TJo prohibit the use of routes or vehicles or prescribe conditions on the use of routes or vehicle.

~ Ibid. at

sec.9(5).

[:qo prohibit the use of buildings or enter into or stay in any place.
-423

Ibid.at sec.9(6).

~~vacuate people out of a designated area for the safety of such people or to prohibit any person from
ntenng a deSignated area.
4<4

htt ~reedom

of movement, Human rights Education Associates, i3vailable at
P.flWWw.hrea.org/learn/guides/freedom-of-movement.html(last visited Aug.1, 2006).
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provides that the right to liberty of movement can be restricted if:

those which are

provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public),
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the

other rights recognized in the present Covenant. "

Due to the fact that this Article

provides limits on the freedom set forth in the Covenant and Universal Declaration,
measures derived from the provisions 'can only be legitimate so long as they are
exceptional, reasonable, and of a temporary nature. The State should carefully consider
whether these restricted measures are necessary and appropriate for the situation. The
State has to ensure that such limitations are in accordance with domestic law, so that the
provisions of martial law and Emergency Decree will meet such standards and will not be
inconsistent with the fundamental of freedom of movement.

b. Humanitarian law
Article 35 425 of the Geneva Convention IV pennits the State the r-ight to refuse
any request for permission to leave the territory, if such departure would be contrary to
the security interests of the State. As every State has its own system based on its own

laws, all countries could exercise their jurisdiction through appropriate laws and have the
~s

See Geneva Convention IV, at art.35.

[AlII protected persons who may desire to leave the territory at the outset of, or during a conflict, shall be
entitled to do so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of the State. The applications of
SUch persons to leave shall be decided in accordance with regularly established procedures and the
d7cision shall be taken as rapidly as possible. Those persons permitted to leave may provide themselves
Wit~ the necessary funds for their journey and take with them a reasonable amount of their effects and
articles
of
personal
use.
If any such person is refused permission to leave the territory, he shall be entitled to have refusal
~dered, as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the
Ul:lalnlng
Power
for
that
purpose.
UpOn request, representatives of the Protecting Power shall, unless reasons of security prevent it, or the

~rson~ concerned object, be furnished with the reasons for refusal of any request for permission to leave
e territory and be given, as expeditiously as possible, the names of all persons who have been denied
PermiSSion to leave.
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right to secure the safety of their country. Thus, these provisions are consistent with
humanitarian law.

4.

Freedom of Communication and Correspondence
Although the Thai Constitution avowedly protects a "person's family rights,

dignity, reputation or the right of privacy," in which "the assertion or circulation of a
statement or picture in any manner whatsoever to the public that violates or affects a
person's family rights, dignity, reputation or the right of privacy, shall not be made
except for the case which is beneficial to the public," there has been a good deal of
criticism that

legislation and administrative directions under the Constitution have

primarily concerned data handled by government agencies, rather. than the private sector.
426In the case of emergency, the freedom of receiving and sending radio or television
waves is prohibited by Martial law. Section 11(St27 of the Emergency Decree provides
that a competent official has the power to issue an order teo-inspect letters, books, printed
matters, telegraphic transmission, telephone communications, or any other means of
communication as well as to cancel or suspend any contact or communication even
though Thai law guarantees: "Persons have the freedom to communicate with one
another by lawful means. "

Asia and the Pacific, Caslon Analytics, available at www. http://www.caslon.com.au/privacyguide6.htm
visited
See Thai Emergency Decree, at sec.11(5).
issue a Notification that a competent official shall have the power to issue an order to inspect letters,
, printed matters, telegraphic transmission, telephone communications or any other means of
'rlIr'~T"'n as well as to cancel or suspend any contact or communication in order to prevent or
the serious incident provided that the rules prescribed in the law.
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a. Human Rights Law
In general, everyone shall have the right to freedom of communication and
correspondence; these rights are basically guaranteed by Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, states: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference

with his .... correspondence. As well as Article 17 (1) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights states: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful

interference with correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.
This right is a common right for all mankind, regardless of age or gender. These
provisions recognize that these are inherent rights and should be protected. However, if
we consider the

world

'arbitrary or unlawful interference,'

the freedom

of

correspondence is obviously limited as it is related to this law. What this means is that
there are situations that are consistent with justice and domestic law and that this right
can be narrow.

b. Humanitarian Law
There are no provisions of humanitarian law that forbid the State's temporary
regulation of these provisions that are not against the fundamental nature of humanitarian

law

C. Justice and Remedy
1.

Judicial Proceedings
When martial law is in effect, a military court will be provided for cases that do

not fall under military jurisdiction. However, the Emergency Decree did not mention
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jurisdiction under the military court because the case will be heard in any court that has
jurisdiction over non-military cases.

a. Human Rights Law
Even though the concept of human rights law has encouraged countries to create
the domestic infrastructure needed to support a fair justice system, legislation is needed in
order to provide the legal basis for national legal systems that have the power to stop
violence and bring peace to nations and people. Therefore, the appropriate system is
needed to exercise a response to violence and to bring perpetrators to trial and just
punishment. Articles 8, Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article
9(3), and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights assert
every person shall have the right to a fair trail by the court. Human rights law does not
differentiate military courts from non-military courts as long as the judicial process is
done in accordance to the constitution or the law, and the Judge is independent and free
from influence of any political party. The Thai military court, therefore, shall not be
prohibited to trying any case or adjudicating a case against an individual who is under
military's jurisdiction so long as the military procedure is conducted without
discrimination and prejudice.428 However, military court procedures state that the verdicts
for cases that are related to emergency conditions under section 61 429 shall be final. This

------------------------428

The Act on the Organization of Military Courts B.E. 2498(1955), Judge Advocate General's Department's
VerSion, sec. 13. [hereinafter The Act on the Organization of Military Courts].
(~].military court shall be competent to try and adjudicate and inflict punishment to any person who violates
1ll~I~tary law or other laws of criminal nature in the case which the offender in under the jurisdiction of the
Illilitary court at the time of committing of offence.
429

See The Act on the Organization of Military Courts, at sec. 61.
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the rights of victims because Article 14 (5) of the International Covenant on

and Political Rights provides: "Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right

his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law. "
military procedure violates the concept of human rights law because a system of
tribunals prohibits the right to appeal but not by reason of providing a military

h. Humanitarian Law
The law of armed conflict permits the adjudication of many types of cases m
tary courts. For example, Article 84430 of Geneva Convention III states that the
has to be provided due process by military court. However, Article 106 431 states
every prisoner of war has the right to appeal. Then, the Martial procedure might
the humanitarian law. On the other hand, there is no provision to prohibit the right
appeal by Emergency Decree.

appeal nor dika appeal shall be lodged against judgments or orders of military court in an abnormal

See Geneva Convention Ill. art. 84.
prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court. unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power
... ~tJl~SS,IV permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the
"~. "',",U',d' offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.
Ibid.at art. 106.

prisoner of war shall have. in the same manner as the members of the armed forces of the Detaining
• the right of appeal or petition from any sentence pronounced upon him. with a view to the quashing
reviSing of the sentence or the reopening of the trial. He shall be fully informed of his right to appeal or
and of the time limit within which he may do so.
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Z. Restitution and Reparation
According to Section 16 of the Martial law, the provision does not provide the
right to compensation by giving the reason that it is necessary for the protection of the
nation, religion, and the King.

However, Section 17

432

of the Emergency Decree

provides that victims shall have the right to seek compensation from the Government.

a. H umall Rights Laws

Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: " Everyone has

the Fight-to an eJJectiveremedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." Also,

Articl~

9(5) of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: Anyone who has been the

victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
Further, Article 2 provides:

"To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as

herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. .. "
According to international law, the compensation or other means of remedies
shall be done at a local level before seeking an international intervention. This rule
intends to allow the State to make the correction to the damage done.

People whose

rights or freedoms have been violated should pursue the legal redress domestically before
seeking an international committee, court, or other tribunal.

433

These remedies are not

;-------------------ITJh~ee Thai Emergency Decree, at sec.17.

OOI;S ~?es not preclude the right of a victim to seek compensation from a government agency under the law
ability for wrongful act of officials.
433

12noternational Norms and Standards relating to Disability, available at http://www.un.org(lastvisitedJan
07).
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limited to property losses but including death, personal injury, property losses, losses of
income, loss of support, loss of housing, loss of medical expenses, or costs of
departure.

434

So therefore, the regulation of the applicable of broad provision of martial law is
clear-cut in that it is contrary to the provision of human rights law even though its
operation might seem just for the protection of a nation.

h. Humanitarian Law
Although humanitarian law does not have a provision to remedy the victims,
according to Article 68 435under the Geneva Convention III, the compensation provided

for the injury is as a prisoner of war. The broad provision of martial law might have
violated this article because it applies in all circumstances. However, the Emergency
Decree does not violate the Geneva Convention because all victims have the right to
compensate.

D. Conclusion
Martial law and the Emergency Decree might seem to abridge the rights and
liberties of civilians. However, if we look to the human rights laws and humanitarian
laws, any government restrictions on freedom for reasons of the nation and security can

bedone. Even the Universal Declarations of Human Rights recognizes the standard rights
~------------------

~uke T. Lee, The Issue of Compensation for Palestinian Refugees, Compensation as Part of a

..

prehensive Solution to the Palestinian Refugee Problem.
Geneva Convention III, at art.58.
claim by a prisoner of war for compensation in respect of any injury or other disability arising out of
shall.be referred to the Power on which he depends.
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of people; under Article 29 (2) provides as follows: "In the exercise of his rights and
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms
of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare in a democratic society." In addition, the International Covenant has a provision
. that is similar to the Universal Declarations of Human Rights but more explicit. It could

be said that such rights and freedoms are exercised if there is support for the purposes and
principles of the United Nations. The issuance of these laws are not contrary to
international law. Nonetheless, such laws must have a clear legal basis for reasons of
security, necessity, and proportion.

According to Thai domestic law, there are some

provisions of the martial law that risk violating human rights and humanitarian law.
Because the Thai Government knew that the martial law might be obsolete because this
law occurred before the Universal Declarations of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights existed, they issued the Emergency Decree. From
my analysis, it was found that the Emergency Decree does not violate both human rights

and humanitarian law, but there were some provisions of the martial law that violate both
laws. Then, such provisions of martial law should be abandoned.

IV - 4 Nature and Extent of Violence
While the military and police forces exercised their powers in the K.ru Se Mosque

and the Tak Bai case, there were other accusations against these Thai Security Forces that
Illade matters worse. It is true that a few aspects of the operations violated human rights
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law and raised questions whether all the methods used by the Thai Government violated
humanitarian law.
1) Consider the Kru Se mosque case. According to the Thai authorities, 30
Islamic dissidents opened fire by launching rifle shots at the police outpost, killing two
security officers in the Pattani province. After the gun fire ceased, the dissidents escaped,
carrying off AK - 47 and M -16 rifles to the Kru Se mosque, and continued to fire from
the mosque at Thai Security Forces. However, after the Thai Security Forces already had
used force, it was found that most of these deceased dissidents only had machetes and
only few carried rifles.
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As State members "pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the

United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights
and fundamental freedoms, " the use of force by the Thai Security Forces must not· be
against the fundamental of the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights that contains a number of provisions which constitute the
foundation for resolutions based on the principle of equal rights. 437 Although the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights forms the fundamental normative basis on which
international norms provides: "Everyone has the right to ... life," these rights and lives
must include not only the dissidents but shall cover the life of the officers as well. As the
436 See more details in chapter 2 .
. 437

International Norms and Standards relating to Disability, available at http://www.un.org(lastvisited Jan
. ,.31,2007); See also the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political.
"recognized that the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
. family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." In Article 7 of the Universal Declaration
states: "All are equal before the law and are entitfed without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.
~IJ are entitfed to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any
incitement to such discrimination." Also Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights
P~ovides: "EachState Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals
lV~thin its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
dIstinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
SOcial origin, property, birth or other status"
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 29 (2) states: "(2) In the exercise of his
rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined
by law solely ... ", and Thai law states: "every person shall obey the law ... " In this case,

we might consider whether the treatment of these dissidents qualifies as a violation of the
fundamentals of human rights law or not. The use of force to stop the violence after the
dissidents launched grenades upon the officers (killing an officer at the outpost) in order
to prevent further violence seemed justified because it came after a warning and a failed
negotiation for surrender. This incident occurred while there were approximately 4,000
onlookers who started fighting with Thai Security Forces. 438

Thai law439 permitted the

officers to use reasonable power to keep the public at peace as long as the operations of
the Thai Security Forces had been performed without prejudice and treated every person
fairly and equally. At this point, we could see that this was not against the concept of
human rights laws. In other words, the Thai Security Forces have the right to operate
according to human rights laws because their duty was to protect the security of the
country.
In cases where the law of armed conflict applies, they would be related to
humanitarian law under the Geneva Convention under Common Article 3. Then, the
second question is whether the method of Thai Security Forces violates the concept of
Common Article 3 because most of these dissidents only had machetes and few carried
rifles.
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Tak Bai and Kru Se Report, The National Reconciliation Commission, TMailand.
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The Criminal Procedure Code ofThailand, at sec.2(16)
(A]dministrative or Police Official" means an official invested by law with the power and duty to keep the
; Public peace.
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As with the concept of Common Article

3,440

the provision protects the person

who laid down their arms. This is indeed not the case of the dissidents as they did not lay
down their arms, still fired, and threw grenades to the Thai Security Forces; thus, they
lost protection under Common Article 3. The following question is whether the use of
force is to be deemed excessive and indiscriminate. If so, does that violate the Additional
protocols in Article 51 (4)? In this case, the dissidents armed with AK -47 and M -16
rifles, and they barricaded themselves in the mosque. The confrontation was made more
perilous by the fact that a number of civilians, apparently hostile to the Thai Security
Forces, had gathered outside the mosque. As time dragged on, and fearing that the crowd
was on the verge of assisting the dissidents in the mosque, the Thai Security Forces
decided that stonning the mosque would be the best operational procedure. Therefore,
this did not constitute an indiscriminate target so as to be characterized as an impulsive
reaction or an excessive use of force. The acts of the Thai Security Forces did not violate
the humanitarian law.
Moreover, in discussing whether Thailand's use of force in the Kru Se situation
violated the law or not, it is important to not only look at human rights and humanitarian
The Four Geneva Conventions Common art.3.
[I]n the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down
their arms and those placed' hors de combat' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in
all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or
faith,
sex,
birth
or
wealth,
or
any
other
similar
criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever
with
respect
to
the
above-mentioned
persons:
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity,
in
particular humiliating a~degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
r~gularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
Civilized
peoples.
440
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law, but also at other treaties that Thailand is party to. According to the Thai Security
Forces stormed this mosque by using tear gas and firing several rounds of vehiclemounted recoilless guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and an RPG Missile. As Thailand is
a State Party to the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,441 and of the
1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development; Production, Stockpiling, and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction which entered into force on April 29,
1997,442 it raises questions about whether the use of such weapons violated such treaties.
As the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and the 1993 Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on their Destruction do not allow Thailand to use chemical weapons as a method of
warfare. They allow, however, the right to use chemical weapons in response to special
cases such as rebellions and riots. These Conventions do not apply to internal affairs.
Therefore, the Thai Security Forces still have the right to use tear gas, liquids, or similar
substances to control agents under Thai law so long as the conflict is not an armed
conflict and the using of such instruments are proportional.

Considering the use of

grenades and bombs on the mosque, such an attack seems to fit the category of
"incendiary weapons" that falls within the scope of 1980 Convention on prohibitions or

441

Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of

Bacttlriological Methods ofWarfare,17 June 1925, 94 L.N.T.S.65 (Hereinafter 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol].
442

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical

Weapons and on their Destruction, Paris 13 January 1993, 32 I.L.M.800 (entry to force Apr.29, 1997)
(hereinafter 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention].
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restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons that may be deemed excessively
injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. However, Thailand has not acceded to this
Convention and is not bound by it, even if the weapons that I mention are designed to set
fire to objects or to cause burning injuries to persons through the action of heat and flame
from shells, rockets, bombs, and other incendiary weapons.
2) Consider the Takbai case. This violence began when a crowd gathered at the
Takbai 'police station in the Narathiwat province and asked for the unconditional release
from detention of six men who were accused of stealing weapons in January of 2004.

In this assembly, the protesters injured three officers and overturned two military
trucks and one police car. Besides, the evidence showed that the protesters had knives,
machetes, and grenades which were recovered from the area of the protest during.their
attempt to storm the police station. The Security Forces managed to stop the attack and
forced the protestors to surrender, after which approximately 1,300 people were arrested
and detained. Ultimately, they were put into military trucks to be transferred to detention
centers but during that trip, it was reported that 78 prisoners died as a result of
suffocation or dehydration. 443 The question is in this cases is whether the Thai Security
Forces violated human rights and humanitarian law.
Both human rights and humanitarian law absolutely prohibit all forms of torture
and the killing of defenseless people. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
recognizes the rights of all people and all nations. These people were protected under
human rights law, and they were legally protected from being treated inhumanely under
Common Article 3 of humanitarian law.

443

Tak Bai and Kru Se Report, The National Reconciliation Commission, Thailand.
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In this case, the evidence showed that the demonstrators or protestors had
weapons and attempted to stonn a police station by demanding the release of six detained
Muslim security guards. 444 They would not be protected by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in Article 20, which states: " Everyone has the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly and association. " As a result, the State has the right to keep the peace

to detain or arrest by due process of the law. Although the Fact-Finding Commission
presented to the Cabinet on December 28, 2004 that the State exercises its legal authority
in taking control of the situation and maintaining public order, dispersing the crowd and
taking custody of the demonstrators, it concluded that the transportation of those held in
custody was conducted in conformity with laws and was reasonable given the necessity
dictated by the prevailing circumstances. However, serious mistakes occurred during the
transportation process in which the commanding officers failed to carry-out their duties
properly which resulted in many unfortunate deaths. 445 According to Article 5 provides: "
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or

punishment. "and as Article 9 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detain ... ", It could be pointed out that the Thai

Security Forces had violated the human rights law because of the fact that people were
detained face down with hands tied behind their backs inside the trucks without any prior
warning. In this case, it could be said that the Thai Security Forces also violated Common
Article 3 of Geneva Conventions because the Thai Security Forces did not treat them
However, a conflicting report suggests that some deaths were due to
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as a result of religious fasting. 446

Therefore, to analyze this case without

prejudice, one would have to compare the treatment of the protesters to others put in a
siJIlilar situation without having fasted. Could anyone have withstood this treatment?

Such a question can only be answered by a medical doctor and such a judgment can only
be passed through the process of the justice system. Any person who violates the law

shall be punishment.

IV - 5 Conclusion
To impose an Emergency Decree on three provinces seems to limit the rights of
the people and would not be in the best interests of all Thai citizens. However, violence

in Southern Thailand has impacted the peace and stability of the country. If we consider
the families of those killed by the violent acts, then they need protection to ensure the
safety and well-being of Thai citizens as protected by Thai laws. The aim of such laws is
to protect innocent persons and their properties during the eruption of a crisis. The State
has a duty to prevent and block unlawful acts, and perpetrators must be brought to justice.
Additionally, the most important thing that Thailand shall realize is that legislative and
practical means have to fall within the scope of the standard of humanitarian law and the
principles and purposes by charter of the United Nations. As an active member of the
United Nations, Thailand has participated in numerous treaties, international conventions
and international agreements. After ratifying such conventions or agreement, the Thai
domest-itr-laws have to be implemented accordingly. It could be said that the concepts of
;------~.--~~~~~--

78 perished in custody, The Nation, Oct. 27,2004, available at
ttP:llwww.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview .php?clid=2&id= 108077 &date=2004-1 0-27
last visited Aug.1, 2006).
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international laws influenced the Thai laws, which were created to be conformity with
them. Although certain conventions Thailand has not yet ratified (such as the Second
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aimed at
Abolishing the Death Penalty, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and any
other treaties), all are currently under active consideration and there are no government
policies that suggest they would be denied. Thailand has leaded an ongoing effort to
promote and cooperate with peacekeeping forces that follow these principles laid out by
the Charter of the United Nations. Thailand has also ratified the four Geneva Conventions
and the Hague Conventions. Accordingly, there was not a case that Thailand defied or did
not cooperate with the United Nations. The evidence suggests that Thailand accepts in
-principle the existence of customary international law, and as a consequence, is legally
bound to comply with the standard law of armed conflict required by these Conventions.
That is to say both domestic laws and International laws are applicable to the violence in
Southern Thailand. Although the Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocols do
not apply to lately situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature in Thailand, Thailand has
to realize that the Thai Security Forces shall not violate either Thai law or international
law especially human rights according to a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations. Thailand has to bear in mind that these rights are the basic rights
and freedoms to which all humans are entitled. Furthermore, to operate in harmony for
the peace of the country and the world, Thailand should ensure that its laws respect the
concepts of international law even though some Conventions have not yet been ratified.
The most fundamental purpose of Human Rights and International Law is to protect the
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To violate this most basic hUrtlan right is to not only deny individuals their
nlU'''''''''~''.-~'

moral entitlement but to make a country vulnerable to "crimes against

Additionally, there is a support for the International Criminal Court in the Asian
'region, which is crucial for the growing global fight against impunity and for the defense
. . of fundamental human rights. Thailand has already signed such a statute even though it
haS not ratified the Rome Statute. Thailand played a crucial role to support the

establishment of the International Criminal Court and remains a staunch supporter of the
main idea behind this Statute. For that reason, Thailand has to take measures to ensure
that the country can effectively operate all of the measures in its humanitarian approach

********
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~CHAPTERV

SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

v- 1

Introduction
In the last four years, there has been an increase in seemingly unpredictable,

sporadic and pointless acts of violence in southern Thailand. A few of the conditions that
have perpetuated the conditions for such violent acts include weaknesses in the
infrastructure, long-standing miStlilderstandings of the history and culture of ethnic
groups, and the lack of coordination between government agencies across the country.447
Thus, there is no single flawed policy of the Thai Government that might fix this serious
dilemma but rather multifold reasons that are intricately woven into the conflicts of
society and culture, economic factors, domestic and international organizations as well as
domestic and international laws and policies. This chapter will examine the solution of
problems in this area by addressing the following important points:
-- Ethnic diversity in Thailand must be understood, its history must be made
and its differences must be publicly as well as privately appreciated so that the
conflicts can be diminished. This is an important part of Thailand's domestic
that can have significant international implications.
-- An analysis of security measures - of both preventative measures and of the
""U'""'-'_~

made in the past of what security forces did (or did not perfonn)-will help find

to resolve the immediate and long-tenn violence.
. Michaellgnatieff, Humanitarian Interve~tion : Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas 302, (J.l.Holzgrefe
RObert O.Keohane., ed., Cambridge University Press 2003).
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The studying and comparison of Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the
violence in southern Thailand by analyzing the strategies, tactics, and techniques are to
. provide the policies for the Thai Government to adjust for the current situations.
The goal to stem violence cannot be merely something that Thailand tries to
achieve by itself.

Rather, it needs the cooperation of international organizations and

other countries.

Pattani has long been recognized as one of the most important of the ancient
empires in Malayu. Pattani's history is one rife with conflict with the Siamese Empire
and the profound differences between Pattani's and Siam's religious, political' and
cultural history have been (and continues to be) sources of great misunderstanding and
prejudice. Historically, Pattani has embraced Islam and the vast majority of citizens
. identify themselves as either practicing Muslims, or belonging to the Muslim community.

As with most traditional Muslim communities, notions of religion and the law are
inextricably tied to one another. In Thailand, however, monarchal rule is in many ways
.the result of enlightenment ideals of the separation of church and State. This is a point of
:contention between Siam and the former colonized country, in which the Koran continues
to dictate moral and legal precedent for the vast majority.
To complicate matters, Thailand has suppressed the history of Pattani in the
education of its youth out of fear that being too explicit about Pattani's past might give
cause for more dissident in the name of self-determination in that troubled southern
n.

Siam has, for centuries however, been able to incorporate diverse ethnic
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populations where traditional values and practices have survived within the increasingly
modernized world of Southeast Asia.
In general, Thai policies have proven to be contentious issues for the southern
region because the uniformity of such laws lacks a particular responsiveness to the
distinct cultural differences found in the south.

So even when Pattani, Yala and

Narathiwat seem to be congenial to certain policies of Siam, all policies, however
seemingly innocuous, have far-reaching impact. For example, despite the goals of the
government to improve the structure of these provinces, policies that required Thai
language as the official language alienated those in the south who were not native Thai
speakers. This is one of many examples that suggest that, prior to launching any policy,

.

the government should study how these policies might impact this important minority
population. Any policy concerned with sustaining and maintaining a peaceful community
in Thailand must have a healthy balance between the people's needs and State's needs. It
is impossible to have a peaceful community if only one side is satisfied.
In this thesis, I recommend the first goal for improving government policymaking is to make an attempt to understand the diversity of cultural, religious and
political histories that make up the main subgroups in Thailand. As the well-known
aphorism would have it, those who fail to learn the lessons of history are doomed to
repeat it. 448

According to Adam Garfinkle, history is "an art just like painting or

architecture and is designed like them only to give intellectual and artistic pleasure.,,449
But most of those who seek knowledge from history have more purposeful ends in mind,

Adam Garfinkle, How to Learn Lessons from History- And How Not To, Foreign Policy Research
Institute, May. 2001, Vol. 7, No.1, available at
.
http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/071.200105.garfinkle.lessons.html(last visited Aug. 1, 2006).
448

449

Ibid.
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particularly policymakers and policy analysts who discern a moral responsibility to
protect their nations and their fellows from gratuitous harm. Thailand should apply this
idea towards improving its domestic policies because the past is the only data we have
from which to glean patterns of behavior, the endurance of which are features of human
nature, relevant to our own times and problems.45o
Because an understanding of history and traditions of peoples helps the State to
launch the appropriate policy, the State should publicly avow respect of people history.
For instance, public schools should therefore include more history of Pattani in their
curriculum. So although the history of Pattani might cause pain for many of those who
have suffered during Siam's conquest, no State is without prior conflict and we can learn
how to solve such programs from understanding better the world's history. It's hard to
find the "perfect" solution but improvements can be made. For instance, I mentioned fhat
Pattani's people are proud of their history and that Thai schools should include such
history in their curriculum.

I understand this is not only to benefit the people

intellectually but is, more importantly, a sign of the Thai Government's sincere intention
to recognize and support this difficult past. By including such a history, it is less likely
that Pattani children will reject studying in a state school.

B. Culture
In order to have a better understanding of Pattani's people history, the next step is
to attempt to understand more about the distinct cultural, social, religious and ideological
beliefs and values.

According to Mathew Arnold, culture is a constantly evolving
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component of a healthy democratic State, but rather than assuming that these values exist
in the abstract and are the same for all human societies, values, behaviors, and ideologies
obviously differ from people to people. 451 To better understand the culture of a people is
to better understand how policy might exacerbate or allay the conflict between the State
and various ethnic, religious or educational problems.
After the Government clearly understands more about the culture and nature of
ethnic peoples, the Government will be able to better manage the system through various
kinds of responses to religious, political and military conflicts. For instance, when the
Thai police or military want to search, seize person or things especially in the respectful
place or the Muslim temple, it has to be done in a manner that's respectful and not against
the religion of Islam. The use of police dogs should be the last option to the operation. If
it is unavoidable to using dog police, the Govemment should ask for the recommendation
of Muslim leaders first. To create a peaceful community, the Governnlent needs to show
concern for all types of people and belief systems .

. 451

.

Matthew Arnold, Culture is "High Culture" From Culture and Anarchy. 1869, available at

hNttP:/Iwvvw. wsu. edu: 800 1/vcwsu/commons/topics/culture/culture-defi n ition s/arnold-text. html

(last visited

oV.1,2006).
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c. Education
Today, there are more than 500 pondok schools that operate in southern Thailand.
These schools were originally religious schools that took as their aim the continuation
and promotion of Muslim customs, beliefs and culture. However, only about 300 of them
are registered with State authorities. The Thai Government suspects that some of these
traditional schools foster religious extremism and harbor militants. 300 of these 500
schools are suspected of being places where preaching violence is a cO!11I1lonly accepted
practice. 452 Recently, research conducted by the Prince of Songkhla University (Pattani)
found that up to 64% of the Pattani people desired general education for their children
rather than Ponok schools in spite of the fear that secular education will not provide a
balance of religious instruction and other forms of education~ 453 Therefore, the challenge
of the Thai Government is to distinguish between the illegal ponok's school and the
traditional pondok's school.
This implies that many people still see the benefit of a State funded education and
these findings are not only a sign of confidence in the Thai education system but also an
acknowledgement of the power that such.a system has in regards to future employment.
The Thai Government has a plan to develop the education in this region but the
management of these institutions has to start· with the balance between culture and
education.

By this I mean that the development of an educational system and

socioeconomic development has to be consistent with the region's culture. 454 The final

Joseph Liow, The truth about pondok schools in Thailand, Sep. 3, 2004, Asia Times, available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FI03Ae04.html(1ast visited Nov. 1, 2006).
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Ibid.

Overcoming Violence Through the Power of Reconciliation: Executive Summary, the National
Reconciliation Commission, Thailand.
.
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report of UNESCO-UNICEF on March 1, 2006, suggested that the Thai Government
should support such policies as followS:

•

455

Work (in cooperation with Southern leaders) to support a written
Malay language since the Ministry of Education still has no clear
policy on use oflanguage in mother tongue language and writing;

•

Make more government resources available since the Th.ai state is
weak in the South, and (regarding the decentralized system) insure
better quality to promote the participation of all in learning, and for
education management;

•

Provide more resources from

the state to

support better

development of .rural areas and especially under privileged
children, particularly in pondoks and tadikas;
•

Provide government advisors in pondoks;

•

Give more scholarships for Muslims to study abroad (and then teach
the next generation in Southern Thailand);

•

Provide the best teachers for Southern Thailand (not now a priorit)

To develop the education system, therefore, will be to help solve some of the
deep-seated poverty of this region since more education also means more job
opportunities for a region traditionally saddled with low income and lacking job
opportunities.

To improve the quality of the education, Thai public schools need to

include more culturally sensitive understandings of the Thai ethnic past so that there is a
viable option for trying to solve not only ethnic divisiveness but also economic disparity .

Final Report, UNESCO-UNICEF on March 1st 2006 workshop on: [E]ducation for Peace-building in
Southern Thailand: Reflections on Human Security.

. 455
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D. Economics
One of the mam causes for the radical separatist sympathies in southeastern
Thailand is the impoverished conditions that the majority of Muslims in this area contend
with. The disparity between the rich and poor has generated dissident groups that
galvanize various Muslim factions and often justify crimes on the grounds of social
equality and economic justice.456 The Thai Government cannot ignore this crucial
element of the conflict in this region. The Gov.emment should not only be concerned with
the GOP or SET index but should pay attention to the ways of life particular to the
cultural and social context. The plan to support the weak economy in this region has been
effective and needs to find continual support in the coming years. It advises: 457
- Promoting the halal food industry to enhance job opportunities and stimulate
economic growth in the south;
- Providingfinancial assistance and tax incentives to attract investments;
- Ensuring that financial services provided be in accordance with the
Islamic prinCiples;
- Providing assistance in developing local products and enhancing its market
accessibility;
- Providing low interest rates to expand the economy; and
- Improving the transportation system to enhance the flow ofgoods and services.

Asep Chaerudin, Countering Transnational Terrorism in Indonesia afld-the Phillipines, Naval
Postgraduate, 2003.

456

457 Developments in the Southern Provinces of Thailand, Royal Thai Consulate-General, Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia.
.

200

The important thing that the Government has come to realize is that developing
economic initiatives must be undertaken in a long-term and comprehensive manner.
Although the government does not have the capacity to develop all of these areas in a
short period of time, at least one of the three provinces should be the focus of a
developing tourist or agricultural industry.

E.

Creation of a Unifi~d Society
The Phibulsongkram policy only proved that the attempt to unify the country by

compelling the subjects to accept Buddhism as the state religion was a failure. Muslim
people could not accept such policies because they did not allow for the integration of the
ideas, beliefs and values of Islam. However, the Government's need to create a unified
society need not depend upon the notion that all subjects share the same religion. A more
persuasive idea, in fact, is that a shared sense of community is built upon the principle
that people come from very different origins, religions or cultures. The key is how
government integrates the varieties of people to live together in the same community or
country. China has managed to create a nation in which over fifty different languages are
used on a daily basis and the United States is another good example of how a unified
society might integrate diverse populations. In many cities, such as Los Angeles, San
Francisco and New York, there are big Chinese communities with vibrant Chinese
cultural traditions and most Americans have the impression that the Chinese in the United
States live in these Chinatowns.458 However, there is a wide variety of diversity among
the Chinese who, in reality, often speak different languages, come from different cultures

---------------------Paul Halsall, The History of Chinatown, Brooklyn College,1996-1999, available at
http://academic,brooklyn.cuny.edu/core9/phalsall/studpageslikram/chinatown.htm (last visited Nov.1, 2006).
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and live in all different parts of town. Among Native Americans, many human cultures
over thousands of years flourished without resorting to reward-punishment systems. The
results were cohesive societies that could serve as models for changing our fundamental
approac h to c:.
lalrneSS to d ay. 459
These are good examples that Thai Government can learn from. Moreover, the
Thai Government should revise previous policies that succeeded in the past such as the
flexible policies of King Rama Xr. 460

F.

The Transparent Justice System and Fair Policy
The concept that the justice system is transparent is at the heart of the Thai

Government's need not only to ensure the legitimacy of the criminal justice system but
also to establish a foundational public confidence in all of the infrastructures. According
to this understanding, justice informs the making of life decisions, the building of social
relationships and the designing of societal structures. For these reasons, the transparency

459

Denise Breton, The Mystic Heart of Justice, Steiner Books 2001.

460 1. Any regulations or procedures that coerce people into suppressing their religious beliefs or practices
have to be abandoned or amended. The new amendment shall not contradict Islam religion. If any
regulations or procedures will support the Islamic Religion, it should be done.
2. To collect Tax or any fee should be comparable to the rate of tax in a neighbor country. The rate should
not exceed or be less than the rates in such country.
3. Any action of the officers that make the civilian waste their time shall be revised and processed by the
justice.
4. Any policy that make the civilian waisttbeir time shall be revised and amended. The officer shall do his
best.
-5. The officer who shall be designatec[inPattani must be honest and polite. When sending any officer, such
Officer has to be trained to know his duty according to section 1 and section 4 above. The commander must
sUpervise his officers in control and attempt to prevent mistakes from happening before they happen.
6. Any regulations or procedures that make people feel uncomfortable shall be considered or, at the very
least, such regulations or procedures shall be submitted to the King who will adjudicate.
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of the law is a crucial element to establishing a fair and just (as well as functioning)
•

Soclety.

461

One part of such a foundational concept is that the Thai Government gives out fair
punishment whether the offender is an officer or civilian. There is a popular prejudice
that officers of the law receive less than impartial treatment when any charge is brought
against them. Part of the challenge that exists in Thailand today is to find a way to rectify
this popular belief so that if an officer is proven guilty of a crime, he or she is punished
accordingly. Of course, if a civilian commits the same offense, the Government must be
compelled to punish him or her using the same criteria.

Moreover, punishment is only meted out to people once firm evidence has
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a fair legal precess. When the judge orders
the punishment to the offender, it is crucial that it is a result of the transparent process of
justice that the offender is guilty of such a crime and not merely because the State is more
powerful than the individual.

A shift in the popular belief towards a more just and transparent system of the
Government will help build trust in the Government's policies. It will also remind the
officer to exercise more judiciousness in volatile situations and will help decrease what is
currently rampant corruption.

Secondly, the Thai Government should review the justice system by starting with
identifying the problems and proposing the implementing of solutions. For example,

---

46, - - - - - - - - - -

Lynette Parker, cited Denise Breton and Stephen Lehman, The Mystic Heart of Justice, West Chester
Pennsylvania: Chrysalis Books 2001.
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according to Chapter 4, there are some provisions of Martial law against the Human
Rights Law.

These provisions should be amended in order to accord with (not in

contradiction to) Human Right Laws. Moreover, mostly people in southern Thailand are
Muslim, and the Thai law for Muslim people must be adjusted according to the whole
system not merely the family law.

Thirdly, the implementation of the provisions should be made as easy as possible.
The provisions should not use the vague words or meanings that might lead to dispute or
might be easily misinterpreted.
International Crisis Group

462 0r

Namely, many international organizations such as the
Human Right Watches are concerned that the Thai

Emergency Decree grants enforcement official's immunity from prosecution and such a
decree violates Thailand's international legal obligations. 463

According to these

provisions, the two articles have created a grave public misunderstanding that this Decree
granted immunity of officers. The aim of the Decree is to assilre the officer who is on
duty that he will not be punished if he performs an action in good faith in case of there is
any infringement against a civilian. This fundamental Decree is similar to the Section 449
464

and Section 450 465 of the Thai Civil and Commercial Code and the Section

6i 66 and

An independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization, working through field-based analysis and
high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve conflicts across Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the
Middle East.
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See Thal'E mergency Decree B.E.2548 (2005), at sec.16.
[A] Regulation, Notification, order or an act under this Emergency Decree shall not be subject to the law on
administrative procedures and the law on the establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court
Procedure.
Ibid. at sec.17.
[T]his does not precludeihe right of a victim to seek compensation from a government agency under the law
onJiability for wrongful act of officials.

463

464

See The Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand, Kamol Sandhikshetrin's version, at sec.449

[~] person who, acting in lawful defence or under a lawful! command, has caused injury to any. person is not
hable to make compensation.
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Section 68467 of the Thai Penal Code, in which guilt is only established by identifying a
clear intention and exempts punishment if the illegal act was committed in good faith.
Such a decision is, however, the result of legal procedure and if such an act is clearly
seen to have a clear intention then that officer will have to be committed and punished.
This law does not prohibit the victim from suing the officer if he or she believes that such

an infraction violated their rights. 468 Because any person may be criminally responsible
for committing an offence against the law of nations, no one individual is exonerated
from this responsibility.469 Then, this Decree cannot mitigate or disallow punishment of
an official for any illegal operation. There is no such rule as: "The King can do no

wrong," "the Emperor is above the law," or "Ceasar's wife is above suspicion. ,,470

The injured person can claim compensation from the person against whom the lawful defence was directed,
or from the person who wrong fully gave the command, as the case may be.

Ibid. at sec.450.
II]f a person damages or destroys a thing in order to avert an immediate common danger, he is not liable to
make compensation, provided the damage done is not out of proportion to the danger.
If a person damages or destroys a thing in order to avert an immediate individual danger, he shall make
restitution therefore.
If a person damages or destroys a thing in order to protect the rights of himself or of a third person against
immediate danger threatened by the thing itself, such person is not liable to make compensation, provided
the damage done is not out of proportion to the danger. If the danger was caused by such person's fault he
is liable to make compensation.

465

466 See Thai Penal Code sec.4, Lueng Dulyasath-Pathiweth' s version (Suchart Jiwachart ed.), sec.67
IA]ny person shall not be punished for committing any offence of account of necessity:
(1) when such person is under compulsion or under the influence of a force such that person cannot avoid or
reSist; or
(2) when such person acts in order to make himself or another person to escape from an imminent danger
Which could not be avoided by any other means, and which such person did not cause to existthrough his
own fault;
Provided that no more is done than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances.

Ibid. at sec.68.
lW]henever any person commits any act for the defence of his right or right of the another person so as to
escape from danger arising from act of violence which violates the law and such adanger is imminent, such
act, if reasonably committed under the Circumstances, is lawful defence, and such person shall not be guity.
467

46a The Office of the Council of State, Thailand.
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See S. Sucharitkul, cited in note 211supra at p.249.
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Every civilian and officer is a legal subject and therefore beholden to the Courts of
Justice.
Fourthly, heavy-handed policies, characterized by slogans such as the "war on
drugs" or the "war on terror," will stimulate rather than quell dissident groups looking for
an overt (seemingly) anti-Muslim policy against which they might seek to revenge
themselves upon the State. Although the State's standpoint is, of course, that every kind
of illegal act is in need of punishment, whereas the dissidents will likely look upon such a
policy as a fairly transparent form of social control.
Finally, before launching any policy, the Thai Government should be concerned
that there is an underlying sense of distrust in the Government. Most perceive the State to.
break its promises, incompetent and the antagonistic towards those whom they are
supposed to serve. Citizens are likely to trust the Government only to the extent they
believe that it will act in their interests, that its procedures are fair, and that their trust of
the state and of others is reciprocated.47\ As I mentioned in the above chapter, Southern
Thailand has continuing problems, namely; crime, grim poverty levels and ethnic
conflict. To resolve these problems, the Thai go'vernment must develop a policy that
devotes funds to this area, funds equivalent in size to those devoted to the other
provinces. Moreover, funds must be accompanied by a way for the State to check if these
funds are being utilized effectively and ways to monitor how the State might best use this
money in the future interests of the region.

471
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argaret Levi, A State of Trust, Trust and Government 8, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
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G. Remedial Measures
As the Government attempts to go forward with changing this popular belief,
another help would be to give assistance to the victims who have suffered as well as
expedite and review pending issues and petitions in accordance to the due process and the
law to the remedial measures given to families affected by incidents. This has already
started to take place.

For instance, the Prime Minister's Order No. 9/2548, dated 6

January B.E. 2548 (2005), allowed a Remedial Commission for persons who have
suffered from the Tak Bai incident to be provided with necessary assistance and
compensation for the families of the deceased. The injured, as well as missing persons,
are covered by damages and losses. Regardless of the investigation's result, remedies
have been made in various forms such as financial assistance of up to 300,000 baht per
person, free education as well as social assistance to enable the affected families to
continue their daily lives and lifestyles. 472 However, remedy measures are not the only
form of payment, and the Thai Government should express a public apology to the family
of the innocent victims.

V -2 Security Measures
In an attempt to stop the violence, there have been security measures that the Thai
Government has instituted. However, daily killing goes on and an analysis of both
preventive measures and where security has failed in the past will help try to solve some

~-------------------The Thai National Reconciliation Commission (NRC).
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of the security problems that have plagued Thailand despite the Government's best
efforts to secure land, air and sea for this area.

A. Border Security
Protecting cross-border security and enhancing business mobility are two key
elements in these efforts. But more is needed. All security and law enforcement agencies
must be improved upon to detect, monitor and be alert to any movement of persons or a
group of persons who are believed to be associated with terrorist organizations. The goal
is to deter any terrorist group from using Thailand as a base. 473
The Ministry of Interior formulated policies for cross-border security and
equipped rural provinces with ways to prevent, arrest, and suppress terrorists from using
Thailand as a safe haven. As a result, the Thai authorities responsible for protecting
national security have created a "watch list" database of suspicious terrorist groupS.474
However, there is again great room for improvement. There needs to be a far
greater assurance that the highest possible integrity of all government officials who are
involved in border operations have a more well-coordinated exchange of knowledge,
know-how and experience. Immigration officers need to have seminars, conferences or
workshops for managing 'groups of individuals from the ultra-wealthy to the very poor.

475

In terms of preventing passport counterfeit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
other relevant authorities are doing their utmost to ensure that the procedure of issuing
Progress Report on Thailand's Implementation of Counter - Terrorism Activities, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand, available at http://www.mfa.go.th/internetldocumentrrerrorism%20Report.doc
(last visited Aug. 1,2006).
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Counter Terrorism Action Plan: Counter Terrorism Task Force Meeting Phuket, Thailand, Aug. 20, 2003
2003/S0MIII/CTTF/028 Agenda Item: 6, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
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visas for entry and exit continues to meet international standards. 476 But to· ensure more
safety and security for tourists, a standardized strategic safety and security master plan
needs to be

developed-~:me

that is based upon a crisis management model and the

promotion of and development of simple-to-use security measures for potential threats to
. .IIIdustry. 4TI
the tounst

B. Maritime Security
Ninety-five percent of Thai imports and exports are transported exclusively by
sea. With the Andaman Sea in the West and the Gulf of Thailand in the East, Thailand
has one thousand and five hundred nautical miles arourid its border and a water area of
about three hundred and eighty thousands square kilometers. Thailand is also surrounded
by the water areas of many neighboring countries, namely, Cambodia, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Myanmar, Bangladesh and India. Therefore,
coping with maritime terrorism is quite a challenge to Thailand, as the area of
responsibility is huge, compounded by concerns about criminal activity (piracy and drug
trafficking) as well as threats to Thailand from unprotected connecting waters. 478
Although Thailand also continues to promote strengthening domestic policies and
broadening intematiooalcooperation to suppress piracy and armed robbery, Thailand
needs to enhance its maritime defense and disaster relief capabilities in order to improve
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See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand.

477 See Counter Terrorism Action Plan cited in note 475 supra.
478

Suriya Pornsuriya, Maritime Terrorism: Thailand's Perspective 1, Royal Thai Navy_
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the navy's mobility capability and enhance its ability to work with other allies or
coalition partners during contingencies.
Besides the Royal Thai Navy, the Marine Police, the Marine Department, the
Customs Department and the Fisheries Department are also major players in maritime
counter-terrorist capacities in Thailand. 479 The joint training on the international level
units are very important but such ventures need to be more routine so that there is an
ongoing commitment between Thailand and countries such as the USA, Australia,
Canada, and India to develop the skills and required discipline for the Thai armed forces.
Moreover, the support and financial assistance to . help build a greater capacity of
Government agencies for maritime security is necessary.480
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lb'Id. at p 3.
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See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand.
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c.

Aviation Security
Although the National Security Program of Thailand has made progress revising

its security program, measures, and procedures to provide tighter civil aviation security
systems in airports and the screening of passengers' luggage are as important as maritime
security. Training for emergency responses during aircraft hijacking situations among
national authorities481 has improved and the introduction of highly effective baggage
screening procedures has tightened security in the airports. So although accelerating
implementation of standards for reinforced flight deck doors for passenger aircraft and
supporting International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) mandatory aviation security
audits has helped,482Thailand still needs additional training and technical assistance in
completing the ICAO mandatory aviation security audits to develop into a center to train
other countries or organizations. It would be in Thailand's best interest to set up
simulation-type activities for crisis management during emergency situations. 483
Although Thailand has joined Conventions to prevent the use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction through biological and chemical forms, there is an ongoing need to
exchange up-to-date information among all relevant agencies and countries. For example,
the Office of the National Security Council of Thailand with the US embassy arranged
the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) First Responder Training Program in June
2001 and also jointly held the Postal Chemical/Biological Incident Management Training

Program for relevant governmental agencies during April 2002. 484
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See Counter Terrorism Action Plan cited in note 475 supra.
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example of cooperation between the US and Thailand although there is an ongoing need
for more cooperation between Thailand and other countries as well. Thailand also needs
to develop a strong policy toward countries that have such weapons and must develop
concrete plans as to what to do in response to a country potentially deploying these
weapons.

D. Intelligence Measures
So long as the violence in Southem Thailand continues to increase, it could be
implied that these intelligence measures are inadequate and need more development and
improvement. The Thai Government has increased her existing close cooperation with
their allies.

For example, the sharing of information and intelligence on terrorist

activities and movements has dramatically increased in the last five years. A list of
persons who have any connection with terrorist groups has been shared among a wide
array of agencies so that they can cooperate in an attempt to prevent suspects from
entering the country by checking criminal records, interrogating suspects and monitoring

. movement. 485 However, such problems can't be solve d by one agency a1one; t11ey
thelr
require the cooperation from a great array of government officials as well as those from
other countries.

485

ibid.
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E. Cyber Crime
To anticipate and prevent violence of all types, the Thai Government has become
cognizant of a new form of violent threat. The FBI predicts that terrorist groups will
either develop or hire hackers specifically for the purpose of coordinatif!.g large-scale
attacks with cyber attacks. 486 A cyber attack could be used to destroy not only the
electronic, but also the physical infra structure that holds a nation

~ogether

since

important elements of a nation's infrastructures (defense systems, chemical and
hazardous materials, water supply systems, transportation, energy, finance systems, and
emergency services) are electronically controlled by centralized computer networks. For
instance, in 2002, a hacker was arrested in Australia for breaking into the Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCDA) of an Australian sewage and water treatment plant
for directing the pumping of one million liters of sewage into the environment. This is
the first reported instance of a hacker successfully breaking into a critical infrastructure
and causing massive damage. I believe it is a harbinger of things to come.
With nearly two hundred countries connected to the Internet, cyber crime has
become a global issue that requires the full participation and cooperation of the public
and private sectors in all countries, including each one of the one hundred and eighty
developing countries around the globe.

A major component of information and

infrastructure security is a nation's ability to deter, detect, investigate, and prosecute
cyber criminal activities.

Industrialized nations and multinational organizations have

taken significant steps toward combating cyber crime.

The central problems in

combating cyber crime to date are (1), inadequate international coordination anEl (2),

486

Terrorism Law 286, Jeffrey F. Lawyers & Judges Co, 2004.
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woefully deficient legal frameworks and organizational
countries.

487

capacity

In

developing

Not only should the provision of laws relating to such crimes be updated by

the Thai Government but there should be institutional agencies devoted to directly
assessing the level of threat and vulnerability such as Computer Emergency Response
Teams.

488

F. Rules of Engagement489
Not only preventative measures need to be evaluated but it is also necessary to
consider the failure of security forces in the past in order to better evaluate what needs to
be changed for greater

succ~ss.

One of the lessons that the tragic events in Krue Se and

Tak Bai taught the thai Government is that although the training and equipment for the
Security Forces were adequate to handle crowd control situations, the decision about
what type of force to use, when to use it, under what circumstances should it be used and
what are the repercussions of that act were all not well thought out. In the case of killing
of the two marines and luling Case, for instance, Thai Security Forces failed to use force
out of fear that such action would escalate the violence and enflame public opinion.
However, were they to have followed the concepts of the Rules of Engagement, which
permit force in cases of national security, many lives would most likely have been saved.
According to international standards and practice, military use of force is allowed in
Jody R. Westby, International Guide to combating Cyber crime XXI, American bar Association Privacy&
Computer Crime Committee Section of Science & Technology Law (Chicago, Illinois).
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See Counter Terrorism Action Plan cited in note 475 supra.

489 Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the primary too used to regulate the use of force, and thereby serve as
one of the comerstones of the Operational Law discipline. The legal factors which serve as a foundation for
ROE, that is, customary and conventional law principles regarding the right of self defense and the laws of
war, are varied and complex. They do not, however, stand-alone: non - legal issues, such as political
objectives and military mission limitations, also play an essential role in the construction and application of
ROE. (see Operational Law Handbook cited in note 329 supra at p.67).
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cases of self-defense and under circumstances of necessity. The rules of engagement are,
in other words, not merely measures necessary for crowd control but also for preventing
too long a delay in responding to a terrorist act. 490 The rules allow for action as much as
they attempt to deter an irresponsible use of force.
Since 1981, Thailand and the United States have coordinated annual bilateral
military exercises. 49 ! This mission (COBRA GOLD) was originally created to improve
Thailand's military readiness and

knowled~e

of how to fight terrorism by providing an

opportunity for the two militaries to work together. However, this training is not just a
political bond between Thailand and the United States but rather a sign of the United
State's investment with helping prevent terrorism throughout Southeast Asia. 492 Thailand
is one of five countries in the Pacific region in which the U.S. has devoted

time~

money

1) Every military officer stationed in the three southern provinces of Thailand must receive training on
effective crowd-control handling and negotiations in accordance with the standards used during UN
peacekeeping operations in East Timor;
2) A special "Riot Control Company" was set up to handle crowd control - using only shields and batons for
protection and no firearms permitted. There are two units thus far - one stationed in the south and other - its
reinforcement unit, is located in Bangkok;
3) The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials was also
translated and disseminated as a training manual to all relevant agencies;
4) The Southern Border Provinces Peace building Command also conducts an evaluation of its personnel's
overall performance periodically (3 to 6 months) to ensure efficiency in resolving the situation in the south in
a peaceful manner;
5) A number of cultural awareness trainings and language course have been organized for security
personnel working in the southern provinces of Thailand to enhance understanding among the local
community;
6) The Ministry of Defense and its Supreme Command Headquarters have periodically organized human
rights seminars, in conjunction with international military offices. (e.g., May 2005, a seminar on human rights
and laws governing conflicts of firearms);
7) The Royal Thai Police also gives high priority on the prevention of human rights violations by police
officers. It issued a human rights handbook and organized education and training programs for police
officers on human rights issues. (e.g., Training for police officers in the south by the Foundation for Human
Rights and Development in Yala).
490

Four years after independence, unrest again threatens EastTimor, T~ JAKARTA POST, May.17, 2006
p. 12, available athttp://www.etan.org/et2006/may/13/17military.htm(lastvisited Nov.1, 2006).
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492 Abigail B. LaBin, USMC, 1ih Annual Cobra Gold In Thailand, available at
http://www.pacom.millforumlWinter_98/cobraJhtml (last visited Nov.1, 2006).
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and energy to help fighting terrorism (along with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia,
and the Republic of the Philippines).493
Although the military training (COBRA GOLD) was commonly perceived to be a
sign of tacit support for US foreign policy, the Thai Government promotes such military
training because the Military Joint Task Force is a way for Thai Security Forces to
develop military skill and tactics. The Thai Government should not support the Military
Joint Task Force, however, if it is an endorsement of any particular US political policy
but only so long as it is merely an acknowledgement of the ongoing commitment both
countries have toward combating terrorist activity.

v -3

Modifying the Communist's strategies
As a result of Vietnam War (a conflict that provided numerous lessons regarding

counterinsurgency), Thailand faced to a bid for power from the Communist of Thailand
(the CPT).

The strategy of the Communist Party is to combat the state's greater mili-

tary power by mobilizing the people through the appeal to a counter-state. Direct
mobilization of a popular base and indirect mobilization through front organizations were
to be the party's main lines of operation. Further, the Communist Party used local
guerrilla units (main forces were never formed) to challenge government control of
certain areas tactically. The link operationally between the party and the guerrillas was a
clandestine infrastructure, the counter State, a local area in which the Communist of
Thailand control was deeply rooted and that functioned as a base for further expansion.
To establish authority in such areas, the Communist party employed terror. Recalcitrant
Military Cobra Gold, Global Security Organization, available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cobra-gold.hbn (last visited Nov.1, 2006).
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villagers, or those whose community standing made them symbols of government
authority (e.g., village headmen and schoolteachers), were selectively targeted. 494 The
Communist Party of Thailand continues to use the same strategies for committing acts of
violence as they have for the last twenty years. They have recruited new members of
political dissent. For instance, the hill tribe people, who have been typically treated as
second-class citizens, by the average Thai soldier, are frequently involved in hostile acts
against members of the population. The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) has taken
advantage of the hostility generated and stoked the fire created by the government's
discriminatory racial attitudes.

495

However, the new face of the dissident was dissimilar from the communists of
the 1970s and 1980s, as the communist - separatist struggle in southern Thailand was
rapidly transforming into a politico-religious conflict. Dissident ideologues were
becoming increasingly skilled at politicizing and mobilizing the targyt audience, using
~.

~

religion rather than nationalism as the selling point. The character of campaign was
changing from guerrilla warfare to urban terrorism as communists engaged in ambushes
and raid in populous areas. The dissidents mostly conducted assassinations and
bombings. Whereas the communists of the past operated mostly in the jungles and
mountains, the new wave of dissidence began to operate in the villages, towns and
cites. 496 The complexion of the problematic in southern Thailand is changing rapidly an
although much as changed from end of the cold war, the main strategies of these

494
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Rohan Gunaratna, & Arabinda Acharya , & Sabrina Chua, Conflict and Terrorism in
110, Marshall Cavendish Academic 2005.
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dissenting factions have remained the same. These groups continue to bid for power,
despite the changes in the world politics.
Today, the members of dissidents are the Ponok's teachers and religious leaders.
There is no arguable that the dissident movement in Southern Thailand has used pondok
as recruitment centers. The main strategies and approach of the communist party are not
different and have inspired the current group of dissidents in southern Thailand.

As General Saiyud Kerdpol stated:
An imperfect system itself "threw up" the manpower that became the
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). The people's war strategy,
combined with· a plenitude of manpower produced by government
abuses, allowed the Communist Party of Thailand to grow.
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To establish political control over the fonnerly contested areas and to meet future
challenges, the old strategies that the Thai Government have relied on should not be
forgotten and should be revised in the following ways:

*

Psychological operations, persuasion,

and using the

cooperation of civilians.

*

Development-for-security, with development understood to

be a socio-economic-political process.

*

497

Civic-action programs instituted and local forces formed.

See T.A.Marl< , cited in note 88 supra
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*

The democratic process to be brought in accord with

traditional demands by the populace for a just order, thereby
legitimizing the government.

*

The army's task to foster just such development as a counter.

*

All regular army and security force units in operational areas

were likewise placed under the CPM task forces, where they
work intimately with civil authority.

*

Offer amnesty with minimal security precautions, so as to

•
A
b'l'
.
entIce
uemo
I lZe Insurgents
to resume normaII'lVes. ./98

That is, the Thai Government should consider developing new capabilities adapted
from what can be learned from the past in order to meet future challenges. Even these are
old strategies but not completely antiquated; the government can adjust these strategies to
the current situations and apply them. In addition, one of the most important issues is that
the Government must realize is that as the heavy-hand tactics grew, so did the number of
dissidents.

v -4

International Cooperation
Any policy on terrorism cannot succeed alone. Any plan for peace between

nations needs mutual assistance and international cooperation.

In 1992, Thailand

developed the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act that forms a broad basis for
cooperation with other countries in criminal matters, e.g., taking testimony and
statements; providing documents, records and evidence for prosecution and search and

498

Ibid.
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j
! forfeiture of properties. The rest of the law is based on principles of double criminality
,~
l

i

1

1 and reciprocity that allow Thailand to extend assistance in criminal matters to virtually

1

I

every country.

The law is supplemented by the Treaties of Mutual Assistance in

Criminal Matters that Thailand has with five countries (United States, Canada, United
Kingdom, France and Norway). The Royal Thai Government set up the Committee of
Counter-International Terrorism (COCIT), which is responsible for the coordination
between policies and operational units. This measure was ProP9sed by the National
Security Council and endorsed by the Thai Cabinet in 1983, when the National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) was established in order to address the violence
afflicting southern Thailand and bring about a peaceful resolution by balancing security
with respect for .the rule of law and human rights. That is a good policy but not adequate.
Thailand has to do more to cooperate with international human rights organizations that
have as their goal protecting against civilians from violence.
One such instance of an effort to solve problems in the south is the cooperation
between the Thai Government and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
The Thai Government reaffirmed that the Government is willing to work with the
Organization of the Islamic Conference and with southern local communities to solve
problems by peaceful means. The Thai Government also avowed to keep an open mind,
welcoming the occasion to exchange opinions with the Organization of the Islamic
Conference to promote the constructive role of the peace-loving moderate Muslims
(which constitute the majority of the world's Muslims). In exchange, the Organization of
the Islamic Conference will try to help the communities in the southern Thailand. The
relationship between the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Thai
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Government is, nonetheless, a tenuous one and both sides must pay constant attention to
how the media reports on this ongoing dynamic. Public opinion is easily swayed by such
reports and media bias can often distort and exaggerate politically volatile situations.

An admirable instance of cooperation between both sides was Thailand facilitated
and arranged a visit by the Ole delegates to visit to Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. This
visit enabled the delegation to have a better understanding of the actual situation in the
southern part of Thailand. In the future, there should be a permanent office in the area
devoted to human rights and coordinating the joint efforts of the Thai Government with
the Muslim factions.

V . . :. 5 Conclusion
The short-term goal is to stop the dai'ly killing; the long-term goal is to stem the
ongoing violence. The success of such security measures depends largely upon funding,
military training, developing tactics and techniques through the cooperation on both a
domestic and international levels. Most importantly, there will be no success if the
problems in southeastern Thailand are seen as what could be solved over a short period or
without the cooperation from the diverse groups of people in this area and the Thai
Government.
In 2005, a hundred million hand-made paper origami birds were dropped over the
troubled Southeast region of Thailand with peace messages on the paper. The spectacle
showed, if anything, the great dedication of many Thai citizens (the creators of the birds
were primarily non-Muslims) to the cause of resolving the conflict but little practical help
in addressing the deep-seated problems of this conflicted region.
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Regardless of how the form or characteristic of the violence changes over time,
the solutions and recommendations that I suggest can be used in many different
circumstances. These ideas I believe apply not to resolving problems during the times of
violence but also to easing tension during peacetime.

By addressing the roots of the problem and the attempts to settle these disputes
through dialogue and acknowledging the legitimate aspirations of the Muslim people in
the south, there can be a deeper sense of connection between these people. There has
been little done by the Thai Government to encourage the people of this area to maintain
a proud expression of their cultural identity. This freedom of cultural expression should
be guaranteed by the Thai constitution within the framework of respect for the territorial
integrity of Thailand. The fairness of the Thai policies, the transparency of the justice
system, the effectiveness of security measures, the International cooperation and most
importantly, the concept of universal human rights -- all of these are what will make
southern Thailand forever peaceful.

********
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